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In August 1916, the native nomads of southern Semirechye rose in a popular rebellion 
that reduced the colonial presence in the region to several beleaguered towns and 
settlements. While the rebellion claimed over 3,000 victims in the settler society, the 
punitive actions of the authorities led to a far greater loss of life among the native 
communities. Beyond the loss of life, the uprising had much broader implications. The 
decimation of the nomadic population, which had shrunk to less than two thirds of its pre-
rebellion level, and the plans of the government to resettle the remaining nomads in the 
geographically isolated and resource poor area of Naryn suggest that the administration 
came to view the rebels as a potential threat not only to the well-being of the settlers, but 
also to the integrity and security of the colony at large. The rebellion had in effect 
engendered long-standing concerns among the Russian military and statesmen about the 
ability of the metropole to protect its borderlands and maintain sovereignty in the 
ethnically and religiously “alien” regions. Indeed, the then military governor of 
Semirechye, General Fol’baum, framed the rebellion in the strictly state-centred terms: 
“the situation” he said of the rebellion “could change so suddenly that the entire Russian 
enterprise will come to ruin in Semirechye.” 
 
Placing the uprising of 1916 and the region of Semirechye, where the uprising was at its 
most violent, at the heart of the broader political history of Russian imperialism, this 
thesis examines the forms and strategies of state-building in the colonial context. 
Semirechye’s frontier position – on the border with the Qing Empire – and its ethnic 
diversity make it an ideal region from which to study the relationship between the centre 
and the periphery. At the same time, treating the uprising of 1916 as a point of rupture, 
which had ushered in the “continuum of crisis” that engulfed the Russian Empire during 
World War I and determined, to a considerable extent, the course and content of the early 
Soviet policies in the region, allows us to understand how certain conceptions of 
nationality became central to questions of state security and sovereignty.  
 
Substantively, this study traces the political history of Semirechye from the early years 
of conquest and colonization in the second half of the 19th century until the beginning of 
World War II, which the region entered as a part of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Organized around the cross-cutting themes of empire, state, and nation, this thesis 
advances the key proposition – that sovereign power is predicated on the control of 
territory and population. Crucially, this study demonstrates that both the imperial and 
later Soviet state sought to impose and consolidate its power over the region’s landscape 
and peoples through the establishment and use of institutions, policies, and practices 
targeted at the management and supervision of Semirechye’s natural and human 
resources. Furthermore, by arguing that both governments sought to fashion popular 
loyalties, create a productive labour force, and develop the economy for the purposes of 
national defence, this thesis highlights the critical continuities between the imperial and 
Soviet practices and ideas in governing the region.  
 
By examining Semirechye as a zone of state formation, this thesis also illuminates the 
critical nexus of state-building and control over natural resources and foregrounds the 
relationship of asymmetry and dependence between the centre and the periphery 
accomplished through the seizure of the region’s vital resources – namely agricultural 




In order to develop these arguments, the thesis draws upon approaches from history, 
political science, and anthropology. Based on archival research, this study contributes to 
current debates on colonialism and state formation.  
 
Drawing attention to the security rationale of the state-sponsored programmes of nation-
building, such as the national delimitation and the policies of indigenization, implemented 
by the Soviet administration, this study offers a departure from the long-standing view of 
ideology as the primary engine of the state-led national construction in Central Asia. 
Instead, this thesis argues that the “affirmative action” principles of the early Soviet 
regime were grounded in the efforts of the government to mobilize resources of the region 
to maintain the regime’s internal and external security. Consequently, the harmonization 
of the Soviet and ethnic affiliations under the rubric of Soviet nations allowed the 
Bolshevik leadership both to enforce the boundaries of the state and to mobilize the 









































Note on Transliteration 
 
 
I have used the Library of Congress transliteration system for Russian and Kyrgyz 
language materials with some modifications. I have rendered ё as io for Russian sources 
and where the phonetic spelling of native terms demanded, I have used j instead of dzh. 
Original quotations have been left unchanged as have been established English spellings 
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This thesis emerged from a personal interest in the communal commemoration of the 
uprising of 1916 in the northern half of modern-day Kyrgyzstan, known before 1924 
national delimitation of Central Asia as a part of Semirechye or Jeti-Suu (Zhetisu in 
Kazakh). The history of the uprising, or urkun (exodus) in Kyrgyz, holds a deeply 
personal connection for me, as my seven of my great-grandfather’s ten siblings and his 
mother perished during the uprising and the subsequent reprisals against the rebels by 
both the colonial authorities and the settlers.1 Beyond the obvious tragedy of the loss of 
life, what particularly troubled me was a virtual absence of communal remembrance of 
the events. Although often upheld in the official pronouncements as the foundational 
event in the modern Kyrgyz history and the ground zero of Kyrgyz statehood in ethnic as 
well as territorial terms, the rebellion of native nomads is not an event that attracts mass 
popular celebrations in a way that the Victory Day, for example, does. In more informal, 
family settings, too, urkun is rarely brought up. My own family is instructive in this 
respect; it was not until after I started my doctoral research, that my grandmother related 
her father’s story to me. But even as she did, the story she told me was frayed, 
fragmentary, and incomplete, indicating that communal histories of the uprising were 
being lost. But why were memories being lost in a culture that prides itself on its bardic 
tradition and oral history-telling?  
The search for a potential answer to this question first pointed me in a familiar 
direction. Like many Central Asian historians of the region, I came to the conclusion that 
under the Soviet regime, communal memories that were at odds with official histories 
were silenced and eventually forgotten. Further research proved me partly wrong. While 
looking for both official and unofficial accounts of the uprising, I made a startling 
discovery that far from silencing the uprising, the Soviet historiography of the uprising 
of the 1920s celebrated and propagated this “movement of national liberation.” The extent 
to which the central government supported public commemoration of the uprising was 
truly astounding. The uprising was celebrated in the same way that the October revolution 
was; festivities were organized, brochures disseminated, books written, and theatre plays 
staged – all devoted to the subject of the rebellion. Even more intriguingly, the idea of the 
rebellion as the moment of national awakening, the first foray into independence, first 
emerged as a part of a state-sponsored campaign of development of national cultures. Put 
                                                          
1 Urkun is more properly translated as “panicky flight” than exodus, but as a term used primarily in referring to livestock 
herds, it may have negative connotations for many. 
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simply, the belief that the “national” uprising was the foundation of modern Kyrgyz 
statehood was shaped by Soviet rather than post-Soviet historians.  
My fascination at coming across these largely overlooked materials soon gave 
way to more troubling questions. The very different tone and content of the early Soviet 
historiography of the uprising of 1916 and its shift to the dogma of class-based “friendship 
of nations” seemed particularly problematic. The tectonic change in national 
historiographies and Soviet official culture more broadly in the early 1930s presented an 
obvious conundrum. Looming even larger, however, was the choice of a destructive 
ethnic conflict as the cornerstone of “national culture” of Soviet Kirghizia. Having 
identified the changing national historiographies as a platform from which the Bolshevik 
leadership sought to rally support for Soviet power among the largely indifferent or 
hostile native population, I began to ask myself why and how Semirechye, torn away by 
the civil war from the empire’s metropole, became a part of Soviet Russia in the wake of 
the war. By the same token, the failure of colonial rule, exemplified most dramatically by 
the native rebellion that led to the deaths of more than 3,000 Russian settlers and signalled 
the beginning of the civil war, raised the question of the expediency of conquering and 
managing a far-flung colony. Thus, the question which my research eventually boiled 
down to was simple: why, and by extension, how was Semirechye incorporated into the 
Imperial and later Soviet Russia?  
In broadest terms, this thesis investigates the logic and nature of Semirechye’s 
incorporation into the geographically large and ethnically diverse polity ruled from a 
single centre before and after the October Revolution. By examining the fundamental 
reconfiguration of the region and its pastoralist population in the course of the second half 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this thesis seeks to understand what this 
transformation reveals about the nature of the state and state-building. To complicate my 
argument, I analyse the strategies of state-building in the context of the imperial periphery 
and against the backdrop of cross-border challenges. In other words, I look at how the 
state was produced and constituted in the geographically distant, ethnically different, and 
politically contested borderland. 
But why study Semirechye? There are at least two good arguments in favour of a 
Semirechye-focused study. Beyond the obvious personal attachment to the place I 
consider home – my home city of Bishkek stands on the north-eastern edge of the region 
– Semirechye presents an interesting case study of one of the fault lines of the “Eurasian 
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conquest empires” identified by Alfred Rieber.2 As a multi-ethnic frontier whose 
boundaries were “solely established by force” during the conquest, Russian Semirechye 
displayed all six distinguishing features of what Rieber describes as “complex frontiers.”3 
Before and during the Russian conquest, Semirechye continued to be an area of rivalry 
for “political and economic domination” between “at least three polities,” including the 
Russian and Qing Empires and the Kokand Khanate. Because of this contest, 
Semirechye’s “border lines were frequently unclear, unstable, and porous.” Owing to its 
trans-border location, Semirechye was also an “area of trading and raiding by nomadic or 
semi-nomadic and settled populations even after…the incorporation of nomads into the 
imperial system.” At the same time, “large scale population movements resulting from 
warfare, invasions, migrations and colonization, both coercive and voluntary” meant that 
the Kirghiz and, to a lesser extent, Kazakh pastoralists of Semirechye were scattered “on 
opposite sides of state boundaries.” The “ambiguous loyalties” of the native nomads owed 
much to the colonial settlement of Semirechye, which the central government 
implemented in order to counter “the imagined and real threats to stability and security 
of the imperial order” and to “subdue the local populations.”4 The geographical location 
of Semirechye – at the crossroads of the nomadic Steppe and the oasis regions of 
Turkestan and on the border with the Qing China – makes it a unique vantage point from 
which to examine the cross-border dynamics of imperial state-building.  
Despite its importance, Semirechye remains understudied. The dearth of research 
on Semirechye is all the more surprising given a relatively large – and growing – number 
of studies on the oasis regions of Turkestan and the nomadic Steppe.5 The few existing 
studies of Semirechye generally fall in the category of social history and ethnography. 
The contributions by Svetlana Jacquesson and Tetsu Akiyama examine the interactions 
between the colonial administration and the Kyrgyz pastoralists of Semirechye.6 Where 
Jacquesson explores the informal forms of resistance employed by the native 
communities in response to the land seizures by the colonial authorities, Tetsu Akiyama 
                                                          
2 Alfred J Rieber, "The comparative ecology of complex frontiers," in Imperial Rule, ed. Alexei Miller and Alfred J. 
Rieber (Budapest: CEU University Press, 2004), 177; Alfred Rieber, The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5-78. 
3 Indeed, Rieber explicitly identifies Eastern Turkestan and the Ili Valley in particular as one these fault lines. Although 
Semirechye was separated from Ili (Kuldja) by the Tian Shan mountains, the borders between the two were porous, 
allowing mass population movements. Rieber, 196.  
4 Ibid., 178-79. 
5 For excellent studies of the Steppe, see Virginia Martin, Law and Custom in the Steppe, Ian Campbell, Knowledge 
and Power on the Kazakh Steppe. For equally good studies of the sedentary Central Asia, see Alexander Morrison, 
Russian Rule in Samarkand,  
66 Svetlana Jacquesson, "The Time of Dishonour: Land and Murder under Colonial Rule in the Tian Shan," Journal of 
the Economic and Social History of the Orient 55, no. 4-5 (2012); Tetsu Akiyama, "Why was russian direct rule over 
kyrgyz nomads dependent on tribal chieftains “manaps”?," Cahiers du monde russe 56, no. 4 (2015); Daniel Prior, 
"Heroes, Chieftains, and the Roots of Kirghiz Nationalism," Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 6, no. 2 (2006).  
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examines the role of the native elites, known as manaps, in mediating between the 
colonial administration and the native population. As purveyors of influence and political 
power in the native society, manaps are also discussed in the work of Daniel Prior, 
Benjamin Loring, and Jipar Duishembieva.7  
In terms of time frame and geographical focus, my thesis comes closest to 
Duishembieva’s thesis on the transformations of the northern Kyrgyz society and oral 
culture between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Duishembieva’s work 
explores the emergence of the sense of collective national belonging among the 
indigenous elites of northern Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, this thesis shares significant 
similarities with Benjamin Loring’s study of the Soviet state-building in Kyrgyzstan. Like 
Loring, I examine the critical junctures in the first two decades of Soviet power in 
Kyrgyzstan, including the land and water reforms of 1921-1922, national delimitation, 
and collectivization.  
At the same time, my work departs from Diushembieva’s and Loring’s studies in 
significant ways. To begin with, in contrast to Duishembieva’s study, which focuses on 
the agency of the native elites, my work puts the state in focus. Adopting a state-centric 
perspective from the International Relations, I treat the state both as an actor and as an 
agent of change.8 Put simply, I look at the policies of the Tsarist and Soviet Russia on the 
region and its inhabitants to discern their implicit logic and their implications for the 
project of state-building. I furthermore situate the state in the broader context of interstate 
competition, which distinguishes my perspective from Loring’s. By looking at how cross-
border developments shaped the domestic policies of the Tsarist and Soviet state in 
Semirechye, I point to the transnational nature of state formation.  
Similarly, the longue dureé approach to the history of Semirechye allows me to 
trace the crucial continuities between the Imperial and Soviet strategies and practices of 
domination and control. At the heart of my thesis, then, is an assumption of a “grand 
design” driving the Russian state’s conquest and integration of Semirechye into the 
Imperial and later Soviet polities. This grand design, I argue, constituted a set of policies 
implemented by the metropole, which were aimed at maintaining the cohesion of the state, 
protecting its borders, and cultivating the highly productive and loyal population. Put 
                                                          
7 Jipar Duishembieva, "Visions of Community: Literary Culture and Social Change among the Northern Kyrgyz, 1856-
1924" (University of Washington, 2015); Benjamin H Loring, "Building Socialism in Kyrgyzstan: Nation-making, 
Rural Development, and Social Change, 1921--1932" (Brandeis University, 2008). 
8 For a discussion of the place of the state in the IR theory, see Peter B Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda 
Skocpol, Bringing the state back in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). I drew my key insights, however, 
from the works of Alfred Rieber and Michael Reynolds. Rieber; Michael A Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash 
and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918 (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
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shortly, the respective governments of the Tsarist and Soviet Russia sought to build 
competent states capable of providing domestic stability and maintaining external 
security.  
Semirechye’s borderland position, its geographic proximity to the Qing China, 
and the highly mobile nomadic population with suspect loyalties and cross-border ties 
made it simultaneously an area of strategic importance and a source of constant security 
concerns. To eschew an overly deterministic approach to the history of Semirechye as 
driven by its geography, I provide a historiographic treatment of the concepts that guided 
the Russia’s expansion in the region to demonstrate that these concepts were shifting and 
contingent on a number of factors. Ultimately, this thesis aims to examine the ways in 
which the Tsarist and later Soviet Russia conceived of itself in relation to the native 
nomads of Semirechye and what implications this had for the region and its peoples.  
As an exploration of the relationship between the centre and the periphery, this 
thesis contributes to the growing body of literature representing the “imperial turn” in the 
historiography of the Tsarist Empire and Soviet Union.9 While building on the insights 
derived from these studies, this thesis also makes a contribution to the field by 
highlighting the significance of the hitherto overlooked borderland to the imperial 
projects of the centre. At the same time, this thesis problematizes the division between 
the Tsarist and Soviet states by emphasizing the remarkable similarity between the 
practices of state-building of the Tsarist and Soviet Russia. Ultimately, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, both the colonial and Soviet Semirechye was shaped by the dynamic 
interplay of “historical circumstances…physical geography, warfare and cultural 
change.”10 
Central to this study is an engagement with the history of the uprising of 1916 in 
Semirechye, which provides a perspective “from below” through the examination of the 
native response to the state policies. The chapter on the uprising, thus, forms the centre 
of gravity in the thesis, linking the Tsarist and Soviet periods. I seek to provide a 
conceptual and chronological framework of Semirechye’s incorporation into the Imperial 
                                                          
9 For an excellent survey of the “imperial turn” in the field of Russian and Soviet history, see Theodore R Weeks, 
"Nationality, Empire, and Politics in the Russian Empire and USSR: An Overview of Recent Publications," H-Soz-u-
Kult 29 (2012). The list of studies falling in the category is too extensive to be cited here, but for a sample selection of 
recent trends in the “imperial turn” scholarship, see Marco Buttino, Revoliutsiia naoborot: Sredniaia Aziia mezhdu 
padeniem tsarskoi imperii i obrazovaniem SSSR (Moscow: Zven'ia, 2007); Daniel R. Brower, Turkestan and the fate 
of the Russian Empire (London: Routledge, 2003); Rieber; Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: 
Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 1998). See also the following editions of Ab Imperio. 
Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space: “Organization of Political Space of Empires 
and nations,” 3 (2002) No. 2; Russian Empire: Borderlands and Frontiers, 4 (2003) No. 1; Conversations about 
Motherland: Individual and Collective Experiences of “Homeland”7 (2006) No. 2 
10 Rieber, 178. 
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and Soviet Russia. My primary archival sources come from the collections of the Kyrgyz 
State National Archive and the Manuscript Fund of the Kyrgyz National Academy of 
Sciences, as well as collections of documents published before and after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  
 Before I begin my discussion of the Tsarist and Soviet state-building projects in 
Semirechye, I would like to clarify several key concepts that I use throughout this thesis 
and that form the conceptual arch of the thesis. The fist concept addresses the relationship 
between “empires” and “nations.”11 Drawing on Nick Baron and Alexei Miller, I suggest 
that empires are not necessarily antithetical to nations and, as Alexei Miller has 
convincingly demonstrated, can promote national identities.12 Nick Baron, on the other 
hand, argues that “empires” and “nations” are not “real things,” but ideas and concepts. 
Furthermore, both “empires” and “nations” employ “similar strategies of domination.”13 
In the final analysis, I understand both “empires” and “nations” to be forms of statehood, 
which have more in common than they have differences.  
 The second concept I engage with widely in this study is the concept of space. By 
space I understand two separate but closely related analytical categories. To begin with, 
throughout the thesis I analyse Semirechye as a borderland and as a zone of state 
formation where claims to sovereignty were made and challenged.14 Secondly, I draw on 
Tomohiko Uyama’s argument that Asiatic Russia was a “space for asymmetric 
interaction” to examine space as both a resource and a “place” marked by hierarchies and 
inequalities.15 That is, I contend that by appropriating the physical space of Semirechye 
through the redistribution of land to the Russian settlers, the state created a relationship 
of inequality and dependence between the designated core of the state and the periphery.  
 The third concept that I employ is the concept of population politics proposed by 
Peter Holquist. I understand population politics to be concerned with population as a 
                                                          
11 For discussions of nations and empires in Russian and Soviet History, see Peter A Blitstein, "Nation and Empire in 
Soviet History, 1917–1953," Ab Imperio 2006, no. 1 (2006); Weeks; Mark R Beissinger, "Soviet Empire as" Family 
Resemblance''," Slavic Review  (2006).   
12 Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, eds., Nationalizing empires (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015).  
13 Nick Baron, ""Empire" and "Nation" as Categories of Spatial Politics and Historical Study: Methodological Notes 
for the Ab Imperio Roundtable," Ab Imperio, no. 2 (2002): 117, 20. 
14 For a good starting point to read more about borderlands, see I Gerasimov et al., "From the Editors: Probing the 
Limits of Historical Metanarratives: Imperial Boundaries," ibid.2003, no. 1 (2003).  
15 Tomohiko Uyama, Asiatic Russia: imperial power in regional and international contexts (Routledge, 2012), 7. On 
the “spatial turn” in Russian and Soviet history, see Kimitaka Matsuzato, Regions: a prism to view the Slavic-Eurasian 
world: towards a discipline of" Regionology" (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido Univ., 2000); Nick Baron, "New 
spatial histories of twentieth century Russia and the Soviet Union: Surveying the landscape," Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas  (2007); Malte Rolf, "Importing the" Spatial Turn" to Russia: recent studies on the spatialization of Russian 
history," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 11, no. 2 (2010); Willard  Sunderland, "Imperial Space: 
Territorial Thought and Practice in the Eighteenth Century," in Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930, ed. 




social aggregate to be shaped and acted upon.16 In my analysis of the Tsarist and Soviet 
policies, I tie the conceptions of population, which emerged in the nineteenth century to 
security concerns of the Tsarist and Bolshevik Russia.  
 The fourth concept that I borrow from an edited volume by Jane Burbank, Mark 
Von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev is their definition of “power.” By “power” they 
understand “institutions and designs.”17 At its simplest, power can be understood as a 
network of institutions, practices, and concepts that informed the conquest and the 
governance of the region. To conclude, this thesis will examine the “configurations of 
territory, populations, and power” in the colonial and Soviet Semirechye.18 At the same 
time, it will also emphasize the perpetuity of violence in the project of state-building, be 
it Tsarist or Soviet, and conclude that the enormous loss of life in the period between the 
conquest and the consolidation of Soviet rule in the region is a stark reminder of the 
human costs of establishing sovereignty and securing borders.  
 A note of caution before I proceed further. I use both “Kyrgyz” and “Kirghiz” to 
convey the original spelling used in my sources. Rather brazenly, I also use the terms 
nomadic and pastoralist interchangeably. It would be more correct to say that the Kyrgyz 
and Kazakhs, whom I call nomads, in fact practiced transhumance – short-distance 
seasonal migrations while maintaining permanent winter camps. Again, I use the term 
“nomads” or “pastoralists” to stay true to the sources I use throughout the thesis.  
This thesis is organized in a way that allows to highlight the state consolidation in 
the periphery by providing a chronological treatment of the Imperial and later Soviet aims 
and strategies as they related to the region and its population. By focusing on critical 
junctures in the history of Semirechye, such as its conquest, the native uprising of 1916, 
the civil war, and the policies of “socialist construction” in the first decade of Soviet rule, 
this thesis highlights the interventionist nature of state-making and the centrality of 
security concerns to state-building in the periphery.   
Chapter one explores the emergence of the concepts of territory and population 
and their centrality to the conquest and integration of Semirechye with the Imperial 
Russia. It looks at how the intersection between security concerns of the Tsarist state, 
colonial bias, and the population politics led to the central government’s attempts to 
secure Semirechye by moving large numbers of Russian peasants into the colony. It 
                                                          
16 Peter Holquist, "To count, to extract, and to exterminate: population statistics and population politics in late imperial 
and soviet Russia," in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor 
Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
17 Jane Burbank and Mark Von Hagen, Russian empire: space, people, power, 1700-1930 (Indiana University Press, 
2007), 5.  
18 Baron, "New spatial histories of twentieth century Russia and the Soviet Union: Surveying the landscape," 376.  
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argues that as the group of population whose lands were targeted for dispossession by the 
state, the nomads of the Steppe and Semirechye came to lose most.  
Chapter two combines the macro- and micro-analysis of the native rebellion of 
1916. By placing the uprising in the context of First World War and the mass mobilization 
of the population, this chapter explains the uprising’s high death toll and the decision of 
the central government to expel the surviving nomads into an isolated mountainous area 
of Naryn. Drawing on literature in anthropology, this chapter also highlights the 
contingent nature of the rebellion and its roots in perceptions of insecurity.  
Chapter three examines the civil war in Semirechye. It analyses the practices of 
state-building in the colony far removed from the metropole to explain how the colonial 
state in Semirechye survived despite the continuing and intensified ethnic and agrarian 
conflict. In discussing the continuing dispossession of the native nomads and their 
marginalization under the Provisional and later Bolshevik governments, this chapter 
highlights the russo-centric nature of the policies that allowed the Bolshevik to regain 
control of the region.  
Chapters four and five examine the key Soviet policies in Semirechye and later 
Soviet Kirghizia, including the land and water reforms of 1921-1922, the national 
delimitation of 1924-1925, the programme of regionalization in 1925-1926, and the 
collectivization of the native nomads. Both chapters demonstrate that the “development” 
programmes implemented by the Bolshevik state in Semirechye and later Soviet 
Kirghizia were not so much about development as they were about establishing and 
extending the state’s presence and control in the region. They show that depending on its 
objectives, the Soviet state employed both positive and negative policies to attract broad 
support or, conversely, to counter the potential threat. These chapters argue that in 
implementing these policies, the Soviet state sought to consolidate its grip on the 
population and territory of Semirechye. At the same time, these chapters argue that in 
significant ways, these policies arose in response to outside events and developments.  
The concluding chapters sum up the findings and open new prospects for research 
into the uprising of 1916 by discussing the communal memories of the rebellion, which 
prompted my initial interest in the subject, which led to writing this thesis. 
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Chapter I  
 
From Natural Frontiers to National Core: The Conquest and Administration of 
Semirechye  
 
The conquest of Central Asia represented the last stage in the long and gradual process of 
Russia’s colonization of the grasslands stretching, as Willard Sunderland points out, from 
what is today western Ukraine to the republics of Central Asia. Central Asia occupied a 
special place in a state that ruled population as diverse as catholic Poles and shamanistic 
Buriats. In addition to being Russia’s last “true” colony and its latest permanent territorial 
acquisition before the revolution, Central Asia was also the site of the empire’s last 
instance of confrontation with the nomadic people, whose rebellion in 1916 signalled the 
end of the autocracy, which ruled the vast lands between the Baltic Sea and the Pacific 
Ocean for more than five centuries.  
Russia was certainly no stranger to dealing with the nomadic peoples that haunted 
European imagination for centuries. In 1223, the Mongol armies defeated the armies of 
Kievan Rus’. The ensuing three centuries of Mongol lordship over the Russian lands came 
to be known as Mongol yoke. The yoke itself consisted as much of collaboration as of 
conquest and left lasting legacy of the extensive financial networks and taxation system. 
By the end of the fifteenth century, the crisis of succession in the Mongol Empire led to 
its weakening grip on the Russian lands.  
The next two centuries saw a reversal of fortune as the Muscovite state absorbed 
the former dominions of the vanquished Golden Horde. In the late 1600s, Russia was the 
largest contiguous state in the world. Between 1581 and the late nineteenth century, 
Russia’s Asian territories had expanded at an average rate of 20,643 square miles of 
territory annually. Only 1,530,000 square miles large in 1584, by 1899 the Russian 
Empire had acquired the territory of 8,660,282 square miles.1 By the end of the 18th 
century, the Russian Empire bordered the Ottoman, Persian, and Chinese empires.2  
 Yet, Russia’s heady advance into Central Asia had its own logic and dynamics. 
Driven largely by the shifting geopolitical concerns of the Tsarist government, the 
conquest of Turkestan and the Steppe, as the settled and nomadic halves of Central Asia 
became known to the Russian military, sought to complete the process of consolidation 
                                                          
1 Alex Marshall, The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1860-1917 (London: Routledge, 2006), 1.  
2 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 2.  
10 
 
of the imperial state. How this process unfolded and what motivations and events guided 
the Russia’s expansion into the region are the subject of this chapter. 
In the broadest terms, this chapter is an attempt to understand the grounds for and 
the mechanisms of the conquest of the mainly pastoralist regions of the Steppe and 
Semirechye by the Tsarist state. It does so by examining the conquest and administration 
of the Steppe region and Semirechye in the context of the concepts of territory and 
population outlined in the introduction.  
In examining the conquest of the nomadic Central Asia against the backdrop of 
inter-state competition between the Tsarist Empire and the cross-border states, most 
prominently the Qing China, as well as regional powers, notably the Kokand Khanate, 
this chapter will argue that security and state-building in the strategically important 
borderland were the primary considerations of the empire’s statesmen. I draw on 
Alexander Morrison’s contention that the “desire for a firmly demarcated, secure frontier” 
guided the conquest of Central Asia to argue that the imposition of Russian imperial 
authority rule in the region constituted the expansion and consolidation of the imperial 
state.3 The empire’s officials, historians, and geographers saw the conquest of the Steppe 
in terms of self-preservation of the imperial state.  
As a form of statecraft, the conquest enforced the boundaries of the growing state 
and centralized political rule, cultivating as the result the vision of a bounded and unified 
imperial space. As this chapter will demonstrate, this process was both complex and 
contingent on external factors. To begin with, the distance of the region from European 
Russia and its inhospitable terrain made the actual logistics of conquest difficult and 
costly.4 Furthermore, the efforts of the central government to project power over the 
nomadic lands by dispossessing and driving off their native inhabitants generated 
resistance of the nomads who raided the frontier settlements and rose in several violent 
rebellions.  
Adding to the difficulties of overcoming native resistance and extending the 
state’s reach into what imperial administrators perceived as a lawless space were the 
attempts of the Qing China to counteract the growing presence of Russia in the borderland 
                                                          
3 Alexander Morrison, "‘Nechto eroticheskoe’,‘courir après l'ombre’?–logistical imperatives and the fall of Tashkent, 
1859–1865," Central Asian Survey 33, no. 2 (2014): 165.  
4 For a discussion of the difficulties of mounting military campaigns under the conditions of dependence on camel 
transportation and the implications of this dependence for the Russian invasion of India, see "Camels and colonial 
armies: The logistics of warfare in central Asia in the early 19th century," Journal of the Economic and Social History 
of the Orient 57, no. 4 (2014).  
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it considered a part of its own sphere of influence and the disruptive behaviour of the 
oasis-based khanates of Turkestan seeking to restore their rule over the nomads.5  
The overlapping and disputed nature of loyalties in the Steppe borderland was a 
source of constant conflict and tension between the imperial state and the native society, 
further convincing the Tsarist military that stronger borders were necessary to defend the 
empire against outside aggression. Beginning from the eighteenth century, the imperial 
authorities built fortified lines consisting of fortresses, redoubts, and lighthouses along 
the frontier. These fortified lines anchored and defended the gradually advancing 
boundaries of the empire while simultaneously establishing the physical presence of the 
imperial state in the region. The stationing of permanent garrisons in the fortresses and 
the agricultural settlement of the frontier both facilitated the conquest of the Steppe and 
demanded further incursions into the outlying nomadic lands in order to prevent nomadic 
raids.  
But the imperial administrators did not rely only on force; they sought knowledge 
of the region and peoples that inhabited it. The conquest of the Steppe brought the 
imperial state into increased contact and conflict with the pastoralist communities of the 
region, compelling the Tsarist government to collect and categorize information about 
their new subjects. At the same time, the territorial expansion of the empire necessitated 
the mapping of its new dominions. The emergence of the idea of territorial sovereignty – 
the conception of state as a unified and bounded political space – in the eighteenth century 
gave further impetus to projecting idealized visions of firm state boundaries onto the 
seemingly unbounded landscape of the Steppe. As representations of this imagined 
geography, maps politicized natural landmarks by rendering them into “natural frontiers” 
and legitimized the conquest as the imperial statesmen sought to move the boundaries of 
the state closer to these “natural frontiers.”6  
                                                          
5 On the Russo-Chinese rivalry, see Sarah Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, 
New York: ME Sharpe, 1996). On the relationship between the nomadic Kazakhs and the Russian and Qing Empires, 
see Jin Noda, The Kazakh Khanates Between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian International Relations 
During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2016).  
6 For a comprehensive historical survey of the development of territorial notions of sovereignty, see Stuart Elden, The 
Birth of Territory (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
On the connections between cartography and the emergence of the concept of territorial sovereignty, see Jordan Branch, 
The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 2013). For a 
survey of the history of cartography in Imperial Russia, see Alexei Postnikov, "Outline of the History of Russuan 
Cartography," in Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World. Towards a Discipline of "Regionology", ed. 
Kimitaka Matsuzato (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000). On the role of cartography in the 
conquest of Central Asia, see Stanovlenie rubezhei Rossii v Tsentral'noi i Srednei Azii (XVIII-XIX vv.): rol' istoriko-
geograficheskikh issledovanii i kartografirovaniia: monografiia v dokumentakh (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi 
mysli, 2007). For two analyses of the role of “natural frontiers” in the Russian military campaigns against the Kokand 
Khanate and Kuldja in Eastern Turkestan, see Alexander Morrison, "Russia, Khoqand, and the Search for a "Natural" 
Frontier, 1863–1865," Ab Imperio 2014, no. 2 (2014); Svetlana Gorshenina, "Teoriia "estestvennykh granits" i 
zavoevanie Kul'dzhi (1870− 1871 gg.): Avtoportret rossiiskikh voenno-diplomaticheskikh elit Sankt-Peterburga i 
Turkestana " ibid.  
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Similarly, the territorial expansion of the empire had a profound impact on the 
ways in which the imperial state sought to govern the newly conquered territories. In 
response to the challenges of governing the space with few apparent “natural frontiers,” 
the Tsarist state developed the “spatial view of government,” where territory became a 
subject of tools and practices that allowed the state to “deepen its conceptual and physical 
grip” on the region.7 The implications of this turn to forms of state-building based on 
territorial control were far-reaching for the native population of the empire’s new Asiatic 
frontier. The territorial conquest of the Steppe brought its peoples under more direct rule 
by the Tsarist government, portending their transformation into colonial subjects.  
 
The Rise of Territorial State  
 
As Christopher Bayly notes, “the expansion of knowledge was not so much a by-product 
of empire as a condition for it.”8 In the Tsarist Russia, this expansion occurred as a part 
of a transition to the new modes of governance under the government of Peter I in the 
eighteenth century.9 Willard Sunderland traces this transition to the rise of cameralist 
thinking in the pan-European context and the increasingly ambitious visions of the 
Russian elites of the place of their state in European politics. It is no by coincidence, 
Sunderland notes, that after the military victory over Sweden, Peter’s official title 
changed from tsar to emperor and Russia became an empire.10  
 This change, as Sunderland points out, involved a profound transformation in the 
way the Russian elites understood the nature of the state and state power. Territorial 
space became simultaneously a “resource to be studied, managed, and exploited” and a 
“terrain to be shaped and moulded as the physical expression of state power.”11 In short, 
territory – understood by the Petrine establishment as both land and physical space – 
served as the basis and the source of state power. Sunderland distinguishes two stages in 
the transformation of thinking about territory from the emergence of a “new territorial 
order” during the Petrine and early post-Petrine periods to a period of “high territoriality” 
                                                          
7 Sunderland, 53.  
8 Christopher Alan Bayly and CA Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence gathering and social communication 
in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 56.  
9 Sunderland, 36. For a survey of cartography in pre-Petrine Russia, see LA Goldenberg, "Russian Cartography to ca. 
1700," in The History of Cartography, Volume Three: Cartography of the European Renaissance, ed. David Woodward 
(Chicago and London: 2007), 1852-904. For a cultural history of cartography in seventeenth-century Russia, see Valerie 
Ann Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom: The Land and its Meanings in Seventeenth-Century Russia (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
10 Sunderland, 36.  
11 Sunderland also adds that the Petrine establishment regarded territorial space also as a “symbol of national pride and 
a basis of national identity,” which I will discuss in the next chapter. Ibid.  
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in the late eighteenth century, which saw the consolidation of practices and ideas about 
this order.12 
 Part of this process involved an unprecedented interest in defining, mapping, and 
cataloguing the empire’s territorial possessions. Maps helped the imperial military and 
bureaucrats to assert claims over contested territories.13 As visual representations of 
imperial power, maps were integral to the conceptual and physical conquest of space. 
Through maps, the imperial elites imaged and imagined the empire’s dominions. 
Geographic knowledge also provided the expanding state with tools of ordering and 
organizing the empire’s territory and peoples by defining categories of ownership.14 Put 
simply, by knowing territory, the empire’s military and administrators could act on it.15 
Along with censuses and museums, maps, as Benedict Anderson argues, served as 
institutions of power.16 
 At the same time, maps supported a more exclusive vision of the empire. 
Cartography divided the world into bounded and carefully delimitated sovereign spaces, 
separated from each other by borders. As sites where states “stood face to” an enemy, 
borders became increasingly important to state-building.17 Borders simultaneously 
contained the empire and served as its defence lines. A heightened awareness of the 
significance of borders, which Sunderland aptly describes as “territorial consciousness,” 
was at once the result and the cause of the growing role of geography as a tool of statecraft 
and a scientific discipline in the service of the empire.18 In short, geography was one of 
the “knowledge-based systems of control and administration,” to quote Alexander 
Marshall.19   
                                                          
12 Ibid., 53. 
13 The literature on the relationship between cartography and imperial conquest is extensive. Some of the more recent 
studies include Steven Seegel, Mapping Europe's Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and 
Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Matthew H Edney, 
Mapping An Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009).  
14 The first cadastral survey undertaken by the government of Catherine the Great in 1765 and the territorial reforms 
begun ten years before the survey are a perfect illustration of this process. The survey was “designed to clarify land 
ownership in the countryside by drawing property lines and cataloguing the rural economic landscape through the 
compilation of tables and “economic notes,” while the reforms “aimed to clarify the administrative space of the state 
by (a) creating a new territorial division based on a new space of provinces and districts (initially the namestnichestvo, 
then the modern guberniia and uezd) that were smaller and had roughly uniform populations; and (b) extending this 
new structure into borderland areas that had previously been subdivided and administered according to local historical 
practice.” Sunderland, 48-49. 
15 Ibid., 34.  
16 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New 
York: Verso Books, 2006), 163-86.  
17 Peter Sahlins, "Natural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century," The American 
Historical Review  (1990): 1426. 
18 Sunderland, 37.  
19 Marshall, 184.  
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The history of Russia’s expansion into the Steppe and further into Turkestan is 
particularly illustrative of this dynamic. Before the Russian troops could advance, 
“military-scientific expeditions” were dispatched to survey and map areas suitable for 
conquest.20 These expeditions, according to the eighteenth-century statesman and 
ethnographer, Vasilii Tatishchev, were “extraordinary enterprises, usually involving 
troops, carried out by sea or across land, and placed under the command of a talented 
officer.”21 In addition to maps, explorers kept detailed logs and made detailed 
descriptions of surveyed lands and peoples that they encountered during their trips. 
Furthermore, if considered within the realm of possible, these expeditions would also 
attempt to impose Russian rule in new territories.22  
 The first such mission to Central Asia was dispatched by Peter I in 1714.23 
Consisting of 7,000 troops, including “two engineers, two merchants, and several naval 
officers” and armed with cannons, the expedition was entrusted with the dual task of 
exploring the upper reaches of Amu-Darya for gold deposits and convincing the Khan of 
Khiva to submit to Russian rule.24 Although a disaster in military terms – the head of the 
expedition Prince Alexander Bekovich-Cherkassky and his troops were slaughtered or 
sold to slavery – the expedition succeeded in collecting the topographic and geographic 
data of the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea.  
The Russo-Persian war of 1722-1723, in which the Russian army pushed further 
into the Safavid dominions in the Caspian and the Caucasus in an attempt to thwart the 
Ottoman designs in the region, produced a well detailed map of “the Caspian Sea and the 
Uzbek land.” The map provided detailed drawings and descriptions of the main water 
ways, trade routes, and political borders of the region.25 Another map of the “Kirghiz-
Kaisak Steppe” was compiled by General Major Iakov Bouver sometime between 1787 
and 1794. The map recorded the territories of the Junior and Senior Kazakh Hordes (zhuz 
in Kazakh), the Karakalpaks, and the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.26 Another map 
published at about the same time was compiled by Ivan Liutov, the chief quartermaster 
                                                          
20 More on military-geographic exploration in Russia, see Willard Sunderland, "Exploration in Imperial Russia," in 
Reinterpreting Exploration: The West in the World 
ed. Dane Keith Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand, 2014), 135-53. 
21 Sunderland, 40.  
22 Sunderland, 139.  
23 Strictly speaking, the first mission to Central Asia was dispatched by Peter’s father, Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich. David 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, "Paul's great game: Russia's plan to invade British India," Central Asian Survey 33, 
no. 2 (2014): 144.  
24 Ibid., 139.  
25 Postnikov, Stanovlenie rubezhei Rossii v Tsentral'noi i Srednei Azii (XVIII-XIX vv.): rol' istoriko-geograficheskikh 
issledovanii i kartografirovaniia: monografiia v dokumentakh 67-68.  
26 N. E.  Bekmakhanova, Formirovanie mnogonatsional'nogo naseleniia Kazakhstana i Severnoi Kirgizii (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1980), 48.  
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of the Orenburg corps. Liutov’s map provided information on the economy of the region, 
its borders, as well as its fortresses, towns, and trade routes.27  
In 1797, Paul I established the Map depot, which became a central archive for the 
state’s collection of geographic and topographic maps. It also functioned as a special 
office for geographers and cartographers to compile and prepare maps for state 
intelligence.28 In 1812, the Map Depot had been replaced by the reformed Military-
Topographical Depot, divided into six specialized branches, producing and compiling 
clerical, topographic, astronomical, and mechanical data as well as engraving and 
archiving this data.29 
As the empire pushed further into Central Asia in the nineteenth century, the 
Depot produced more detailed and accurate maps. In contrast to the maps compiled by 
the eighteenth-century geographers, the maps produced by the Military-Topographical 
Depot used geodetic data, were properly scaled, and specified longitude and latitude 
values.30 
Along with geographic data, the expeditions into the Steppe collected 
ethnographic and demographic data. In 1803, for example, Lieutenant Iakov 
Gaverdovskii, despatched to Bukhara as the head of an armed caravan, collected data on 
the nomadic Kazakhs he encountered during the trip. Gaverdovskii described the social 
structure of the nomads of the three zhuzes, their political organization, economy, and 
even the system of seasonal migrations.31 In 1809, translator Andrei Putintsev described 
the Kazakh legal system after his trip to Kuldja in Chinese Turkestan.32 In 1825, an armed 
expedition of 50 Cossacks, accompanied by military doctor Fadei Zibbershtein, reached 
Semirechye, where Zibbershtein collected data on the Kazakhs of the Senior zhuz and the 
Kyrgyz of the Bugu tribe.33 The first maps of Semirechye were compiled by the zoologist 
Leopold von Schrenk and naturalist Grigori Karelin between 1840 and 1843.34 Shrenk’s 
and Karelin’s maps, along with the extensive botanical collections, were soon followed 
by others. By the late 19850s, Russian military geographers, such as Alexander Vlangali, 
Mikhail Khomentovskii, and most famously, Piotr Semenov (Tian-Shanskii) and Chokan 
Valikhanov, had surveyed and mapped much of southern Semirechye, parts of the Tian 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 49.  
28 Seegel, 72.  
29 Ibid., 74.  
30 Bekmakhanova, 49; I. V.  Erofeeva, ed. Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikakh XVI-XX vekov. Tom V. Pervye 
istoriko-etnograficheskie opisaniia kazakhskikh zemel’. Pervaia polovina XIX veka (Almaty: Daik-press, 2007), 6-14. 
31 Bekmakhanova, 49.  
32 Ibid., 54.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Shnitnikov, V. N. ed., Dzhetysu (Semirech’e). Estestvenno-Istoricheskoe Opisanie Kraia (Tashkent: Uzbekskoe 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1925), 5-6.  
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Shan mountain range on the border with Chinese Turkestan, and the cross-border Ili 
Valley.35  
An increasing demand for military intelligence on new territories and their 
population led to the further expansion and institutionalization of military geography in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.36 The exceptional importance the imperial 
military attached to knowing their new dominions and subjects in Asia was reflected in 
the 1866 decision of the Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin to establish topographical 
sections staffed by 20-40 personnel in the new military districts of Orenburg, Western 
and Eastern Siberia, and Turkestan.37 
 
Knocking on India’s Gates: Russia’s Conquest of the Steppe  
 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia’s eastward expansion had brought it 
into close proximity to the lands of rival Junghar and Kazakh factions. The increased 
contact with the nomads of the Steppe and the gradual encroachment of the Russian 
frontier on their territories made Russian fortresses and garrisons subject to the frequent 
nomadic raids. Wary of the raids and the mounting hostilities between the Junghars and 
the Kazakhs and the threat that it posed to trade with Bukhara, which connected the 
Russian traders with the Mughal India, the authorities came to increasingly rely on the 
Kazakhs’ cooperation.38 
 Eager to establish the Russian presence in the Steppe and to find a reliable trade 
route with the Mughal India in the increasingly tumultuous Steppe, Peter despatched two 
military expeditions to Khiva and the Junghar territory. The first expedition, led by the 
unfortunate Bekovich-Cherkassky, ended in a disaster as the Prince and his men were 
taken captive or slain at the hands of the Khivans. The second expedition under the 
leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Buchholz ended less heroically. Although 
Buchholz returned to Saint Petersburg alive, he lost most of his 3,000-strong troops and 
faced harsh criticism, leading to his demotion.39  
                                                          
35 Postnikov, Stanovlenie rubezhei Rossii v Tsentral'noi i Srednei Azii (XVIII-XIX vv.): rol' istoriko-geograficheskikh 
issledovanii i kartografirovaniia: monografiia v dokumentakh 228-34; Morrison, "Russia, Khoqand, and the Search for 
a "Natural" Frontier, 1863–1865," 171. 
36 On the emergence of professional military intelligence in the imperial Russia, see Marshall; David 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce W Menning, eds., Reforming the Tsar's army: military innovation in 
Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 133-88. 
37 Marshall, 184-85.  
38 Khodarkovsky, 148.  
39 Ibid.  
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Despite the failure of the expeditions, Peter was not deterred. Although the 
expeditions failed to deliver on Peter’s ambitions, they convinced him that the Steppe was 
“both the key and the gates to all of Asia” and that because the Kazakhs “were nomadic 
and unreliable people” they “ought to be under the Russian protection so that it is possible 
to establish through them communication with all the Asiatic countries” (chtob tol’ko 
chrez ikh vo vsekh aziatskikh stranakh komonikatseiu imet’).40  
In the following decades, Russia came knocking resolutely on these gates. The 
continued enmity between the Junghars and the Kazakhs presented the imperial 
government with a threat and an opportunity. Suffering defeat from the Junghars, between 
1718 and 1730s, the Kazakhs of the Junior Horde sent several envoys to the Russian 
government with the request for Russian protection. In 1731, the Khan of the Junior 
Horde, Abulkhayir, swore allegiance to the Russian emperor.41  
As the Russian envoy to the Kazakhs, Muhammed Tevkelev soon found out, 
however, the Kazakhs gave oaths of allegiance out of political expediency to offset the 
Junghar expansion and for the sake of “payments and presents” from Russia.42 To 
complicate things further, not everyone agreed to accepting Russian suzerainty; 
Abulkhayir had neither consulted many of his notables nor had full power over them.43 
The lack of earnestness on the part of the Kazakhs was matched by the unwillingness of 
the Russian authorities to extend their new subjects protection against the empire’s other 
subjects. 
To keep their unruly new subjects in check and to reduce the government’s 
dependence on untrustworthy intermediaries – Abulkhayir’s lukewarm submission was 
duly noted by Tevkelev – he recommended building a fort on the River Or under the 
pretext that it was requested by Abulkhayir.44 The construction of the main fort and a 
chain of smaller fortifications would secure the trade caravans and ensure the compliance 
of the nomads by denying the nomadic communities access to their summer pastures and 
creating a sham Kazakh court consisting of de-facto hostages from among the native 
                                                          
40 Ibid., 149; K. A.  Suteeva, "Russkie voennye istoriki XIX v. o prichinakh i motivakh dvizheniia Rossii na vostok (v 
Sredniuiu Aziiu i iuzhnyi Kazakhstan)" (paper presented at the Pervye nauchnye chteniia pamiati E. M. Zalkinda, 
Barnaul, 2003), 104. 
41 Tevkelev A. I., "Donoshenie perevodchika Kollegii inostrannykh del v Kollegiiu inostrannykh del o priniatii 
rossiiskogo poddanstva kazakhami Mladshego i Srednego zhuzov ot 5 ianvaria 1732 g. ," in Zhurnaly i sluzhebnye 
zapiski diplomata A. I. Tevkeleva po istorii i etnografii Kazakstana (1731-1759 gg.) Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh 
istorichnikakh., ed. I. V. Erofeeva (Almaty: Daik-press, 2005), 53-64. Khodarkovsky, 153; Alan Bodger, "Abulkhair, 
Khan of the Kazakh Little Horde, and His Oath of Allegiance to Russia of October 1731," The Slavonic and East 
European Review 58, no. 1 (1980). 
42 Khodarkovsky, 154.  
43 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1987), 32. 
44 Khodarkovsky, 155-56. 
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notables.45 A year after Tevkelev’s visit and recommendations, the government formed 
the Orenburg expedition headed by the Ober-Secretary Ivan Kirilov, who was tasked with 
developing the plan for the Fort Orenburg. In March 1734, Kirilov presented the proposal 
on “retaining the Kirghiz as Russian subjects and the ways of governing them 
(upravliat’)” and the ethnographic study of “the Kirghiz-Kaisak and Karakalpak 
hordes.”46  
Kirilov endorsed Tevkelev’s recommendations. In presenting his arguments in 
favour of constructing a fortified line along the new frontier, Kirilov emphasized the 
military utility of the fortifications, which would secure the southern frontier of the 
empire by breaking up potential nomadic alliances or, conversely, preventing hostilities 
between the various groups and factions and their raids on Russian settlements, and 
advancing the frontier to the Junghar territory.47 At the same time, the fort would also 
strengthen the Russian claims to the region and restrain the appetites of the Junghars and 
the Persians.48 
 In practice, the Orenburg fort would continue the chain of fortifications that 
emerged along the nomadic frontier in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Orenburg 
was critical to the conquest of the Steppe, but a number of smaller fortifications had 
already been erected by the earlier expeditions. The first fortifications in the Steppe were 
built already in 1717 by the expeditions of Bekovich-Cherkassky and Buchholz, although 
only one of them, the Omsk fortress, was not destroyed by the nomads.49 The construction 
of the Omsk fortress was soon followed by the founding of the Semipalatinsk fortress in 
1718, the Ust-Kamenogorsk fortress in 1719, and the Koriakovskii Forpost in 1720. By 
1725, the Irtysh Line – so called because the forts were erected along the Irtysh River – 
included 7 fortresses that were guarded by 489 Cossacks. Between the 1730s and the 
1750s, the Line extended in three directions, forming new lines of fortifications. To the 
West, the Yaik, Orenburg, Uisk, and Ishim Lines were formed; to the North, the 
Kuznetsko-Kolyvansk Line, and to the East, the Irtysh Line was extended in 1745.50 By 
1755, the three Lines formed the Siberian Line, which stretched for 2,991 versts (about 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 
46 T. A.  Lobashkova, ""Otpravili dlia Nashego interesa v Nashi podannye zemli…": Donosheniia I. K. Kirilova iz 
Orenburgskoi ekspeditsii. 1734-1735 gg.," Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 1 (2002): 205.  
47 Khodarkovsky, 156; Lobashkova,  205. 
48 Khodarkovsky, 156. 
49 To be fair, the three other forts were rebuilt later in the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
when the Russian empire had conquered the region in its entirety.  
50 Virginia Martin, Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the 
Nineteenth Century (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 61.  
19 
 
3,190 kilometres) and consisted of 18 fortresses, 13 outposts, 31 redoubts, 23 stations, 
and 35 beacons.51  
 The construction of the Lines – facilitated by the submission of Khan Ablai of the 
Middle Horde in 1740 – widened Russia’s presence in the Steppe and, as Michael 
Khodarkovsky argues, signalled its impending colonization.52 Reflecting on the role of 
fortresses and the fortified lines in the conquest of the Steppe a century later, the War 
Minister Dmitrii Miliutin  recognized the significance of the fortresses in the Russian 
occupation of the Steppe and the “consolidation” (uprochenie) of Russian rule among the 
“nomadic tribes.”53 
 The fortresses were indispensable to the conquest and administration of the new 
territories; they enhanced claims to the sovereign rule in the Steppe and provided a 
physical representation of the empire.54 By housing permanent garrisons, the fortresses 
projected military might and political power of the state on the new subjects. As sites of 
military defence, the fortresses marked and enforced state boundaries, punishing 
trespassers and policing the frontier zone.55 In substance, the fortresses established the 
state’s presence in the distant and “savage” borderlands, allowing the imperial 
government to “tame,” to borrow Sunderland’s term, the nomadic inhabitants of the 
Steppe.56 The presence of permanent troops likewise enabled the imperial administrators 
to secure the roads, levy taxes, and legitimize the conquest and occupation of the new 
territories.  
 Equally importantly, the fortresses paved the way for the colonization of the 
Steppe. A chain of settlements emerged behind the Lines, which supplied the garrisons 
with produce. To further support the colonization of the Steppe and where peasants were 
unwilling to move to the new frontier, the government resettled convicts. Beginning from 
the 1760s, the fortresses of the Siberian Line were resettled with convicts in addition to 
Cossacks and regular peasants. In autumn 1771 alone, for example, about 6,000 convicts 
were resettled behind the Line with 4,000 more expected to be resettled shortly.57 
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The growth of sedentary agriculture in the place of nomadic pasturelands rendered 
the landscape of the Steppe more familiar and pushed the state’s interior further into the 
nomadic territories. The construction of the fortresses and the emergence of colonial 
settlements prohibiting the nomads’ passage to rich pasturelands caused the justified 
anger among the Kazakhs, who responded with more raiding. In 1765, to protect the 
population of the Line from raiding, a “ten-verst tract” (desiativerstnaia polosa) was 
formed on the left bank of the Irtysh River.58  
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, a strong consensus emerged about the 
need to move the Line 100-150 versts further into the Steppe. Among the most fervent 
supporters of the new Line was the Governor-General of Orenburg, Vasilii Perovskii. The 
construction of the new Line, Pervoskii argued, would accomplish two goals. Firstly, the 
expulsion of the Kazakhs from the novolineinaia (“new line”) area would protect the 
settler population from raiding. Secondly, the Line would separate the Kazakhs from the 
Bashkirs, thereby preventing the potentially dangerous contacts between the nomadic 
frontier peoples. The construction of the line was completed between 1835 and 1837. The 
new Line was 500 versts (533 kilometres) long and consisted of 5 fortresses, 15 redoubts 
and pickets surrounded by moats and ramparts with beacons.59 The Line added 435,000 
dessiatines of the former nomadic lands to the Cossack landholdings.60 In the next two 
decades, the authorities moved the Line yet again, transferring more land to the Cossacks. 
In 1862, the new Governor-General of Western Siberia, Alexander Duhamel (Diugamel’) 
prohibited the settlement of Kazakhs within the 10-verst zone. “Significant improvements 
to the existing winter camps (zimovki)” were expressly banned to ensure “the removal of 
the Kirghiz (Kazakhs).”61  
 
Defensive Conquest: The Russia’s Annexation of Semirechye  
 
Understandably, the discontent of the Kazakhs, who were forced off their lands, escalated, 
leading to more raids on the Cossack settlements, which in turn prompted construction of 
new fortresses and further advancement of the Line into the Steppe. Desperate to reclaim 
their lands or, at the very least, to be able to access the pastures, the Kazakhs rose in 
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several violent rebellions in the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the 
nineteenth centuries. In 1773-74, some Kazakhs joined forces with the leader of the 
renegade Cossacks, Emel’ian Pugachev, in return for the promises of “land, water, 
pastures, arms and munitions, salt, grain, and lead.”62 The “Syrym rebellion” – over the 
Kazakhs’ right to use the pasturelands between Volga and Yaik – flared in 1782-83 and 
lasted until the death of its leader Syrym Batyr in 1799.63 Yet more rebellions, led by 
Isatai Taimanov of the Bukei Horde and Kenesary Kasymov of the Middle Horde, 
followed in the 1830s and 1840s.  
 Although undoubtedly bothersome, the nomadic rebellions provided the imperial 
authorities with a reason and an excuse to occupy more territories. The empire’s military 
justified the conquest of the “militant nomads,” whose “wild hordes” put Russian borders 
“in constant danger of raids” and threatened to “revive the horrors of Batu Khan’s 
invasion (of Russia),” as an act of self-defence.64 
  In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian advance began to encroach 
on the territory of the Khanate of Khiva. Claiming authority over the Kazakhs migrating 
between the Caspian Sea and the lower Syr-Daria, the government despatched a young 
ensign of the Orenburg Line Battalion, Ian (Ivan in some sources) Vitkevich, to the 
Kazakhs of Syr-Daria in 1835. Vitkevich’s task was to hamper any attempts of the Khiva 
and Bukhara khanates to spread influence among the Kazakh subjects of the empire and 
to impose their authority on the Kazakhs who had not yet submitted to Russian rule.65 
Vitkevich’s report revealed the critical weaknesses of Russia’s position in the region. The 
“power and influence” of Russian rule, Vitkevich noted, “did not extend beyond the 
frontier line of Ural and did not command respect of either Kaisaks (Kazakhs) or the 
sedentary areas (oblasti) of Central Asia…Except for the Kaisaks who live near the Line, 
Kaisaks have not the faintest conception of their allegiance (poddanstvo).” 66  
 The British invasion of Afghanistan in the end of the decade sealed the Russian 
government’s decision to send a military expedition against Khiva. On the face of it, the 
expedition aimed to free the captured Russian slaves, but the records of the special 
committee, which convened in March 1839 to discuss the expedition, suggests that 
“beyond its stated principal aim,” the expedition had “another, still more important: to 
establish and consolidate the influence of Russia in Central Asia, weaken the long-
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standing impunity of the Khivans, and especially that constancy with which the English 
government, to the detriment of our industry and trade, strives to spread its supremacy in 
those parts.”67 Although the Khiva expedition never reached its destination, the Russian 
expansion into the nomadic territories continued.68 
 The construction of the Kopal fortress at the mouth of Syr-Daria in 1847 brought 
Russia into confrontation with the Kokand Khanate, which claimed authority over the 
Senior Kazakh Horde and the Kyrgyz tribes of Semirechye. A “reasonably successful 
state,” the Kokand Khanate was “an aggressive, ambitious, expansionist rival to Russia”69 
Although relatively young, the Kokand Khanate was an ascendant power in the region. 
Beginning from the second half of the eighteenth century, the rulers of Kokand sponsored 
increased urbanization, the expansion of irrigation agriculture, and sought contacts with 
both India and China.70 It had a regular army comprised of professional soldiers and 
conscripts who were trained to use gunpowder weapons, including muskets and siege 
cannons.71 Like Russia, Kokand, too, sought to establish control of the nomads in both 
the Steppe and Semirechye and employed remarkably similar methods to achieve its 
goals.  
By 1834, the Kokanese army had conquered the northern Kyrgyz and built a chain 
of fortresses that stretched for 500 versts (533 kilometres) and connected Tokmak in the 
north and Suzak in south.72 Much like the Russian government, the Kokanese settled their 
fortresses with the sedentary “Sart” population, which supplied the garrisons. The largest 
fortress of Pishpek, for example, was home to 400 “Sart” households.73  
Although the increased competition for land among the northern Kyrgyz tribes 
and the pressure of the Kokand Khanate forced some of the tribes to request Russian 
protectorate, the Russian authorities remained deeply suspicious of the nomads. The 
shifting loyalties of the Senior Horde and the Kyrgyz and the presence of the Kyrgyz 
among the Kokand’s political elites gave the Russians a good reason to doubt their oath 
of allegiance. Compounding the concerns of the empire’s military was the reported 
interest of the Qing government in the Kyrgyz (dikokamennaia orda, “the wild rock 
horde”) of Semirechye and their attempts to “enforce claims to influence in the horde.”74 
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 Russia’s commitment to conquering the region pursued several goals at the same 
time. Of prime importance was the defense of the vulnerable southern frontier against the 
depredations of the Kokand Khanate and the establishment of the fixed and well-defended 
state boundary in the Steppe. An ultimate solution lay, in the view of the empire’s 
military, in the Russia’s movement towards the “natural” frontiers, which at different 
times meant an imaginary string of lakes between the Syr-Daria and Lake Balkhash, the 
Kara-Tau mountain range and the River Arys.75 To do so, the military recommended to 
unify the New Line and the recently formed Syr-Daria Line, enclosing Semirechye within 
the Russian boundaries and capturing Tashkent.76 Advising St. Petersburg in January 
1859, the Governor-General of Western Siberia, Gustav Gasfort, argued that by capturing 
the Kokanese fortresses of Tokmak, Aulie-Ata, and Suzak and connecting them with the 
fortress of Verny would give Russia “a firm state boundary” (tverduiu gosudarstvennuiu 
granitsu).”77 This would put a check on the Kokand’s expansion and establish Russian 
authority over the Kazakhs of the Senior Horde and the Kyrgyz of Semirechye. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Gorchakov, had further emphasized the suitability 
of Semirechye – “fertile, well wooded, and watered by numerous watercourses” – to the 
“regular colonization, which alone can prepare a future of stability and prosperity for the 
occupied country.”78  
Of equal importance was Semirechye’s proximity to “Kashgaria (Chinese 
Turkestan), the vast and fertile (obshirnaia i plodonosnaia) province with a population of 
more than a million, separated from China and the English dominions in India by the 
Mus-Dag passage…and a relatively small, though mountainous, zone (prostranstvo); 
bordering with Afghanistan and the Kokanese domains in the west; and finally, adjoining 
a part of the disputed (sic, somnitel’nye) possessions of the  Kirghiz (buruty) in the north,” 
which made “Kashgar important in a political sense for Russia as well as England.”79 
 Unlike the conquest of the Steppe, the conquest of Semirechye was swift, though 
beset by the return of the Kokanese troops, which rebuilt the destroyed fortresses and 
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reasserted their rule over the Kyrgyz and the Kazakhs of the Great Horde. The conquest 
of Semirechye began with the capture of the Kokanese fotress of Taushubek in the north 
of Semirechye in 1851. Two years later, Russian troops led by the then governor of 
Orenburg, Vasily Perovsky, seized another Kokanese fortress, the Ak-Mesjid. The 
establishment of Verny – a fortified garrison town that would anchor the Russian line of 
defense into a “firm state boundary” – in 1854 made the conquest of the region all but 
inevitable. Between 1862 and 1864, the Russian forces captured the key Kokand’s 
fortresses in southern Semirechye, including Pishpek, Tokmak, Naryn, and Kurtka. Such 
a rapid advance towards the Qing borders alarmed both the Qing and European powers. 
In defending their new conquest, the imperial administrators invoked their civilizing 
mission. The rhetoric of Russia’s civilizing influence on the “half-savage” nomads was 
put to a particularly good effect by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Gorchakov 
in his infamous 1864 circular on Russia’s policies in Central Asia:  
The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilised States which are 
brought into contract with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social 
organization. In such cases, it always happens that the more civilized State is forced, in 
the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain 
ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make more 
undesirable neighbours. First, there are raids and acts of pillage to be put down. To put a 
stop to them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect 
submission. This result once attained, these tribes take to more peaceful habits, but are in 
their exposed to the attacks of the more distant tribes.  
The State is bound to defend them against their depredations, and to punish those 
who commit them. Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically recurring 
expeditions against an enemy, whom his social organization makes it impossible to seize. 
If, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is soon forgotten; 
its withdrawal is put down to weakness. It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing 
but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization 
has as yet to hold upon them. The work has then always to be done over again from the 
beginning.  
In order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are 
established in the midst of these hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon 
them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or less forced submission. But 
soon beyond this second line, other still more distant tribes come in turn to threaten the 
same dangers and necessitate the same measures of repression. The State thus finds itself 
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forced to choose one of two alternatives, either to give up this endless labour and to 
abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, rendering all prosperity, all security, all 
civilization an impossibility, or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and deeper into 
barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expenses increase with every step in 
advance,  
Such has been the fate of every country which found itself in a similar position. 
The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her Colonies, England in 
India – all have been forced, less by ambition than by imperious necessity, into this 
onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know when to stop.80  
 A somewhat more prosaic reason was cited by historian Vladimir Dolinskii, who 
declared that Russia “must act decisively or renounce its possessions in Asia... enclosing 
the state within the boundaries of the early seventeenth century.”81 Another historian and 
the former Lieutenant General, Mikhail Terent’ev, put the logic of the conquest in even 
blunter terms: “Baring (obnazhenie) of the state borders,” he said, “amounts to the 
renunciation of self-defence (samozashchita), of one’s own political role.”82  
 The Muslim rebellion (1864-1869) in the Ili region (Kashgaria) and the overthrow 
of the Qing administration brought the security concerns of the Russian military to the 
fore.83 On the one hand, the colonial administration of Semirechye was alarmed by the 
reported flight of the Russia’s Kyrgyz to Ili to join the rebels.84 On the other hand, the 
rebellion created the prospect of an independent Muslim state bordering the Russian 
domains in Turkestan.85 Certainly, the closure of the Russian consulate in Kuldja and 
Chuguchag, the assault on the Russian consul Konstantin Pavlinov in Kuldja, the 
suspension of trade, the influx of refugees, and the increased raiding of trade caravans 
boded ill for the security of Russian Semirechye and Turkestan in general.86 To make 
matters worse, Russian intelligence reports that after capturing Kashgar, Turfan and the 
Muzart passage, the leader of the rebels, Iakub Bek was going to capture Kuldja and seek 
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the protection and support of the British and the Ottomans in order to secure independence 
from the Qing China.87 
 These concerns led to the Russian occupation of the Muzart passage in 1870. The 
occupation of the passage – located 250 versts (266 kilometres) east to the Lake Issyk-
Kul” was intended to “pacify the Kirghiz on both sides of the border,” and “to disunite 
(razobshchit’) Kashgar and Kuldja and to create an obstacle to the formation of a strong 
Muslim state.”88 A year later, in 1871, the Russian troops invaded Kuldja, killing 4,000 
locals in the process.89 The Ili region was returned to the Qing China in 1881, a decade 
after the occupation. By that time, the Semirechye and its nomadic population was firmly 
under the control of the colonial government. By the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the government adopted colonization policies aimed at the simultaneous integration of 
Semirechye into the sovereign space of the empire and exclusion of its native population 
from the national body, which will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.  
 
Settlement Battalions: The Colonization of Semirechye  
 
The rise of cameralism and the growing ambitions of the Russian empire coupled with 
the search for the “firm state boundary” led to the conquest of the Steppe and Semirechye, 
bringing the nomadic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz into the empire’s fold. The merging of the two 
fortified Lines in the second half of the nineteenth century established the more intrusive 
state presence in the region and heralded the new intensified efforts of the central 
government to pacify and “tame” the nomads by turning them into sedentary farmers.  
 At the same time, the second half of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of 
the idea of modern citizenship. Judicial reforms, the introduction of new forms of local 
self-government, and serf emancipation put the empire’s subjects on a more equal footing 
in relation to the state.90 Not everyone, however, was included into the empire-wide civil 
order. The introduction of the legal category of inorodtsy in 1822 (“aliens,” literally 
persons “of different origin”) excluded the native population of the Steppe and Turkestan 
from the project of grazhdanstvennost’ (“civic consciousness”).91 The reason behind the 
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exclusion was simple; beginning from the nineteenth century, the government began to 
identify more closely with the Russian nationality.92  
Like many of their European counterparts, the Tsarist elites engaged in conscious 
attempts to restructure the ethnically diverse empire along the national lines. The 
corollary of this process was that as the empire’s Russian subjects became more equal 
and integrated into the political life of the state, the native subjects of the empire were 
increasingly excluded and marginalized. Basing their vision of an ideal – and secure – 
state on the vision of a mono-ethnic political body, the colonial administrators of 
Turkestan viewed their native subjects with suspicion. In the view of the empire’s military 
and administrators, the “alien” makeup of the nomads of Semirechye and their mobility 
served as a proof of their inherent unreliability. In other words, they “imagined ethnicity 
to be a key predictor of political behaviour.”93 
To correct the potentially dangerous behaviour of the native nomads and to 
integrate the region more firmly into the empire, the central government began to resettle 
the “reliable” and “healthy” peasant population from Central Russia in the region. The 
establishment of the Resettlement Administration in 1896 and the Main Administration 
of Land Management and Agriculture (hereafter GUZZ) in 1905 signalled the beginning 
of mass agricultural colonization of Semirechye.  
The resettlement of Semirechye achieved two goals at once. First, by resettling 
and arming peasant colonists, who formed “settler battalions,” the central government 
ensured the military security of the distant borderland region. Second, by concentrating 
the ethnically Russian population along the borders of the empire, the government sought 
to enforce and entrench the political boundaries of the state. Ethnicity thus emerged as 
the primary marker of state sovereignty.  
The implications of these policies for the nomadic population of Semirechye were 
immediate and thorough going. To make space for colonial settlements, the authorities 
displaced the growing number of nomads, leading to a steep rise in ethnic hostilities. The 
ethnicization of conflict and, indeed, the imperial rule itself was among the chief reasons 
behind the destructive rebellion of 1916, which will be discussed in the next chapter.94 
To sum up, this half of the chapter looks at how the ideas of what constituted the “correct” 
form of governance in the ethnically diverse borderland intersected with the political 
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currents of imperialism and nationalism in the 19th century to produce a model of 
governance, which excluded and marginalized the native population of the colony.  
 
Searching for the Ethnic Core of the Empire 
 
In common with the other European Empires, by the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the ideas of what Peter Holquist terms the realm of “social,” became more 
prevalent amid the empire’s military and administrators.95 The rise of military science 
concerned with “population politics,” including statistics, sociology, and ethnography, 
equipped the state with tools to act on this realm. Along with geographers and 
topographers, statisticians and ethnographers produced knowledge that was crucial to the 
government’s efforts at managing and controlling the subject populations. Like space 
before, peoples became an object that needed to be studied and shaped through active 
state intervention.  
 The Polish uprisings of 1831 and 1863 as well as Russia’s defeat in the Crimean 
War in 1856 further convinced the central government that borderlands harboured the 
treacherous and dangerous peoples, casting into doubt the loyalty of other ethno-
confessional communities.96 In the wake of the Polish uprising of 1832, Sergei Uvarov, 
the Minister of Education, introduced the infamous triad of Pravoslavie-Samoderzhavie-
Narodnost’ (“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality”).97 
 The new military science began to classify the peoples of the empire by their 
degree of reliability (blagonadezhnost’). To increase a given group’s blagonadezhnost’, 
the empire’s military reasoned, it was necessary to dilute the population of the 
borderlands with the “Russian element.”98 By the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the concept of population as the key resource of the state was firmly entrenched. The 1874 
Tsar’s manifesto, introducing universal conscription, emphasized that “the power of 
states is found not only in the number of forces, but pre-eminently in their moral and 
intellectual qualities.”99 Similarly, textbooks produced for students in military schools in 
the decades before the First World contended that “man was, is, and remain the primary 
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instrument of warfare” and that “an ideal population is a monoethnic population, with one 
language.”100 By extension, the ethnically diverse population with little or no “Russian 
element” in its midst was considered unreliable.  
 The belief in the inherent unreliability of minority groups of population was 
formalized with the promulgation in the second quarter of the nineteenth century of the 
new Statute on the administration of native Siberians. The so-called Speranskii’s statute 
of 1822 – named after its author, the Governor-General of Western Siberia, Mikhail 
Speranskii – permanently codified the diminished status and rights of the non-Russian 
population of the empire, confining many of them to the role of “congenital and 
apparently perennial outsiders.”101 
 The fast expansion of the empire and the growing conviction that the empire’s 
minorities were inherently unreliable gave rise to a complementary movement to define 
the ethnic core of the empire.102 The search for this core produced the results that 
disappointed many of the Russia’s statesmen. General Nikolai Obruchev, a leading 
strategist of the period and the author of the 1885 memorandum “On the Basic Historical 
Missions of Russia,” compared Russia to a comet with a poorly developed European 
“core” and “a horrifying Asiatic tail, stretching from Tiflis to Vladivostok” that drained 
the empire’s resources and moral strength.103 According to Obruchev, the establishment 
of “a living and whole strictly national Russian body” was key to the empire’s health and 
flourishing.104 
 Mikhail Veniukov, the military geographer well familiar with Turkestan and 
Semirechye, similarly saw in the establishment of a “national Russian body” a solution 
to securing the volatile borderlands. To him, natural frontiers afforded little protection as 
even the highest mountains could be crossed and the only stable frontier was the one 
permanently occupied by “Russian bayonets” and peasant settlers. Colonization alone 
could secure “durable peace (prochnyi pokoi) of the new lands.”105 A secure state – and 
the one favoured by “public opinion” – was the one where “the people (narod), as the 
ethnographic group” was coterminous (tozhdestvennyi) with “the state, as the political 
group.”106  
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 Like Veniukov, the Steppe Commission convened to develop the suitable model 
of governance for the nomadic peoples of the empire’s Asian borderlands came to the 
conclusion that “the durable and strong binding of these lands to Russia forever and their 
gradual, organic merging with her can be the only goal of our administration in its Central 
Asian holdings.”107 According to Georgii Gins, the head of the Resettlement 
Administration, “Russian colonization was designed to secure the possibility of the 
Russian Empire’s “dual expansion” through the growth of the “imperial core” (imperskoe 
iadro) at the expense of adjacent borderlands.”108 
  
Securing the Dangerous Frontier: The Settlement of Semirechye  
 
Although, mass colonization of Semirechye did not become possible until the 
construction of the railway connecting central Russia with Central Asia in the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the gradual encroachment of the Tsarist empire on the nomadic 
Steppe was facilitated by the establishment of a legal-administrative system, which broke 
the nomadic land holdings into separate administrative units, promoted agriculture, and 
restricted nomadic migrations.109 The first statute, drafted by Mikhail Speranskii in 1822, 
effectively transferred the nomads’ land to the state by allocating land on the condition 
of its permanent “use,” which excluded pasturage.110 The 1868 “Provisional Statute on 
Administration in Ural’sk, Turgai, Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk Oblasts” divided the 
nomadic lands into two types: winter pastures (zimovki), which remained the property of 
volost and aul (native village) administration, and summer pastures (letovki), which were 
marked as state lands “for communal use of the Kirghiz.111 The designation of letovki as 
state lands made it easy for the authorities to seize and redistribute these lands among the 
arriving settlers. Even before settlers arrived, the colonial administration established a 
special land fund, which could be distributed in future. The 1891 “Statute on 
Administration of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, Ural’sk, and Turgai Oblasts” 
further restricted nomadic movement. Migrating outside of one’s uezd required proper 
attestation and special permission of the local authorities.112  
 Semirechye emerged as a prime site for settlement. By 1867, Semirechye already 
had 13 Cossack stanitas with a population of 14,000. From 1868 till 1882, 29 new 
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settlements were founded in Semirechye with the total population of 15,000 peasants, and 
7,000 officials and artisans in towns.113 Between 1868 and 1869, the military governor of 
Semirechye, General Alexei Kolpakovsky settled a few peasant families in the Vernyi 
uezd. When the province was transferred to the new Steppe governor-generalship in 1883, 
Vernyi was home to 36 peasant settlements with a population of approximately 2,500. 
The new 1886 Turkestan statute planned the creation of purely Russian cantons “with the 
development of colonisation” (s razvitiem kolonizatsii). Beginning from 1883, the 
governor of Syr-Darya oblast, General Nikolai Grodekov established 41 Russian 
settlements with a population of 16,000 along major roads, describing them as battalions 
and distributing some firearms.114 In 1891-1892, when severe famine hit the central and 
Volga regions of Russia, 1,792 families moved into Turkestan despite the temporary ban 
on settlement.115 The steady stream of settlers continued and, in 1897, the first national 
census found 23,000 mostly illegal settlers living in the Kyrgyz areas of Semirechye.116 
The creation of the Resettlement Administration in 1896 signalled a new intensive 
phase of colonization. By time the Resettlement Administration was established, a 
government survey of the previous year had already earmarked 48% of the area covered 
as “surplus” and thus available for resettlement.117 The task of colonizing Semirechye 
acquired a new sense of urgency by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries.  
A series of events, including the Kyrgyz participation in the 1876 uprising of Abd 
al-Rahman Aftabachi and the Andizhan uprising in 1898 attracted the interest of the 
oblast’ military administration. When in 1895, the Minister of War Piotr Vannovskii 
inquired with the oblast’s governors about the suitability of native militias for 
reconnaissance work, the special commission at the Ferghana oblast army headquarters, 
responded that Muslim militias should not be used in wars with coreligionists. The 
commission also drew Vannovskii’s attention to the fact that Kyrgyz and Kazakhs 
rebelled against Russia in the past and that they maintained ties with their co-ethnies in 
China. The commission’s members warned Vannovskii against “awaking the sleeping 
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militant tribe,” which constituted “a single Mongolian tribe and was once the core of large 
armies of Chingis Khan and Tamerlane.”118  
Intriguingly, another man fearful of the “yellow peril” was no other than Alexei 
Kuropatkin, appointed to the post of Governor General of Turkestan in 1916 to suppress 
the native rebellion. In case of a conflict with China, Kuropatkin reasoned, only the local 
Dungans would provide assistance to Russia. Other groups, including the Kyrgyz and 
Taranchi, would submit to the Chinese. Furthermore, the political influence of the 
Chinese Kyrgyz on Russia’s Kyrgyz could be most detrimental in the event of an invasion 
of Russian Turkestan.119 
Later expeditions to the Kyrgyz living on both sides of the border confirmed the 
suspicions of the colonial administrators. The trip of the Muslim officer Ravil Syrtlanov 
in 1909 to the Kyrgyz of China, of whom he counted 236,000 in the areas he visited, 
revealed that the Kyrgyz remained highly autonomous. Norms of Chinese administration 
did not apply to them, they were exempt from military service, and they skillfully played 
on the Chinese fears of Russia to extract privileges for themselves. From this, Syrtlanov 
concluded that the Kyrgyz held both the Chinese and Russian authorities in contempt and 
that in case of a Russo-Chinese conflict, the Kyrgyz would side with the likely victor and 
if Russia lost, they would attack the Russian rear and hamper cavalry reconnaissance.120 
In 1910, a year after Syrtlanov’s visit of the Chinese Kyrgyz, Captain Dmitrii 
Fedorov of the General Staff also identified the Kyrgyz as a politically unreliable group. 
In his view, the retention by the Kyrgyz of a strong and culturally impenetrable clan 
structure made them a potential threat.121 He advocated the colonization of Semirechye, 
whose composition of the population he found “unfavourable…from a military point of 
view, since “the Russian element comprised less than 50%.” Fedorov recommended 
colonizing Semirechye with “a Russian element” and suggested that officials pursue “an 
intensified colonization of the region by the Russian ethnicity, even if at the expense of 
the natives.”122 
In practice, the colonization in Semirechye had been underway for some time. A 
settlement region was formed in Semirechye in 1905.123 By 1910 the Russian population 
of Semirechye stood at 188,016, or 16% of the total population of Semirechye.124 In the 
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first decades of the twentieth century, Semirechye experienced the largest growth of 
Slavic population in Turkestan. By 1911, over 150,000 Slavic farmers settled among 
nearly one million Turkic nomads. Over 80,000 of them had settled in the Pishpek and 
Przhevalsk uezdy, among an estimated 325,000 Kyrgyz. Nowhere else in Turkestan, as 
Daniel Brower notes, did Europeans settle in rural areas in such large numbers.125  
 
Table 1. Colonization in Semirechye (1884-1895). 




 Cossacks in 1896 
 No. Pop. (A) No. Pop. (B) B/A% Pop. (C) B/C% 
Vernyi 6 3,092 6 5,042 163.1 12,302 41.0 
Kopal 2 1,277 2 3,128 244.9 6,473 48.3 
Sergiopol’ 
(Lepsinsk) 
9 6,494 8 10,084 155.3 5.398 169.8 
Jarkent - - - - - 1.481 - 
Tokmak 
(Pishpek) 
8 4,176 10 9,397 225.0 - - 
Issik-Kol 
(Przhevalsk) 
6 4,118 6 7,918 192.3 - - 
Total 31 19,157 32 35,659 185.7 26.194 135.8 
 
Galuzo, “Agrarnye otnoshneniya”, p.206 
 
Lest the Kyrgyz raid the Russian settlements, the authorities supplied the colonists 
with rifles. That the central government considered Semirechye as simultaneously critical 
to the security of the colonial state and exposed to potential hostility of the native 
population is best demonstrated by the fact that of 31,401 rifles distributed to the Russian 
settlers in Turkestan, roughly half – 15,282 rifles were concentrated in Semirechye.126 
Like in the Steppe, the Statutes governing Semirechye facilitated the seizures of 
the nomads’ lands. The legislative act stipulating the rights of settlers to the colony’s 
lands was the article “On the use and ownership” of the 1868 temporary Statute. 
According to the article, settlers could rent the lands designated as winter pastures from 
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the local population. Summer pastures were open to settlement at the discretion of the 
administration and did not entail compensation to the native owners of the pastures. But 
the difference between the two kinds of pastures was often unclear; furthermore, the 
article 270 of the same Statute put the land occupied by nomads into a broad category of 
lands under “communal use”, which included winter quarters, summer pastures, and even 
cultivated plots. In spite of the regulations, the Resettlement Administration did not 
discriminate between the different kinds of pastures or fields and confiscated lands that 
they deemed most suitable for new settlements.  
The presumably “scientific norms” employed by the Resettlement Administration 
to identify “unoccupied lands” were equally dubious.127 According to the norms 
developed by the 1896 Shcherbina Comission on the Steppe Region, nomads were 
entitled to 30 hectares of land, and farmers – to 6 hectares. Despite the seeming rationality 
of the mechanism of allocating land to settlers, these norms, according to Palen, proved 
useless and harmful. While the Steppe region consisted of flat lands with little water, 
where cultivation was principally of winter wheat on unirrigated lands, Semirechye 
boasted a varied terrain of valleys and mountains with plentiful water resources and 
milder climate, which allowed for irrigated agriculture and cultivation of high value cash 
crops such as peaches and cotton.128 The lands that the resettlement authorities declared 
as “excess” were in fact already occupied, irrigated, and cultivated by the former 
nomads.129 As the head of a Senatorial investigative commission, Konstantin Palen aptly 
observed, the resettlement officials’ system of norms “serves, as it were, as a title for the 
expropriation of private land rights, without granting to the population those guarantees, 
which by the law of expropriation it should enjoy.”130   
The fragility of the nomads’ claim to land was further revealed in the revised 
Steppe Statute of 1891, under which Semirechye was governed, even after it was returned 
to the Turkestan governor-generalship in 1897. The article 120 of the statute stated that 
“the land, occupied by nomads, remains in indefinite collective use of the nomads, on the 
basis of custom and the rules of this statute,” but “land, which appears to be surplus to 
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requirements for the nomads, will come under the direction of the Ministry of State 
Properties.”131  
In the space of a few years, the newly arrived settlers built a chain of villages 
along the road from Tashkent to Verny. “From Karabalty (the city of Kara-Balta in 
today’s Kyrgyzstan) to Pishpek and further, to Konstaninovka, for 75 verst (an old 
Russian unit of measurement, roughly equal to kilometre), the post stations are connected 
to each other by the continuous line of settlers’ villages; the entire Pishpek uezd is covered 
by a mass of villages” reported the native engineer Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev in 
1910.132 These villages “fused into this one immese uninterrupted street through which 
ran the postal road.”133 The majority of these settlements were illegal and were built on 
the lands leased or simply seized from the Kyrgyz in breach of the legal norms established 
by the colonial regime itself. The military governor of the Semirechye oblast Aleksei 
Alekseev in his report to Nicholas II noted that “the Semirechye resettlement 
administration was forced, in the course of three years, to settle up to 40,000 unauthorized 
settlers primarily in Pishpek, Verny, and Przhevalsk uezds.”134 What governor Alekseev 
cryptically described as “valuable lands” were arable agricultural lands in the valleys. 
Unfortunately for the Kyrgyz, even the “poor quality” compensation lands they received 
were often inaccessible to them because Russian settlements cut through the traditional 
nomadic routes. The Kyrgyz found themselves in an impossible situation - they were 
deprived of their farming lands where they usually stationed for winter, and they lost 
access to their mountain pastures where they grazed their herds in summers. Despite many 
pleas of the native nomads and vocal concerns of some colonial administrators the 
expansion of the Slavic farmlands continued at the expense of the surrounding native 
population. 
In attempt to secure their livelihoods, some of the Kyrgyz bargained with the 
colonial administration over their right to acquire land as settled farmers. For many of the 
Kyrgyz petitioners the sedentary status was the only opportunity to acquire legal rights to 
their land, and to escape the whims and abuses of clan elders seeking to keep clan property 
under their control. The largest number of nomads requesting settled status was found in 
Pishpek uezd, where the Russian settlement had developed most extensively for three 
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decades before the uprising. In 1906-1907 alone, 4,200 households (kibitkd) in Pishpek 
petitioned for their own land title. The majority of these requests were turned by the 
colonial administration, which viewed land ownership the prerogative of Slavic peasants, 
and argued that the Kyrgyz remained essentially nomads and had no claim to farm land 
and village organization. Even when the permission to settle was granted, the 
Resettlement Administration could legally claim the “excess” lands of the settling 
Kyrgyz. Depending on their arability, these “excess” lands cut through fields and 
pastures, thus leaving the Kyrgyz with scattered small plots of land, making proper 
farming impossible.135   
In 1910, the Kyrgyz of the Vostochno-Sokulukskaia volost of the Pishpek uezd 
officially transferred to sedentary farming, prompting the uezd authorities to seize 13,000 
dessiatines of “unoccupied land” from them. That the lands were properly occupied, 
however, was documented by the earlier 1907 land commission, which described the land 
as “watered by blood and sweat of the Kirghiz” and listed “over two thousand winter 
camps, with good houses and gardens, bee hives, mills, clover fields, ancestral tombs, and 
sometimes mosques.”136 By 1914, the nomads of Semirechye lost 4,193,520 dessiatines 
of agricultural land.137 
The Kyrgyz pastoral economy was in disarray and as the influx of settlers 
intensified so did the tensions between the two communities. Nomads and settlers viewed 
each other with suspicion. For settlers, the Kyrgyz were nothing but a nuisance and rivals 
in competition for land. The authorized land allotments were inadequate to accommodate 
the swelling numbers of new settlers and more land was seized from the Kyrgyz. 
Describing themselves as “the tsar’s people” – the faithful Orthodox subjects who 
provided soldiers - the settlers expressed a sense of entitlement to the land.138 With this 
conviction, which often proved true, they were inclined to squat illegally where no legal 
provision could be obtained. To placate officials in Petrograd, the colonial administration 
often turned a blind eye on this land theft and, over time, many of the illegal settlements 
acquired legal entitlements on the lands they occupied.  
To lend weight to their demands, European settlers often descended to violence. 
In one of the more telling episodes, a group of illegal settlers armed with rifles and axes 
attacked Kazakhs whose lands they sought for settlement.139  
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With no room for legal redress, some nomads turned to the traditional ways of 
restoring justice by rustling cattle and organizing raids against Russian settlements. In his 
1909 report on Turkestan, the newly appointed governor general Alexander Samsonov, 
stated that: “Lately, there were several incidents of bloody clashes between the Kyrgyz 
and Russian settlers. Therefore, we cannot call the Semirechye oblast with its significant 




This chapter traced the conquest of the pastoralist Steppe and Semirechye to the 
emergence of the conception of territorial sovereignty – the idea that states constitute 
bounded political spaces and that state boundaries form the protective fence. By 
highlighting rationale of the conquest of Steppe and Semirechye by the Russian empire, 
this chapter demonstrated how the idea of natural geographic markers separating one state 
from another legitimated the Russia’s subjugation of peoples that stood in the way of the 
Russian search for “firm state boundaries.”  
As the next chapter will show, the attempts of the Tsarist military and 
administrators to increase the security of the new borderland by settling the colony with 
settlers from the ethnic “core” of the empire had triggered the gravest crisis of colonial 
rule in the region. In what perhaps was the greatest irony of the Russian colonization of 
Semirechye, the resettlement of vast numbers of Russian peasants in the region made it 
less, not more, secure. For several weeks in August, the rebellious Kyrgyz ravaged 
through the Russian settlements, pillaging and killing their inhabitants. The colonization 
of Semirechye had furthermore caused the mass mobilization of the native population, 







                                                          






When the Natives Went to War: The Uprising of 1916 in Semirechye  
 
In August 1916, the native nomads of Semirechye rose in a popular rebellion that for 
weeks reduced the colonial presence in the region to several beleaguered towns and 
settlements. Although colonial authority was restored already in September 1916, the 
fragile balance between the settlers and the native population was profoundly shaken.1 
The loss of life on both sides and the scale of the uprising, which claimed over 3,000 
victims in the settler society, and up to 150,000 native nomads, or 42% of the ethnic 
Kyrgyz population of Semirechye, cast a critical reflection on the nearly seven decades 
of Russian rule.2 Born of the dislocation wrought on the region by the colonial rule and 
the World War I, the rebellion also attested to the profound transformation of the region.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, this transformation was obvious. The 
“geographical physiognomy” of Semirechye, which in the words of the colony’s first 
governor-general, stood the region apart from the rest of the empire, started to look more 
familiar to visitors from European Russia.3  Grain fields ripened where the nomadic herds 
previously grazed and a chain of Russian settlements stretched for 75 versts in an 
uninterrupted line connecting Verny, Pishpek, and Przhevalsk. The region’s ethnic 
“physiognomy,” too, was rapidly changing as three in five Russian colonists arriving in 
the last decade of the autocratic empire’s existence headed to Semirechye.4 Their influx, 
facilitated by the establishment of the Resettlement Administration in 1896, was in large 
part driven by the imperial state’s pursuit of security. The ethnic diversity of the colony 
and the “alien” faith of its population were utterly suspect in the eyes of the authorities. 
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The solution to this security conundrum was simple; where the loyalty of the native 
population was under question, the Russia’s “core” Slavic people were seen as the 
backbone of the Russian state. By settling the colonies with Russian peasants the 
government sought to project its power over the distant frontier. To this end, it funnelled 
thousands of new colonists into the region.  
It was this herculean joint effort of the government and its Slavic subjects that the 
75 versts of peasant huts and grain fields in the southern Semirechye attested to. Yet, it 
was the very same effort that unsettled the region. The more settlers the colony absorbed, 
the more tense the relationship between the colonists and the native nomads grew. The 
uprising of the latter – predicted by many of the empire’s own colonial administrators – 
came to be seen by most contemporary observers as an expected, if particularly violent, 
continuation of the entrenched animosities. They located the roots of this age-old hatred 
in the dispossession of the native farmers and pastoralists and the occupation of their 
lands by the Russian settlers. A fine example of such an argument can be found in a 1917 
report by the Military Governor of Semirechye, Alexei Alekseev: “the seizure of some 
200, 000 dessiatines of land over the past 10 years,” he argued, “ought to be regarded as 
[among] the chief reasons of the Kyrgyz discontent that led to an open rebellion.”5  
To a great degree, this view of the origins of the uprising in the enmity engendered 
by the nomads’ growing destitution transposed onto the social fabric of the ethnically 
segregated colonial society holds true to this day. An assessment of the uprising that I 
present in this chapter does not aim to refute this argument but rather to problematize and 
historicize it. I aim to place the uprising within the context of the World War I. I argue in 
particular that the native population experienced the economic dislocation on a scale 
comparable to the communities directly affected by the war. The strains of the war further 
reified the socio-economic arrangements within the colonial society making ethnic ties 
more salient and more important to group survival. Equally importantly, I see in the 
experiences of communal violence perpetrated and suffered by the native population of 
Semirechye the constitution of ethnicity and ethnic identity as the basis for mobilization.6 
                                                          
5 “Dokladnaia zapiska n. d. Voennogo gubernatora Semirechenskoi oblasti A. I. Alekseeva general-gubernatoru 
Turkestanskogo kraia A. N. Kuropatkinu o prichinakh i khode vosstaniia v oblasti, pozdnee 1 noiabria 1916 g.” in 
Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 
1960), 374. 
6 On the mobilization of ethnicity in the Russian empire during the World War I, see Mark Von Hagen, "The Great 
War and the mobilization of ethnicity in the Russian Empire," in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State 
Building, ed. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 34-57. Hagen argues that 
“the war was a watershed in relations between Russians and non-Russians and among non-Russians as well,” 36.   
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Paraphrasing Patrick Wolfe, ethnicity of the rebels was made in the targeting and being 
targeted.7 
It is these experiences of victimization and practices of ethnic mobilization that I 
link to the violence of the uprising. I argue that the lethality of the uprising lay in the 
intersection of the total mobilization and the fear of destruction in the hands of the 
“enemy” group. Put simply, both parties to the conflict were driven in their actions by 
what they saw as a threat to their livelihoods and indeed their lives. The matter of 
perception is critical here. Although the threat posed by groups and individuals was often 
exaggerated, perceptions of the threat were real. That this threat was embodied by the 
aggregate group – rather than certain individuals – was the chief reason behind the 
indiscriminate targeting of the non-combatant, civilian population by both the rebels and 
the colonists.  
Indiscriminate, gender and age blind, mass murder remains one of the more 
contentious issues in any study of the uprising. The scope and the depth of violence led 
many to conclude that the rebellion “was in a real sense a settling of accounts with 
colonists.”8 Yet, racial hatred alone fails to account for the highly systematized nature of 
violence. Military intelligence gathered during the uprising and the depositions of the 
native rebels suggest that the rebellion was not simply a crime of passion, but a 
premediated assault on the settler communities. We therefore need to think of violence in 
broad social terms instead of viewing it as an extension of ethnic hatred. I argue that 
violence employed by the rebels was highly instrumental; the rebels sought to reclaim 
access to resources, primarily land, and assert political agency by destroying European 
settlements and killing and expelling the colonists.9 I also contend that, insofar as the 
rebels sought to destroy “all the Russians” their actions constituted ethnic cleansing. 10 
                                                          
7 The original quote is as follows: “…a race cannot be taken as given. It is made in the targeting.” Patrick Wolfe, 
"Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006): 387-409, 388.  
8 Brower, 161. 
9 Indeed, some archival documents suggest that the rebels in Jizak, Semirechye, and other areas of Central Asia, sought 
to create a native state. In Jizak, for example, “the natives, unwilling to give workers, stopped obeying the Russian 
authorities and form of government (gosudarstvennyi stroi), separated from the Russian state, and declared the Dzhizak 
uezd an independent Dzhizak khanate.” “Otchet o sostoianii Turkestanskoi eparkhii za 1916 g. episkopa 
Turkestanskogo i Tashkentskogo Innokentiia Sviateishemu Sinodu, 14 iiulia 1917 g.” in Vosstanie 1916 goda v 
Turkestane: dokumental'nye svidetel'stva obshchei tragedii (Moscow: Marjani, 2016), 288. Similarly, the Kyrgyz of 
Semirechye “having decided that Russia was weakened by the war, that Semirechye was devoid of defence, and that 
time has come to use the ruin to destroy the Russian rule in the region and to create a new Kirghiz khanate in its place, 
threw their caution to the winds, and rose in rebellion.” “Vsepoddanneishii raport i. d. voennogo gubernatora 
Semirechenskoi oblasti A. I. Alekseeva Nikolaiu II o vosstanii v oblasti v 1916 g., 4 marta 1917 g.” ibid, 408. In his 
deposition, Ibraim Dzhainakov, a native translator, also claims that “the goal of the Kirghiz and Dungans was to create 
a Muslim khanate.” “Iz protokola doprosa kirgiza Dzhainakova o vosstanii kirgiz i dungan, 19 avgusta-1 sentiabria 
1916 g.” in K. I.  Mambetaliev, ed. Vosstanie 1916 goda. Dokumenty i materialy (Bishkek: 2015), 122. 
10 In arguing that the Kyrgyz (and to a certain extent, Kazakh) rebels in Semirechye were intent on ethnically cleansing 
the colonists, I draw on the growing body of research into “subaltern genocide” – “genocides from below where subject 
populations seek the extermination of their oppressors.” Donald Bloxham and A Dirk Moses, eds., The Oxford 
handbook of genocide studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 315. Adopting the grassroots perspective 
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Similarly to the violence unleashed by the rebels against the government and the 
colonists, the violence wrought by the authorities and the settlers on the rebels and the 
native population at large had a purpose. I discern two stages – and two sets of 
intertwining goals – in the campaign of ethnic cleansing conducted by the authorities in 
response to the rebellion. I argue that the first stage of the violent suppression of the 
rebellion was a form of ethnic cleansing; rather than punishing the rebellious “elements” 
of the native population as was the case in the oasis areas of Turkestan, with the exception 
of the Jizak uezd, the punitive expeditions consisting of government forces and settler 
militias targeted the entire native population of Semirechye for summary liquidation. The 
second stage, however, sought not so much the wholesale destruction of the nomadic 
population as its elimination from the areas “where Russian blood was spilt” through 
relocation to the geographically isolated and resource poor Naryn uezd.11 This is not to 
argue that the two stages were in disagreement with each other. On the contrary, the 
forced removal of Semirechye’s pastoralists augmented and institutionalized the outcome 
of the ethnic cleansing of the native population, the destruction of property, and the 
seizure of native land. Thus, both should properly be seen as an integral – if particularly 
violent – component of the imperial project of nation and state-building in the context of 
the settler colony.12 The goal of the state-sponsored campaign of cleansing and 
displacement of the indigenous population was the creation of Russian Semirechye in 
both the territorial and ethnic sense.  
To understand why the rebellion led to radical forms of repression or, put simply, 
to understand why the structural violence of colonial rule crystallized into a concerted 
effort by the settler society and the authorities to kill and drive off the nomads, I draw on 
the works of Ronald Suny, Mark Levene and others to argue that the ethnic cleansing of 
the native population by the government and the colonists in Semirechye was the result 
                                                          
allows us to disavow the state as the only possible perpetrator of genocide. Instead, as the studies of the “genocides by 
the oppressed” show, genocidal actions can be carried out by non-state actors and are often “highly fragmented, 
confederational and far from bureaucratic” in nature. Ibid., 319. For a survey of theories of subaltern genocide, see 
“Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice” in Nicholas A Robins and Adam Jones, eds., Genocides by the oppressed: 
subaltern genocide in theory and practice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 1-24. For 
the case studies of subaltern genocide in the colonial context, see Nicholas A Robins, Native insurgencies and the 
genocidal impulse in the Americas (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005).  
11 In my analysis of the “eliminatory” stage of the rebellion’s suppression I draw on Patrick Wolfe’s argument that 
“settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory” and that “the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, 
ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory.” Wolfe,  387-88. 
12 The connection between settler colonialism and genocide has been made by many. The original contribution to the 
field was made by the founder of genocide studies, Raphael Lemkin, who outlines the theory of genocide and 
colonialism in his seminal work on German policies in occupied Europe. Raphael Lemkin, Axis rule in occupied 
Europe: laws of occupation, analysis of government, proposals for redress (Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd., 2005). More recent works on genocide and settler colonialism include A Dirk Moses, ed. Genocide 
and settler society: Frontier violence and stolen indigenous children in Australian history (New York, Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2004); Empire, colony, genocide: conquest, occupation, and subaltern resistance in world history 
(New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008).  
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of heightened anxieties about the threat posed by the rebellious native population to the 
sovereignty of the state defined both in terms of the territory and the settler population of 
the colony.13 To approach the uprising from the rebels’ perspective and to examine why 
the rebels resorted to extreme violence and terror in their resistance to the colonial 
authorities, I build on Donald Horowitz’s suggestion that deadly ethnic violence involves 
“an amalgam of passion and calculation”.14 What unites both of these approaches is their 
suggestion that fear – and the concomitant anticipation of violence from the targeted 
group – provides sufficient motivations for the perpetrator to target this group for 
murder.15 
To provide a comprehensive account of the rebellion, its origins, course, and 
aftermath, I examine both the structural conditions and the contingent factors whose 
convergence set in motion the chain of events leading to the popular rebellion. I open the 
discussion of the uprising with an analysis of the socio-economic crisis brought about by 
the war. I then continue with the chronological account of the uprising paying particular 
attention to the phases in its development and expansion. I conclude the chapter with the 
analysis of Kuropatkin’s plan of the territorial division of the European and native 
population.  
I draw on police reports, military correspondence, and depositions of witnesses 
and native participants of the uprising. To counteract potential bias in my analysis I 
examine several different accounts of the same events as well as native testimonies and 
oral histories. Two of my key native “witnesses” are the Russian-educated Kazakh 
administrator Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev and the Kyrgyz administrator of traditional 
elite manap background Belek Soltonoev, a pioneering native historian and participant in 
the uprising.16  
                                                          
13 Mark Levene’s contention that genocidal behaviour of imperial states at the turn of the twentieth century emerged as 
the result of “imperial anxieties” that their remote regions, their frontiers, would be used by “other powers…as potential 
launching pads from which to strike at the empire’s very own heartland” echoes Ronald Suny’s suggestion that the 
genocidal treatment of the Armenian population in the Ottoman empire was the result of the perceived “mortal danger” 
that the presumably “rebellious and seditious” Armenian population posed to the state’s survival. Mark Levene, 
Genocide in the Age of the Nation State: Volume 2: The Rise of the West and Coming Genocide (London, New York: 
IB Tauris, 2005), 278; Ronald Grigor Suny, "They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else": A History of the Armenian 
Genocide (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015), XII.  
14 Donald L Horowitz, The deadly ethnic riot (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001), 
32.  
15 Suny employs the notion of “affective dispositions,” that is “deep sentiments like resentment, fear, anger, and hatred,” 
to uncover “the mental universe” of the participants in the genocide. Suny, 134. Horowitz, too, argues that “sheer 
physical fear may move those who are frightened to take violent action” and that “anticipated physical assaults, as 
perhaps the strongest instigation, would give rise to the strongest response, also likely to be physical, such as riot 
behaviour.” He also suggests that “the recurrent fear of being swallowed by those who are more adept at manipulating 
the external environment points to the utter helplessness underpinning the violence of those who feel backward.” 
Horowitz, 151-55, 82. 
16 Belek Soltonoev can be credited as the author of the first book of Kyrgyz history written by a native historian in the 
modern tradition of history writing. Born in 1878, Soltonoev was educated in a Russo-native school in Karakol and an 




The Storm Gathers 
 
To canvass the discussion of the uprising and to set the background I propose to examine 
the social and economic disruptions caused to the colony by the war-time policies of the 
metropole.17 While the war affected everyone in Turkestan the regional and ethnic 
inequalities may explain the varying dynamics of the rebellion in the settled and nomadic 
areas of the region. Although the war corroded the native economy in general some native 
communities fared worse than the others. As such, burdens of the war were distributed 
unevenly between the settler and the native population and within the native society itself. 
The seizure of agricultural land in the nomadic areas made native pastoralists more 
vulnerable to the privations of the war. Furthermore, the ethnic division of labour – where 
nomads were dependent on settlers for grain – put the nomads in a particularly precarious 
position.  
As one of the key grain-producing areas and a designated settlement area 
Semirechye attracted more settlers than any other oblast of Turkestan. By 1911, over 
150,000 Russian farmers settled among nearly one million nomads. Over 80,000 of them 
settled in the Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds, among an estimated 325,000 Kyrgyz.18 By 
1916, the Russian settlers who made up less than a quarter of the Semirechye’s total 
population owned more than two thirds of the oblast’s land (23.8% and 67.3% 
respectively).19 Arable land – the most precious resource in the water poor region – was 
seized in quantities that made the pastoralist economy a doomed and quixotic enterprise. 
The livestock population that the nomads depended on for sustenance quickly dwindled. 
Unable to take up farming because agricultural land was diverted to colonists, or raise 
enough animals to trade for grain, the native nomadic population fell by 8-9% in the 
decade before the war, between 1902 and 1913.20  
The beginning of the war amplified the economic distress suffered by the native 
pastoralists. In an effort to raise war revenue the central government sought to draw on 
the human and material resources of the colony. This was accomplished through imposing 
                                                          
He joined the Bolsheviks in 1918. Between 1924 and 1927 Soltonoev was in charge of repatriating Kyrgyz refugees in 
China. A decade later, in 1937, Soltonoev was executed. Three years before his execution, Soltonoev completed “Kyzyl 
Kyrgyz Tarykhy,” which he began writing in 1895. It was not until 1993 that his book was published.  
17 For the discussion of how the war-time economic policies affected the economy of Turkestan see Marco Buttino, 
"Economic Relations Between Russia and Turkestan, 1914-1918, or How to Start a Famine," in Transforming 
Peasants: Society, State and the Peasantry, 1861–1930 (Houndmills, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1998), 194-209.  
18 Brower, 47. 
19 Iu. Abdrakhmanov, Vosstanie kirgiz v 1916 godu (Frunze: Kirgosizdat, 1933), 19-20.  
20 T. R.  Ryskulov, ed. Vosstanie 1916 goda v Kirgizstane. Dokumenty i materialy, sobrannye L. V. Lesnoi (Moscow: 
Sotsekgiz, 1937), 6. 
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direct and indirect taxation, requisitioning, and extracting raw materials produced by 
forced native labour. Between 1913 and 1915, the fiscal revenues in Turkestan grew by 
66%.21 Land tax more than doubled as did the trade tax.22 New taxes were introduced, 
including a tax on exemption from military service of 1 ruble 84 kopeks per household.23  
Even more damaging to the native households were the frequent requisitions and 
forced donations. In 1914 alone, a million sheep were requisitioned from the nomads of 
Syr-Darya and Semirechye.24 The cattle and animal products supplied by the nomads of 
Semirechye the same year brought the metropole nearly 34 million rubles.25 Turkestan’s 
quantifiable contribution to the war effort amounted to: 40,899,244 poods of cotton; 
38,004 square arshins of felt cloth; 3,109,999 poods of cottonseed oil; 229,000 poods of 
soap; 300,000 poods of meat; 473,928 poods of fish, 50,000 of castor; 70,000 horses, 
12,797 camels, 270 carriages, 13,441 yurts; and, finally 2,400,000 rubles.26 It is safe to 
assume that while cotton came from the settled areas of the region, horses, camels, yurts, 
and cloth were sourced from the nomads. The nomads’ wool, animals, and yurts clothed, 
fed, and sheltered the empire’s soldiers. 
While less quantifiable – and often unreported and unaccounted for – the 
contribution of the nomadic population to the war effort in the form of numerous and 
arbitrary donations was equally considerable. According to a group of native petitioners, 
the Kyrgyz of the Przhevalsk uezd had donated large sums of money on at least five 
separate occasions.27 Other, indirect, forms of taxation ranged from fixed prices on raw 
materials produced by the native population, such as opium, to the imposition of labour 
duty or forced monetary compensation of settlers in lieu of free labour.28 
Meanwhile, prices on staple foods increased many times. The arrival of 70,000 
refugees and 200,000 prisoners of war by spring 1916 had further stretched the colony’s 
resources and upset the cycle of production and consumption; there were now more 
people to feed and fewer people to produce the food.29 The drought hit the main grain-
                                                          
21 Tat'iana Kotiukova, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Turkestane: oshibka vlasti ili istoricheskaia zakonomernost'?," 
Obozrevatel', no. 8 (2011): 102. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Vypiska iz pokazanii odnogo iz predvoditelei vosstaniia Kanaata Abukina – kirgiza Abail’dinskoi volosti 
Pishpekskogo uezda po voprosu o prichinakh vyzvavshikh vosstanie. Konets goda.” in Mambetaliev, 64. 
24 Kotiukova,  102. 
25 Mambetaliev, 5. 
26 P. Galuzo, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," Krasnyi arkhiv, no. 3 (34) (1929): 80.  
27 “Kopiia prosheniia kara-kirgiz Przheval’skogo uezda na imia rossiiskogo konsula v Kul’dzhe, data neizvestna” in 
Ryskulov, 150.   
28 According to the deposition of the group of Kyrgyz from the Przhevalsk uezd, the administration forced Kyrgyz to 
grow and sell opium to the government at a fixed price of 12 rubles per pound. Predictably, the market price on opium 
was several times higher. Ibid. Where the Kyrgyz could not provide workers they had to pay colonists 18-25 roubles 
in compensation. Sokol, 73. 
29 Kotiukova,  103. 
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producing oblast of Syr-Daria driving the prices even higher. In 1916, the deficit of grain 
in Semirechye spiked to 22 million poods.30 As the food crisis loomed larger – 
discouraging colonists from selling grain – the frequent requisitions left the nomads with 
even fewer animals to sell to buy grain.  
The war had in effect deepened the existing socio-economic cleavages between 
the ethnic groups and led to the increased salience of ethnicity. The association between 
ethnicity and access to resources had further eroded inter-ethnic ties and facilitated ethnic 
mobilization. The first incidents of ethnic conflict occurred in the sedentary areas of 
Turkestan, where the relationship of reverse dependency had prompted ethnic riots 
targeted at the native population whose perceived economic advantage became a rallying 
call for mobilization. Of particular interest to me is the series of food riots in the early 
months of 1916 in which the Russian population of the cities mobilized against the native 
traders. Started by the wives of the drafted Russian soldiers these riots reveal an emerging 
pattern of ethnic stratification and conflict. 
The European population of the sedentary areas of Turkestan was mainly 
concentrated in cities and towns. The arid climate and the high population density of the 
Ferghana valley precluded the mass agricultural settlement of the kind found in 
Semirechye. At the same time, the demand for cotton produced in the oasis areas of the 
colony made Turkestan dependent on grain from European Russia.31 In more peaceful 
times, grain from the mainland was exchanged for cotton maintaining the colony’s 
balance of trade and feeding its people. The war upset this fragile balance as grain was 
diverted to serve the growing needs of the army. Very soon, grain shortages made 
themselves felt in the grain-poor areas of Turkestan setting off an unprecedented growth 
in prices that primarily affected the European population of the cities. To rein in the 
inflation, the government introduced set prices on staple foods and threatened to fine the 
offenders.  
The artificially low prices and the continuing food shortages, however, 
discouraged the native farmers from selling their produce at the city markets. The policies 
adopted by the colonial authorities to protect the European residents of Tashkent 
backfired; facing prohibitive fines, the majority of traders simply shut their stalls, while 
the remaining traders continued to sell at the market prices. The deficit and the high prices 
particularly affected soldatki, the wives and widows of Russian soldiers at the front. In 
                                                          
30 Ibid, 102. 
31 By 1913, cotton occupied 20% of irrigated land in Turkestan, in Ferghana oblast, cotton was planted on 36-38% of 
the sown area on the eve of the 1917 revolution. Becker, "Russia’s Central Asian Empire 1885-1917’," 242. 
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the conditions of the ethnically segregated colony, the precarious position of the soldatki, 
who were forced to survive on meagre pensions and allowances, soon translated into 
popular hostility towards the native population of the city. The persistent rumours of 
mounds of food concealed in the native quarters of Tashkent erupted into a series of 
violent pogroms against the native traders across the region.  
The first incident of a so-called “women’s riot” (babii bunt) took place in 
Tashkent on the last day of February, 1916.32 Spurred on by rumours of potato hoarding 
by the native traders a group of women marched towards one of the markets.33 By the 
time the women reached the market they were joined by other angry European 
Tashkenters who converged on the market, looting stalls and beating the native traders. 
In mere minutes the market was devastated. As word of the pogrom travelled, crowds of 
European residents descended on six other markets in the city. The next day, the riots 
spread to still more markets. Fearing an escalation of disturbances, the authorities 
attempted to arrest a few of the women-leaders, but were rebuffed by the Russian factory 
workers and railway employees, who threatened a general strike if the women were not 
released and took hand grenades to a protest in defence of the women.34  
Similar – although considerably smaller – riots ravaged the markets of 
Cherniaevo, Krivosheino, and Perovsk days after the first babii bunt in Tashkent.35 Fire 
was deliberately set alight in several market rows in the town of Aulie-Ata in Syr-Darya 
oblast.36 The authorities downplayed the extent of the damage and few, if any, 
compensations were paid. The ramifications of the food riots were, however, significant. 
Firstly, the ethnically targeted nature of the riots suggested a sharp rise in the settlers’ 
hostility towards the native population at large. Secondly, the leniency of the authorities 
in dealing with the protesters cemented the colonists’ belief that food could be extracted 
from the native population by force. Finally, the riots sent a signal to the native population 
that the administration protected the interests of European colonists at the expense of the 




                                                          
32 Buttino, Revoliutsiia naoborot: Sredniaia Aziia mezhdu padeniem tsarskoi imperii i obrazovaniem SSSR. 
33 For a comprehensive account of the 1916 “women’s riot” in Tashkent and a discussion of changing gender relations 
in colonial society during the war, see Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923 (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), 170-76. 
34 Buttino, ibid, p. 60  
35 Buttino, ibid, p. 61 
36 Buttino, ibid, p. 61 
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“A Strike of Thunder” 
 
The austerities of the war had certainly put a strain on the native society. This strain was 
made all the more difficult by the mobilization of the settler society, which placed 
increasing demands on the native farmers and pastoralists. Yet, the failure of the native 
society to openly protest or riot against the heavy toll that the war and colonial rule were 
exacting from the colony and its people in the first two years of the war indicate that the 
economic issues alone cannot account for the violence that gripped the region in 1916. It 
is therefore possible to say that the growing impoverishment of the native peoples created 
conditions for the conflict but did not cause it. An external impulse was needed and this 
impulse came from the central government, which was in dire need of manpower. 
The announcement of the labour draft was the decisive factor in the escalation of 
ethnic violence in the region. It was, in other words, the beginning of the native rebellion 
proper. It is possible to distinguish two stages in the development of the initial phase of 
the rebellion in the wake of the announcement. The first stage saw the political 
mobilization of the native population, which engaged in peaceful protests and petitioned 
the authorities for exemption from the draft. The repression with which the administration 
responded to these protests constitutes the second stage in the emergence and escalation 
of violence. The roots of this repression were located in the military nature of the colonial 
rule, which remained outside of civilian purview and engaged in repressive practices that 
were inconceivable in the ethnically Russian provinces of the empire. 
The labour draft of the native men – suspected of harbouring sympathy for the 
enemy and presumed lacking in patriotic spirit – was a desperate measure intended to 
plug a gaping hole left by the war in the draft-eligible male population. Despite drafting 
the only sons and physically unfit men, and dropping the minimum draft age by two years, 
the military was still short of a million labourers in the front. In May 1916, the Council 
of Ministers resolved to draft the inorodtsy of Turkestan for labour service.  
The Council expected to be able to draft at least 480,000 men aged between 19 
and 43 from the colony; 250,000 from governorate of Turkestan, and 230,000 from the 
Steppe governorate. The numbers were calculated to reflect the number of native men of 
eligible age in every oblast and were further adjusted to ensure a sufficient labour pool in 
the cotton-growing areas of the region in both the current and the coming year.37 To 
compensate for the decrease in the number of workers in Ferghana and other cotton-sown 
                                                          
37 “Razrabotka plana provedeniia mobilizatsii kirgiz voennymi vlastiami kraia, 2 iiulia 1916 g.” in Ryskulov, 15. 
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areas of the region, the Council increased the quota that had to be fulfilled by 
Semirechye.38 In the end, the nomads of Semirechye had to furnish 60,000 workers, or 
18% of the total male population of the oblast.39  
The decree was signed by Nicholas II on June 25. The first announcements of the 
impending draft were made in the first two weeks of July. Immediately, the panic set in. 
A native functionary compared the effect that the draft had on nomads to “a state not too 
dissimilar to that of cattle plagued by gadfly in the month of May, when, tormented by 
the intolerable pain, it jerks violently from side to side with its tail raised, and is unable 
to make out either pits or deep ravines that it can fall into.”40 Another official described 
the draft as “the thunder in clear sky.”41  
Rumours had spread that the natives were drafted for active military service, that 
is, that they were “taken as soldiers.”42 Still others believed that they would “dig trenches 
under the enemy fire” and that “this is the most dangerous work.”43 Seemingly eager to 
upset the Muslims, some of the settlers poured oil on the flames of their anxiety. “Out of 
mischief” some of the settlers “taunted Muslims into believing that they were being taken 
to the slaughter, while others figured that if Muslims will not furnish the workers, their 
land will be taken away from them in punishment and given to Russians.”44 Not a few 
colonists gloated about the extension of conscription to the natives, whose exemption 
from military duty was a frequent source of envy.45   
Equally unfortunate was the wording of the decree itself. Short and vague, it 
drafted native men for “the installation of defensive constructions and military 
communications in the area of active service by the army (v raione deistvuiushchei 
armii)” giving an impression that the draftees would be transferred to the combat zone.46 
Individual announcements did even more to rouse the population. An announcement 
made by the military governor of Semirechye in mid-July stated explicitly that the natives 
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are being conscripted for trench works.47 Some observers, including a group of Kazakh 
intelligentsia, put the blame on “semi-literate” native translators who were unfamiliar 
with the terminology of the draft and translated it “incorrectly and unclearly.” “In their 
interpretation,” the group concluded, “it appeared that the Kyrgyz were conscripted as 
“soldiers” and would be taken to the front without any prior training.”48 As official 
announcements were made in Semirechye in mid-July more than one family decided to 




If the nomads’ flight to China could be seen as passive resistance to the labour draft, the 
mass protests across the region signalled the beginning of the second, active phase of 
resistance. The first demonstrations took place mainly in the sedentary areas of Turkestan 
in the early days of July. Facilitated by the railway, the protests spread quickly across the 
region.50 In the second half of July, 25 mass demonstrations took place in the Samarkand 
oblast, 20 in the Syr-Daria and 86 in the Ferghana oblast.51 The main targets of the 
crowds’ discontent were the native administrators in charge of drawing the lists. Crowds 
of Muslims sought out volost heads and forced them to destroy the lists of recruits.  
The protests claimed their first victims on 4 July in the city of Khojent (now 
Khujand in northern Tajikistan) in the Samarkand oblast. A crowd of 3,000 protesters 
including many native women and children gathered in front of the city’s chancellery to 
demand the annulment of the draft. When a group of policemen attempted to disperse the 
crowd, the crowd responded by throwing stones forcing the policemen to retreat inside 
the building. Several soldiers arriving on the scene fired into the crowd, killing two 
protesters and wounding one. As the crowd surged, the soldiers arrested the leaders of the 
protest.52 The news of the disturbances caused grave concern in the colonial 
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administration. Because of the size of Khojent and its location in the most populous oblast 
of the colony, protests that started in Khojent could travel quickly to other cities and 
settlements of the region. To nip the protests in the bud the authorities dispatched the 
punitive force of 200 soldiers and a Cossack cavalry squadron, and enforced martial law 
prohibiting the townspeople from going outside.  
The first success of the authorities in suppressing the protests in the city proper 
was soon countered by the protests in the countryside. Where punitive forces moved to 
put down the protests new protests flared in the neighbouring towns and villages. On 5 
July, the 2,000 strong crowd broke into the local administration in the town of Urgut and 
destroyed the lists. On the same day, a group of protesters attacked one of the punitive 
detachments at the Kuropatkino railway station. Two days later, on 7 July, the settlement 
of Dagbit became the site of new protests, and on 9 July, protests erupted in the settlement 
of Gazy-Iaglyk in the Kokand uezd. Within days, violent protests enveloped the entire 
Samarkand oblast.53  
On 9 July the protests spread to Andijan. Here, crowds of townsmen and farmers 
armed with sticks and stones descended on the city’s administration but were thrown into 
disarray by the police and Cossacks. On 10 July, the protests moved to Margilan where 
the mob killed several native functionaries. The capital, Tashkent, plunged into protests 
on 11 July. The protest’s victims included 11 dead, 15 wounded, and 34 arrested. The 
oblast’s military governor, Nil Lykoshin, summarized the events as follows: “the 
agitation grew – fistfights and murders flared here and there, the blandishments and 
admonitions of the local authorities had no effect, nor were explanations trusted until, 
finally, all of these took the shape of an open rebellion against the Russian government.”54  
What started as a protest in a single city soon grew into something that the 
government and its repressive powers could neither contain nor prevent. The attempts to 
pre-empt violence by dispersing protests and harassing their participants generated more 
protests. The emergence of disturbances in the areas where punitive troops were 
dispatched was not a coincidence. The use of repressive measures against the native 
population of the region generated more violence as the native society mobilized and 
responded in kind. Violence, in other words, begot more violence. This dynamic of 
violent interactions is also crucial to understanding how the rebellion moved from its 
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initial stage of peaceful protests and flight to a later stage in which the native population 
engaged in what can only be described as ethnic warfare against the settler society.  
A closer look at the events in the Samarkand oblast reveals a decisive moment in 
the rebellion – the events that took place in the city of Jizak between July 13 and July 25. 
Unlike the events elsewhere, the revolt in Jizak showed signs of organization. More 
importantly, the revolt in Jizak spilled over the geographic boundaries separating the 
native half of the city from its European quarters, where the majority of the rebels’ victims 
lived. The most significant difference of the incident in Jizak from similar events in other 
cities of the oblast was that the majority of victims in Jizak were Russian settlers, not 
native officials. Thus, the native protests in Jizak were significant in at least three 
respects: to begin with, it was the first time that the native peoples targeted the entire 
Russian population of the city, including women and children, and did not discriminate 
in their attacks between representatives of the state – officials, policemen, and soldiers – 
and civilian settlers; secondly, the repression that followed was similarly targeted at the 
destruction of the native residents of the city irrespective of their age and gender as well 
as the destruction of the city itself; thirdly, this was the first time during the conflict that 
the government employed the professional military in a highly organized and coordinated 
fashion to cleanse the area of its native population and replace it with Russian colonists. 
As such, the Jizak events both serve as a point of demarcation separating the two stages 
of the conflict and highlight the emergence of the violent extrajudicial mechanisms of 
suppressing the native protests. 
The revolt in Jizak had a direct connection to the disturbances in Tashkent. On 12 
July a meeting was convened in the market square of the native part of the city to draw 
up the draft lists. According to the official sources, the meeting was attended by a certain 
ishan (a religious figure) by the name of Nazyr Khodzha, who arrived from Tashkent 
hours before the meeting. Nazyr Khodzha informed the gathering of the revolt in 
Tashkent against the conscription. Commotions started in the crowd cutting the meeting 
short. The next morning a crowd armed with improvised weapons converged on the local 
administration to demand the surrender of the draft lists. A native bailiff, present at the 
scene, was killed after threatening the crowd with his revolver.55 Upon learning of the 
bailiff’s killing, a native dignitary informed the head of the uezd, Colonel Rukin, of the 
disturbances in native Jizak. Rukin promptly sent a detachment and rode out to the city. 
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Rukin was not alone. In addition to his native informer, Rukin was joined by the head of 
the district police Zotoglov, a native translator, and two native retainers armed with rifles.  
Mid-way between the native quarters and the European part of the city, Rukin and 
his men crossed paths with an angry crowd heading towards the European city. Rukin 
attempted to calm the crowd, which grew increasingly agitated and surrounded Rukin and 
his small retinue. Apparently, the presence of armed retainers had further upset the crowd, 
prompting some of the protesters to drag one of the colonel’s native attendants off his 
horse in an attempt to seize his rifle. Rukin rushed to his attendant’s rescue, but was killed 
by one of the crowd’s leaders with a blow on the head. The crowd then overwhelmed 
Rukin’s men and beat them to death.56  
The arriving detachment dispersed the crowd and blocked the road to the 
European section of Jizak. The retreating rebels launched a series of attacks on the railway 
stations along the stretch of railway connecting Jizak and the European settlement of 
Obruchevo. There, the rebels were joined by the native railway workers. The mobs armed 
with improvised weapons destroyed the railway lines, bridges, and telegraph lines. For 
three days, between 13 and 16 July, all communication between Jizak and Tashkent was 
cut. The rebels plundered the stations and killed the railway workers and their families. 
Altogether, 45 settlers – mostly men and older women – were killed and 75 young women 
and children taken captive.57 Many of the captives were raped repeatedly and forcibly 
converted to Islam. For a short time, the native city was in the rebels’ hands.  
The small contingent of soldiers and Cossacks stationed in Jizak continued to 
defend the European part of the city, but a much larger force was needed to suppress the 
uprising. Although short of resources the administration was able to put together a small 
army of thirteen infantry companies, an artillery battery with six cannons, three hundred 
Cossacks, and three sapper companies under the command of Colonel Ivanov. Ordered 
to show “iron determination, resolve, and ruthlessness” towards “both those guilty of 
murder and disturbances and the local population, responsible to a certain degree, for the 
rebellion against the Russian rule,” the troops were to punish the “rebellious population” 
by “corporal punishment and execution” as well as “the destruction of their 
settlements.”58  
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True to Ivanov’s orders “to shoot, to burn, and to seize household furnishings and 
agricultural tools” the punitive detachments “set upon the native settlements, setting fire 
to properties, shooting anyone in their way, raping women and committing all manner of 
atrocities. They burned the crops in the fields and carried off the harvested grain. The 
population fled to the cities and into the steppe, abandoning their farms. Famine ensued. 
Women fled leaving behind their children. Refugees starved in the distant steppes and in 
the towns.”59 The brutality of Ivanov’s expedition underscored the efficiency of the well-
armed and organized troops. The native part of Jizak ceased to exist; the members of the 
Duma investigation who visited the area in late August 1916 described the city as “totally 
destroyed.”60  
The suppression of the rebellion in Jizak set the precedent for the future campaigns 
of persecution against the native population, but the cumulative effect that it had on the 
native population was at odds with the kind of attitude that the authorities sought to 
cultivate in the native masses. As refugees from Jizak disappeared into towns and 
settlements the word of the Russian atrocities spread, fuelling discontent and driving the 
mass mobilization effort. Rather than pre-empting the spread of rebellion, the fear of 
punitive expeditions spurred further resistance. The more fearful of the punitive forces 
the native farmers and nomads were the more likely they were to organize themselves to 
offer resistance.  
 
“The Reckless Rebellion of the Savage Nomads” 
 
Nowhere was this organization more evident than in the rebellion of the native nomads 
in Semirechye. Convinced “to die here or kill all the Russians” the rebels launched a 
series of organized assaults on European settlements, killing and capturing in the process 
more than 3,000 colonists.61 The death toll that they inflicted on Russian colonists 
exceeded the number of soldiers the empire lost during the conquest of the region.62 
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Similarly extensive was the damage that the rebellion had caused to the economy of 
Semirechye; fields were torched and trampled, entire villages were razed by fire; roads, 
bridges, and telegraph poles were destroyed. Some contemporaries attributed the lethality 
of the uprising to “the excesses of the crowd.”63 Yet, such an approach risks ignoring 
signs of careful planning and organization in the rebels’ actions. On the other hand, the 
underlying emotive factor of the rebellion, expressed in the resolve of the rebels “to die 
or kill,” is evident. Neither an outbreak of “passion,” nor solely the product of “reason,” 
the uprising was simultaneously a crime of passion, where the victims came to be seen as 
an immediate threat to the perpetrators, and a crime of purpose, where the perpetrators 
sought to remove this threat. To better understand the lethality of the uprising in 
Semirechye I propose to examine the interaction of “passion and calculation” as it 
developed in the course of violent engagements between the authorities and the nomads 
in the weeks preceding the uprising.64  
The emotional charge of the rebellion drew on fear. As an emotional experience 
shared across the ethnic divide fear prompted both the colonists and the nomads to resort 
to violence in response to the perceived threat. Yet the violence was neither spontaneous 
nor was it the nomads’ immediate response. A coordinated attack requires planning, 
negotiation, and organization, and, critically, intentions. Intentions are not spontaneous, 
they crystallize in the process of reflection. The physical assault on the settler society – 
or the uprising proper – was the concluding stage of resistance which, in its primary stage, 
took less violent forms. For the rebellion to begin in earnest a series of increasingly 
violent interactions between the natives and the colonists had to occur. The use of force 
by the administration to quell peaceful protests and to implement the labour draft led to 
popular mobilization of the native communities.  
The spatial dynamics of the rebellion was also a significant factor in the escalation 
of violence; the geographical terrain of Semirechye contributed to both the fast diffusion 
of the rebellion and a high casualty rate among the colonists and the rebels. The distinctive 
pattern of agricultural colonization in Semirechye – facilitated by the area’s mountainous 
landscape and the construction of the road from Verny to Przhevalsk – meant that the 
distances between the settlements tended to be short. The proximity of the settlements to 
each other permitted the rebels to travel from settlement to settlement before the news of 
the rebellion could reach the neighbouring settlements or the authorities. The 
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concentration of the settler population in a relatively compact area also meant that the 
rebels could kill more colonists in a shorter period of time. On the other hand, the 
predominantly Russian population of Semirechye’s cities and towns prevented the 
emergence of large-scale protests characteristic of the sedentary areas of the region. The 
largely European makeup of the Semirechye’s largest cities is also a likely explanation 
for the failure of the local administration to notice the warning signs of the growing 
tension.  
The official announcement of the draft was made in Verny, Pishpek, and 
Przhevalsk in the first half of July.65 Official sources and witness testimonies suggest that 
the initial response to the draft was panicky flight across the border. The first crossings 
into China began, according to the native translator of the Przhevalsk uezd administration, 
Tulembai Diusebaev, immediately after the announcement of the draft in Przhevalsk uezd 
on 13 July. The majority of those fleeing were young unmarried men of draft age.66 The 
first exodus was followed days later by the flight of native farm hands who “under various 
excuses” left their Russian employers.67 By the end of the month, the exodus of the 
nomads to China took on a more organized form; families and entire clans crossed the 
border. Some observers noted the sudden rush of Kyrgyz buyers at the local markets and 
the steep rise in prices on horses and staple foods. 68 Horses in particular fetched 4-5 times 
the regular price.69  
Not everyone was able or willing to leave their animals and farms and move across 
the border. Naturally, apprehension about the draft and discontent with the mounting 
pressures and demands of the administration grew. Like in the sedentary areas of the 
colony, the natives’ anger was at first directed at the native administrators responsible for 
drawing up the lists. Fearing for their lives, some of these administrators approached the 
colonial authorities with the request for protection. Less than two weeks after the 
announcement in Przhevalsk, on 23 July, native volost administrators informed the head 
of the uezd, Colonel Ivanov, that their native constituencies threatened to kill them if they 
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gave the authorities the lists of eligible men.70 They pled with Ivanov to put them into 
prison to both ensure their safety and to put an end to rumours that they were in cahoots 
with the administration. Ivanov refused the request.  
Ivanov’s dismissal of the native administrators, most of whom belonged to a small 
group of native elites, is the likely explanation for the elite’s participation in and 
leadership of the rebellion. According to the dragoman of the Russian consulate in 
Kashgar, Georgii Stefanovich, “in virtually every volost the volost heads were the leaders 
of the revolt.”71 A comparison of the lists of Ivanov’s native supplicants, produced by 
Duisebaev, with that of the uprising’s principal leaders confirms Stefanovich’s claim; 
with the exception of the Ulakhol volost head, the administrators of eighteen other volosts 
led the uprising in their respective volosts.72  
At about the same time individuals emerged from among the nomads who 
opposed the draft and called on their communities to protest against it. The majority of 
these “agitators,” as they were referred to by the colonial administration, were of humble 
background, but enjoyed a degree of popularity with local communities and were known 
as baatyrs – individuals of military prowess proven in daring exploits against enemies. 
Several of such baatyrs that figure prominently in police reports and witness depositions 
are Uzak Saurukov (Saurykov in contemporary Kazakh historiography) and Jamanke 
Mambetov of the Verny uezd and Alimkul Taubaldin (Alymkul Tabaldin in 
contemporary Kyrgyz sources) and Egemberdi Sarykov of the Pishpek uezd.73 Wary of 
potential disruptions to the draft, the administration targeted these men and their 
supporters for arrest. In the second half of July, the authorities seized dozens of people 
suspected of agitation against the conscription. On July 17 alone, 34 “agitators” were 
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arrested in 3 volosts of the Verny uezd.74 Often, the arrests were made during the official 
announcements of the draft. Anyone who voiced their disagreement with the draft or 
expressed their doubts was at risk of being arrested. At Ivanov’s announcement in 
Przhevalsk, one of the attending Kyrgyz was arrested after remarking that “the Kyrgyz 
will perish if they are sent to the labour army. In such a case, death at home would be 
preferable.”75 On 17 July, Ivanov dispatched Diusebaev to arrest an agitator in the area 
of Karkara.76  
The wave of arrests failed to quell the discontent and angered the native society.77 
The deployment of armed police, Cossacks, and, occasionally, soldiers to arrest the 
popular leaders and break peaceful protests had further alienated the nomads.78 A report 
of the scribe of the Al’dzhanskaia volost of the Dzharkent uezd, Komarov (full name 
unknown), to the police head of the Narynkol area, suggests that a decision was taking 
shape at the volost level to resist the draft. At a meeting with the volost representatives, 
the attendees “unanimously declared…that they did not wish to implement the draft” and 
maintained that “they would die here, at home, not on foreign soil. Even if all of them 
were executed, they did not wish to work and would not give a single man.”79 The crowd 
then forced the scribe to yield the lists of the drafted and demanded that the administration 
not detain the volost heads. Reporting on the same incident, the head of the Dzharkent 
uezd, Nikolai Stupin, noted the resolve of the crowd to resist “to the last and kill anyone 
who assisted in the conscription.”80 
 Similar instances of resistance to the draft were reported in other volosts of the 
oblast. On 7 July, the Dungans of the Dungan volost in the Dzharkent uezd told Stupin 
that they “would rather die” than become labourers.81 As tension was mounting, 
numerous communal meetings and gatherings were called by the native administrators 
and popular leaders to discuss the draft. Between 7 and 8 July, for example, such meetings 
were held in the areas of Issyk-Ata and Kegety, and the Dzhail’myshevskaia, and 
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Chemalganskaia volosts.82 The meetings were well attended; over 5,000 men and women 
gathered on 10 July in Ul’konzas.83 Crucially, because the meetings took place outside 
the cities and towns they went largely unnoticed by the authorities, allowing the local 
communities to establish a popular base for the rebellion.84 The decision to resist 
“coercion by the administration” by taking “violent and hostile measures…against the 
government and the Russian population” was reached in the course of negotiations within 
and between the volosts.85 A description of one such assembly – on the eve of the uprising 
– between the Atekinskaia and Sarybagishevskaia volosts is given in a deposition of a 
native Pishpek resident, Mulla-Sufi Konushpaev. According to Konushpaev, the first call 
to arms against the authorities came from Alimkul Taubaldin, who “vehemently agitated” 
against the draft” and took an oath, along with 100 other men of the Atekinskaia volost, 
to “die fighting the Russians” in early August. The meeting of the Ateke and Sarybagish 
(Sarybagysh) Kyrgyz took place on the day of the uprising, immediately after the first 
attacks of the Sarybagish Kyrgyz on the neighbouring Russian settlements, on 7 August.86 
The dignitaries (or “honourable persons,” as they were known in colonial parlance, 
included figures as diverse as native administrators, community elders, popular leaders, 
and religious figures), of the two volosts gathered on the bridge over the Kebin river and, 
after an exchange of vows, proclaimed the brother of the Sarybagishevskaia volost 
administrator, Makush Shabdanov, their khan.87  
The assemblies solidified opposition to the draft and ensured the cohesion of the 
future rebel army; here, agreements were reached, oaths of loyalty given, and sacrificial 
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horses slain.88 As the popular consensus for armed resistance to the draft took shape, the 
initial spur of mobilization, triggered by the flight to China, gave way to comprehensive 
mass mobilization of the native society. The would-be rebels raised an army by drafting 
men in each volost and forming military detachments led, as a rule, by their respective 
heads (who, as has been noted above, were often in the service of the colonial 
government). Women, too, were not spared the mobilization. Their role in the native 
protests was remarkably similar to that of the Russian women in the food riots half a year 
earlier. A few administrators noted their presence at the sites of the workers’ registration. 
From what we know, there were no women in combat, but their indirect participation 
included cheering on men going into battle and keeping watch over the captives.89  
Although the capacity for violence, engendered in the mass mobilization of the 
native society, was fully realized in the course of the rebellion, it did not in itself cause 
the rebellion. The transition from mass mobilization to mass violence occurred in the 
course of increasingly violent clashes between the native communities and the authorities. 
The threat perception that the punitive forces represented to the nomads was crucial to 
the escalation of violence. The repressive measures taken by the administration in 
response to the attempts of the native communities to negotiate the terms of the draft or 
evade it by fleeing galvanized resistance to the authorities and the colonial society at 
large. Animated by fear and a collective sense of victimhood and persecution, the rebels 
sought not so much to right the injustices of colonial rule as to simply survive.  
Numerous petitions and depositions convey the sense of desperation and 
entrapment prevalent among the Semirechye’s nomads. In explaining their flight to China 
– though carefully avoiding the subject of the rebellion – the Kyrgyz of the 8 volosts of 
the Przhevalsk uezd indicate that the administration threatened them with execution if 
they failed to furnish eligible men. The execution of the arrested Kyrgyz in the Przhevalsk 
prison confirmed their worst fears.90 A pointed remark by a native judge to the scribe 
Komarov that the authorities are mistaken in thinking that “the Muslims can be 
conscripted like sheep taken to slaughter” lends weight to the sense of apprehension 
among the nomads about the meaning of the draft and the intentions of the government.91 
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That the anxieties about the perceived impending massacre at the hands of the colonial 
government were central to the mobilization of the native population is further evidenced 
in the telegram of the acting Governor-General of Turkestan, Mikhail Erofeev, to the 
Minister of War, Dmitrii Shuvaev, informing him that “at one of the Kirghiz meetings in 
the Semirechye oblast, speakers claimed that Russians want to pick the healthiest element 
(sic) from among the Muslims and send them to the theatre of war before the Russian 
soldiers, where Russian and German troops will decimate them, thereby achieving the 
goal conceived by Russians of destroying the Muslim population.”92 
 The festering discontent of the nomads reached a point of no return in early 
August. The first violent clashes between the authorities and the nomads happened in the 
Lepsinsk uezd between 24 July and 1 August, when a border patrol attempted to detain 
families crossing the border.93 The Kazakhs opened fire in response. Two incidents that 
followed in the wake of the events in Lepsinsk uezd mark the beginning of the rebellion 
proper with attendant violence and targeted assaults on the settlers. What makes these 
incidents particularly noteworthy is the presence of two conflicting accounts, by a native 
administrator, the Kazakh engineer Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, whom we will meet 
again in the next chapter, and a Russian scribe, Petr Driupin. Although markedly different 
in their reading of the events both accounts highlight the role of fear in the rise of violence. 
Read against each other, these two accounts offer an insight into how both groups 
interpreted each other’s motivations and how they acted on them. They illustrate that the 
rebellion was as much a spontaneous response to the perceived threat, against which a 
defensive action had to be taken, as an act of organized resistance.  
According to Tynyshpaev, the first incident took place on 3 August in the 
Kyzylboruk (Kyzylburovskaia) volost in the eastern part of the Verny uezd, where the 
assistant head of the uezd, Khlynovskii, accompanied by the district police captain Kulaev 
and fifteen soldiers and policemen, took several Kazakh dignitaries hostage in an effort 
to force the volost to produce the lists within five hours.94 After approaching Khlynovskii 
on at least three different occasions with the request to release the arrested and to delay 
the draft the crowd grew increasingly impatient. In what seems to have been an attempt 
to disperse the crowd, Khlynovskii fired into the air; mistaking it for a signal to shoot, his 
men fired into the crowd, killing two Kazakhs. As the angry crowd surrounded the station 
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in response to the shooting, one of the protesters, armed with a hunting rifle, killed a 
policeman. A punitive expedition consisting of a Cossack cavalry squadron and a half-
company was despatched to the area on the same day.95 
The second incident occurred in the Botpaev (Botpaevskaia) volost of the Verny 
uezd three days later, on 6 August. The trigger in this case were the machinations of the 
native volost head who used the occasion to include only the Kazakhs of the rival party 
in the lists. Seeking justice, the aggrieved party approached the district police captain 
Gilev. Gilev, however, sided with the volost head who claimed that the rival group was 
plotting to revolt. To put down the disturbances, Gilev led a group of 20 policemen against 
the rival party in the area of the Samsy station. The arrival of armed men in the volost 
alarmed its native population, which gathered in a large crowd. What happened next 
mirrors the earlier events of the Kyzylboruk incident. Angered by the presence of armed 
policemen, the agitated crowd of locals surrounded Gilev and his men forcing them first 
to retreat and then to fire into the crowd, killing twelve Kazakhs.  
Driupin’s version of events diverges from Tynyshpaev’s at one critical juncture; 
in his reading of the precipitating events, Driupin focuses on the precedence of the 
nomads’ hostile actions and the premediated nature of the attack and fails to mention the 
hostile actions of the colonial administrators, such as the arrests of the Kazakh dignitaries. 
According to Driupin, Khlynovskii’s visit to Kyzylboruk volost was prompted by the 
reports of the refusal of the volost to furnish the labourers. To ensure the timely 
submission of the lists Khlynovskii arrived in the volost on 1 August, two days earlier 
than suggested by Tynyshpaev. Here, he ordered the native volost head to convene a 
meeting the next day to produce the lists. Despite the orders no one showed up for the 
meeting on 2 August. The same evening, the district police captain Skliuev (Kulaev in 
Tynyshpaev’s deposition) arrived with ten soldiers and two policemen (three men short 
of the fifteen men in Tynyshpaev’s account). Apparently, Skluiev was acting on the 
reports of a native conspiracy to “massacre the Russians” at night, which in fact did not 
happen. The meeting was convened the next day, on 3 August. Sometime after the 
meeting commenced, a group of crying women threw themselves at the men compiling 
the lists but was led away. When the women rushed forward a second time, a group of 
mounted Kazakhs armed with spears and sticks rode out of the nearby forest and opened 
fire, killing one of the soldiers and wounding another. Khlynovskii and his men returned 
fire, but the crowd only grew thicker. As the Russians retreated they abandoned their 
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belongings, which momentarily distracted the crowd and gave them a chance to cross the 
river and escape.96  
Driupin concludes his deposition with Khlynovskii’s allegation that on 8 July, 
nearly a month before the events in Kyzylboruk and Botbaevo, “all the more or less 
influential Kyrgyz” of the Kyzylburovskaya (Kyzylboruk) and Siugatinskaia volosts held 
a council and resolved not to provie the workers “even if they have to die for that.”97 
Contrast this with Tynyshpaev’s contention that both incidents were “caused entirely by 
the actions” of the colonial administrators, namely Khlynovskii and Gilev, and his 
conclusion that “the identical actions of the administration’s representatives led to 
identical results: 1) Khlynovskii came to the peaceful kyzylboruktsy with a detachment 
and provoked an assault; 2) Gilev came to Samsy with a detachment – the Kirghiz 
(Kazakhs) attacked the detachment.”98 It is inescapable that both Tynyshpaev and Driupin 
seek to assign guilt, but where Tynyshpaev points an accusatory finger at the authorities, 
Driupin holds the natives to account.  
The question then boils down to who started the conflict. Both Tynyshpaev and 
Driupin attempt to answer the question by establishing the sequence of events, where the 
aggrieved party is forced to respond to the threatening actions of the offending party. It 
is ultimately of little relevance who fired the first shot. What these two accounts clearly 
demonstrate is the importance of perceptions and emotions in the conflict. Both 
testimonies highlight the shared nature of fear. The nomads were intimidated by the 
soldiers’ guns, but so were the soldiers intimated by the large crowds. The violent clashes 
like the ones above escalated into a self-perpetuating cycle of violence where the violent 
suppression of protests by the authorities led to further disturbances thereby triggering a 
new wave of repressions.99  
Tynyshpaev’s testimony stands out in particular because it succeeds in grasping 
the contingency of the conflict. His moment-by-moment account of the first violent 
engagements between the authorities and the nomads offers a clue into the motives, 
interests, and fears at the heart of the conflict. He traces the turning point in the escalation 
of violence to the flight of the terrified Kazakhs of the Botpaevskaia volost into the 
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neighbouring Pishpek uezd between 6 and 7 August. Fleeing from a punitive expedition 
consisting of a Cossack sotnia, one infantry company, and a settler militia, groups of 
Kazakhs destroyed the telegraph, plundered the station and rustled cattle.100 In pursuit of 
the fleeing Kazakhs, the expedition seized and executed several Kazakh coachmen near 
the station of Otar.101 The now rebellious nomads of Botpaevskaia responded in kind, 
killing sixteen and taking thirty five settlers captive.102  
The flight of the Kazakhs to the Pishpek uezd between 6 and 7 August triggered 
a series of events culminating in the launch of concurrent attacks on the settlements and 
the siege of the city of Tokmak. The fleeing Kazakhs soon reached the Pishpek uezd. The 
arrival of panicky Kazakhs in the Pishpek uezd spread further panic among the Kazakhs 
of the Dzhanyshevskaia (Dzhanysskaia in Tynyshpaev’s account) and Chumichevskaia 
volosts (of the Pishpek uezd), who “fearing that the punitive detachments will come after 
their Botpaevskaia kin” fled to the Atekinskaia and Sarybagishevskaia volosts. From 
there, the rebellion spread and became increasingly violent.  
One of the reports suggests that the runaway coachmen told the Kyrgyz of the 
Sarybagishevskaia volost about the transport of weapons dispatched by the administration 
from Verny to Przhevalsk.103 On 7 August, a patrol set up by the Kyrgyz in the Boom 
gorge, between the Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds, seized the transport of about 200 rifles 
and 3,000 cartridges.104 Some witnesses of the rebellion observed that the seizure of 
weapons “served…as a signal and an instrument of transition from the passive 
resistance…to the active, murderous one.”105 The timing of the first attack against a 
Russian settlement, hours before the seizure of weapons, gives reason to believe that the 
uprising would, in any case, reach its murderous stage, but it helps to explain the relative 
success of the rebels and their resolve.   
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 The next day, on 8 August, a group of armed Kyrgyz attacked the post office at 
the station of Jal-Aryk.106 From 8 August the uprising unfolded in all volosts of the 
Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds. The rebels launched a series of concurrent and carefully 
coordinated attacks against the settlements and the punitive forces. On 12 August, about 
1,500 rebels engaged a Cossack sotnia, 70 soldiers, and 350-strong settler militia in a 
battle in the environs of Tokmak. During the battle the expedition nearly lost a machine-
gun to the rebels and was forced to retreat to Tokmak.107 The rebel army quickly swelled 
as more Kyrgyz joined the rebellion. On 13 August 5,000 rebels besieged the city of 
Tokmak, which was cut off from the authorities in Verny and Tashkent for nearly two 
weeks between 13 and 22 August.108 The city was able to repel the attacks thanks in no 
small part to the said machine-gun. The rebels in contrast were poorly armed; one of the 
eight volosts that laid siege to Tokmak, for example, had only seven rifles.109 Siege was 
also laid to the large settlement of Preobrazhenskoe, which became a safe haven for the 
refugees from neighbouring settlements. The siege of Preobrazhenskoe lasted from 10 to 
29 August. On 28 August, the arriving punitive expedition lifted the siege and forced the 
rebels to retreat.110 
The pattern of attacks was identical across the two uezds. Groups of rebels armed 
with sticks, axes, pikes, and a few rifles rode into settlements, killing men and older 
women and rounding up women and children many of whom, including children, were 
then raped and killed or taken captive.111 Horses were often stolen before the attack to 
prevent the victims from fleeing. Similar precautions were taken by the rebels to minimize 
their losses during the attacks. Houses were put to torch to weaken the settlers’ resistance 
and to lure them out of their hideouts. Livestock was seized and fields trampled.112 
To prevent the administration from communicating messages to the punitive 
detachments and to hamper their movements, the rebels destroyed bridges and telegraph 
lines and poles, post offices and administrative buildings, railway stations and the railway 
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itself. In battle, too, the rebels exhibited strong organization and coordination. At its peak, 
the rebel army had 5,000 active combatants.113 The rebels formed detachments headed by 
military commanders drawn primarily from among a group of volost heads. To 
distinguish between the individual formations each commander carried a banner. For the 
same purpose, many of the rebels wore metal badges.114 The rebels transmitted messages 
about the movements of the punitive expeditions by using lanterns.115 During shootouts 
with the Russian forces, the rebels dug trenches.116 Their resolve and daring was noted 
even by the colonial officials, who described them as reckless.117  
The damage inflicted by the rebels on the oblast was enormous. The hardest hit 
was the Przhevalsk uezd, where 94 settlements were destroyed and 5,373 farms burned 
and plundered. 1905 men and women were killed, 684 were wounded, and 1105 were 
taken captive. 90% of the settlers’ livestock was seized by the rebels.118 The material 
damages were estimated by the authorities to be as high as 20 million rubles.119 In the 
words of an Okhrana officer Iungmeister, the “wealthiest uezd in Semirechye had ceased 
to exist, only the city of Przhevalsk and the nearby settlements of Preobrazhenskoe and 
Teplokliuchinskoe remain.”120  
Nowhere did the all-out nature of the rebellion in Semirechye manifest itself more 
brutally than in the attacks on the Russian settlements. The violence that the rebels 
inflicted on their victims was cast by the colonial administration as a symptom of the 
nomads’ inherent barbarism.121 Implicitly, the colonial administrators denied any 
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meaning to the rebels’ violence, and, by extension, to the rebellion itself. Yet, although 
extreme, the violence that the rebels used against the settlers was not grounded in the 
nomadic way of life. Furthermore, the systematic nature of the killings and the selective 
targeting of the victims on ethnic grounds was also characteristic of settlers’ actions. To 
understand the brutality of the rebels I propose to examine violence as a form of 
communications.122 By teasing out the symbolic dimensions of violence we can 
understand the rebels’ intentions. 
The violence that accompanied the attacks on the settlements was extreme and 
gender specific. Torture and public executions were common. Women were subjected to 
horrific sexual violence while men were forced to watch. A report by a member of the 
Turkestan Okhrana Department, Captain Iungmeister, describes torture inflicted on the 
Russian settlers in morbid detail: “[the rebels] cut off [the settlers’] noses and ears, 
severed joints, hands, and feet, and when only the torso would remain, would finish 
[them] off with an axe blow in the head. Women had their breasts and genitalia removed, 
4-5 year old girls were raped in front of their mothers, while others were penetrated with 
sticks. Nursing babies were cut into pieces. I have personally seen a year and a half old 
toddlers with fractured heads. [I have seen] A woman with 6 stab wounds to the face. The 
Kyrgyz carried off young women and girls, some of whom were made into “wives” during 
their captivity, while others were passed around, servicing up to 50 Kyrgyz on some 
days.”123  
The use of violence in ethnic conflicts is well established; at its simplest, violence 
is the physical, visceral expression of power over the enemy group. The rebels sought to 
humiliate the enemy and to assert their control over the enemies’ bodies and the power 
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that these bodies represented. By raping the Russian women and killing their children the 
rebels sought to emasculate the Russian men. Violence in the hands of the rebels was the 
ultimate expression of power over the colonists’ life and death.  
Still, there was more to the violence than the assertion of control. The violence of 
the rebels carried a potent symbolic message that they carved into their victims’ bodies. 
It reminded the colonists that their presence was unwanted. By removing women’s 
wombs and breasts and castrating men the rebels had taken away the settlers’ ability to 
procreate.124 By gouging out their eyes and hacking off their tongues, ears, and hands, the 
rebels robbed the colonists of the ability to see, speak, hear, and do. By severing their 
victims’ legs the rebels rendered the settlers immobile. In short, the rebels denied the 
colonists the right to be in the land that the rebels considered theirs. The rebels’ intention 
“to slaughter all the Russians” and their actions to that effect were in practice a form of 
ethnic cleansing targeted at the physical destruction of the settler society.125  
 
The Making of Russian Semirechye  
 
The settler society responded to the rebels’ violence in kind. The mobilization of the 
settler society ran in parallel to the native mobilization. The first telegram ordering 
mobilization – “if local conditions dictate so” – of “peasant and Cossack militias for self-
defence and protection of the settlements by special night watches” was sent from Verny 
to Przhevalsk already on 2 August. Less than a week later, on 8 August, the oblast’s 
military governor, General Fol’baum, ordered the “immediate formation of militias.”126 
Fol’baum’s later telegram reminded the punitive detachments to “…work in complete 
unity” with the militias, to “strike strong blows where there is danger,” and to “become 
masters of the situation.127  
At the same time, military forces were drawn from as far as Siberia. Despite the 
heavy losses suffered at the front the government diverted significant resources to 
suppress the rebellion. Not counting the settler militias, a total of 35 companies, 24 
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Cossack cavalry squadrons, 240 mounted scouts, 16 field-guns, and 47 machine guns 
were deployed in Semirechye.128 
 According to the most conservative estimates, the settler militias and the punitive 
detachments killed no less than 16,000 Kyrgyz and Kazakhs. Many more died on route 
to China in the crossing that to this day is remembered as Urkun (exodus), the most 
traumatic event in the modern history of the Kyrgyz. Early blizzards, deep ravines and 
sharp cliffs, lack of grass, and heavy livestock losses, coupled with chaos and stampeding 
of animals and people killed more people than guns and cannons.129 Still more died in 
China and at home after the return to Semirechye over the course of the civil war. Out of 
the 164,000 refugees in China about 130,000 were Kyrgyz and 34,000 Kazakh. By May 
1917, 70,000 Kyrgyz and Kazakhs starved to death.130  
 Like the rebels, the punitive forces and the militias spared no spite for their 
Muslim victims. The official reports mention rape and torture of the native population in 
passing, although the Duma investigation into the uprising is far more vocal about the 
“marauding, rape, murders, and robberies” perpetrated by the punitive forces.131 A more 
detailed description of what awaited natives who fell into the handsof the settlers in the 
wake of the uprising is given in a handful of witness testimonies; a long-time resident of 
Przhevalsk, one Potseluev (who according to a report by an Okhrana agent took an active 
part in the plunder of the city’s Dungans), reports that the Dungans of Przhevalsk were 
“beaten with sticks and stones, stabbed with pitchforks, disembowelled with sickles and 
scythes.”132 According to another witness, “feeling ran high, and the Russians were so 
exasperated against the Kirghiz that even women gouged out prisoners’ eyes with 
pitchforks.”133 An account of the uprising by a native historian and petitions by the 
returning refugees paint a similarly grisly picture and confirm the systematic use of torture 
and rape by the colonists and the punitive forces. Some instances of torture perpetrated 
by the colonists included driving nails into victims’ bodies, stoning to death, pitchforking, 
                                                          
128 Usenbaev, 119. 
129 A well-equipped and provisioned expedition of the Cossack sergeant (starshina), Petr Bychkov, that set out from 
Semirechye in early December reached Chinese Turkestan in a week. When crossing the border from the Naryn uezd 
to China, the expedition nearly froze to death. Salvation came in the form of thirty bottles of pure spirit. For Bychkov’s 
account of their mission to Chinese Turkestan, see “Opisanie pokhoda komandira 1-I Semirechenskoi kazach’ei sotni 
starshiny Bychkova v Kitai v mestechko Uch-Turfana za russkimi plennymi I skryvaiushchimisia na kitaiskoi territorii 
rukovoditeliami Semirechenskogo vosstaniia,”15-28 ianvaria 1917 g.” in Mambetaliev, 94-100.  
130 D. D.  Dzhunushaliev, "V epitsentre vosstaniia," Vestnik KRSU 15, no. 9 (2015 ): 206. 
131 “Stenogramma zakrytogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi dumy, 31 dekabria 1916 g.” in Kotiukova, 360, 381.  
132 “Protokol doprosa sudebnym sledovatelem Vernenskogo okruzhnogo suda svidetelia Potselueva ob ozbienii 
russkimi kitaitsev-opiishchikov Przheval’skogo uezda, 21 sentiabria-4 oktiabria 1916 g.” in Mambetaliev, 128. On 
Potseluev’s participation in the plunder, see “Svedeniia Zavedyvaiushchego Vernenskim Rozysknym Punktom 
Agentura “Akhmet”, Zapiska №50 po dvizheniiu tuzemtsev,” 6 noiabria 1916 g.” in Koigeldiev, 71. 
133 Nazaroff, 150. 
69 
 
wrapping victims in wool or burying them in hay and setting them alight, setting dogs 
upon them etc.134  
If rape and murder are symptoms of a savage disposition, the punitive expeditions 
and settler militias were as guilty as their nomadic foes. The brutality of the settlers, 
remarked Iungmeister, matched that of the rebels.135 Taken aback by the atrocities 
committed by the punitive expeditions, some of the contemporaries searched for the roots 
of the brutality in the desire for vengeance. Beyond any doubt, many settler militias and 
returning soldiers saw their actions in terms of retribution. The violence against women 
and children struck a nerve with the authorities and the colonists alike. The grisly sight 
of mutilated burned bodies, many with visible signs of rape, made the guilt of the rebels 
all the more palpable in the eyes of the punitive detachments and their mission all the 
more justified.  
There is as well a more sinister edge to the remark. While acknowledging the 
brutality of the colonists and rebels alike, the remark hints – perhaps inadvertently – at 
the similarities shared by the punitive forces and the rebels in their mode of action. As 
the earlier description of the actions of the punitive expedition in Jizak suggests, the 
punitive forces engaged in mass killing, plunder, and rape. None of these was incidental. 
The directives to kill and plunder, though not necessarily to rape, were not the personal 
initiatives taken by the leaders of the punitive forces or militias; they were given by the 
authorities.  
Hatred therefore is a necessary but an insufficient component of the mass killing. 
A more comprehensive explanation is in order. The many similarities in the actions of the 
punitive forces and the rebels denote the affinity of goals. Like the rebels who attempted 
to cleanse the ancestral lands of the Russian colonists, the administration sought to 
cleanse the area of its native population. The campaign of suppression that the authorities 
conducted against the nomads of Semirechye was a concerted effort implemented by the 
military, aided by the civilian population, and overseen by the government.  
Like the rebels, the authorities were motivated by fear. Their fear, however, was 
of a different order. Where the rebels came to view – in the course of the increasingly 
violent engagements with the state authorities – the Russian presence as a threat to their 
very existence, the administration thought of the rebellion in broader, state-centred terms. 
A telegram by the military governor of Semirechye, General Fol’baum, casts the rebellion 
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as a disruption of the Russian state-building project in the region: “the situation can 
change so suddenly that the entire Russian enterprise will come to ruin in Semirechye.”136 
The rebellion therefore was more than simply an assault on law and order. As a group 
attack on the ethnic core of the state, the empire’s “Staatsvolk,” the rebellion constituted 
an attack on the integrity of the state and an attempt to sabotage its sovereignty. It was, 
in short, a state treason and was punished as one.137 The instructions to disregard civilian 
courts, and to court martial and execute the rebels for state treason attest to the view. 
While the native leadership was executed for state treason, the majority of the nomads, 
including men, women, and children were subjected to summary punishment. Fol’baum, 
for example, ordered the complete destruction of the entire native male population of the 
Atekinskaia and Sarybagishevskaia volosts.138 
The colonial administration of Semirechye also implemented a number of 
measures targeted at the destruction of the native population by indirect means. In 
addition to the mass executions, the punitive forces were instructed to “drive the rebels 
vigorously to the most forbidding localities where they will soon succumb to the cold,”139 
to seize the rebels’ animals for “enormous numbers of cattle seized in many locations are 
a clear sign of the rebels’ defeat,”140 to “view the smallest of Kyrgyz groupings as a 
rebellion, and suppress it with peasant militias,”141 and to “strengthen the factionalism 
and to put the Kara-Kirghiz in the most unfavourable conditions.”142 The scope of the 
punitive – or indeed exterminatory – actions was wide, but their goal was focused on a 
single objective; by forcibly moving large groups of nomads and seizing their livestock 
and grain the punitive forces condemned the natives to death by exposure and starvation. 
Once the initial wave of violence against the nomads rendered Semirechye largely 
“clean” of its native population, the colonial government proceeded to legitimize and 
institutionalize the fait accompli of ethnic cleansing. The plan developed by the Governor 
General of Turkestan, Alexei Kuropatkin, in the wake of the uprising envisaged the 
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removal of 37,335 Kyrgyz and Kazakh households, or 190,000 men, women, and 
children, from the Pishpek, Przhevalsk, and Dzharkent uezds.143 The Przhevalsk uezd 
would be cleansed completely of its nomadic population. Altogether, the authorities 
expected to “recover” 2,510,361 dessiatines of land as the result of the removal.144 The 
remaining nomadic population would be resettled in the Naryn uezd adding to its original 
population of 60,000. By seizing the land from the Kirghiz “for the villainy they 
committed” and establishing in their place “the territory with Russian population isolated 
from the Kirghiz by ethnographic as well as geographic borders,” the authorities 
solidified and expanded the presence of the central state into areas where previously it 
had been limited.145 As a part and an extension of the ethnic core of the empire, Russian 
Semirechye would enforce and strengthen the boundaries of the state and thwart potential 
encroachments on the empire’s territory and sovereignty. The nomads – contained in the 
mountainous country of marginal agricultural value and fenced off from the settler 
population by mountains and a string of militarized Cossack settlements – would no 
longer present a threat and become a group of population from which the state could 
extract “millions of sheep for meat, wool, hides, etc.”146All in all, we ought to think of 
the twin policies of the government of stripping Semirechye of its native population and 
“erecting a new colonial society on the expropriated land” as part and parcel of the 
territorial and ethnic consolidation of the state.147  
   
Conclusion 
 
We tend to think of mass mobilization and mass exterminations in connection with wars. 
Rebellions, on the other hand, are rarely seen as wars. What both the rebellion and its 
suppression demonstrate, however, is how the language of war permeated and justified 
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the objectives of the groups in conflict. To the rebels, the forced conscription and the 
violent repression of the protests constituted the declaration of war on the Muslims of the 
region. By the same token, their actions were in response to the belligerent intentions of 
the administration and were therefore entirely justified. In their depositions and 
testimonies the rebels speak of the war. An explanation that one of the rebels offers for 
the uprising is revealing: “We started the war with the Russians because they wanted to 
[forcibly] recruit us as soldiers and because we would be killed by Germans.”148 A 
telegram of the head of the Turkestan military district, Mikhailovskii, corroborates this 
perception: “The Kyrgyz refer to the actual rebellion as the war.”149 
The administration too saw the rebellion as an act of war. The telegram of the 
head of the Kazan military district, Sandetskii, for example, insists that “there was no 
murder of Kyrgyz [Kazakhs] in the Turgai and Irgiz uezds. The forces…did not execute 
the Kyrgyz, but engaged in battle with the organized hordes, which assumed military 
formation and set as their aim the resistance to the state power, the destruction of the cities 
of the oblast, communication lines, and the telegraph.”150 
Perceptions, as I stated in the beginning of this chapter, are important. The 
perceptions of the war in Semirechye suggest that we ought to view the rebellion as an 
integral part of World War I. The war in Semirechye was a war on the domestic front 
brought about by the war fought on the foreign front. The rebellion in Semirechye was 
all the more eventful for they marked “the beginning of the civil wars that would both 
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The Revolution Comes East: Civil War in Semirechye  
 
Wars disrupt the social life of affected communities, they destroy economies and 
infrastructure, and erode the state and civil society institutions. In this respect, 
Semirechye was not an exception. The uprising left the oblast in tatters. The oblast weekly 
“Semirechenskaia zhizn’” (Semirechye’s Life) lamented that the uprising “shattered the 
economic foundations of the local population, arrested agricultural activities, and 
aggravated the burden of the nation-wide economic ailment.”1 Reporting to the Military 
Governor of Semirechye, Colonel Vladimir Kolosovskii had similarly remarked that the 
area from the Tokmak district of the Pishpek uezd to Naryn “bore the character of 
complete destruction…and utter desolation,” with “no attributes of regular peaceful life 
to be found.”2 The head of the Przhevalsk land surveying administration was equally 
pessimistic in his contention that “the uezd was so utterly devastated that it would not be 
able to recover within the next 8-10 years” and that the colonization of the Issyk-Kul 
valley had to be “started anew.”3  
Yet, paradoxically, the rebellion did not bring the colonization of Semirechye to 
a halt. Although the sown acreage dropped as did agricultural productivity, Semirechye 
still produced more grain than it consumed (or was projected to consume) and received 
more Russian colonists than it could comfortably accommodate. So great in fact was the 
influx of new colonists into the oblast that in April 1917, the head of the Semirechye 
resettlement district (pereselencheskii raion) protested against the implementation of 
Kuropatkin’s plan and resettlement of the Ural’sk Cossacks in Semirechye for fear of 
discontent that it would cause among “the Kirghiz, the Cossacks, the long-term 
(starozhily) peasant residents, city residents, and colonists.”4 
Nor did the rebellion and the two revolutions that followed in its wake cause the 
failure of the colonial state in the oblast.5 Although the civil war severed Semirechye’s 
                                                          
1 Semirechenskaia zhizn’ No.1, 03.01.1917 in Boris Mukhlynin, "Istoriia sela Belovodskoe,"  http://belovodskoe-
muh.ucoz.ru/publ/v_d_leonskij_vospominanija_otca_chast_1_aja_istorija_semi_akimenkovykh/1-1-0-145. 
2 “Raport polkovnika V. P. Kolosovskogo voennomu gubernatoru Semirechenskoi oblasti A. I. Alekseevu o sostoianii 
Pishpekskogo i Przheval’skogo uezdov posle vosstaniia i o polozhenii kirgizskogo naseleniia, bezhavshego vo vremia 
vosstaniia v Kitai, 3 noiabria 1916 g.” in Piaskovskii, 692. 
3 “Vosstanie 1916 goda v Chuiskoi oblasti Kyrgyzstana” in Mukhlynin. 
4 “Telegramma zaveduiushchego pereselencheskim delom v Semirechenskom raione ministru zemledeliia o proteste 
vsego naseleniia oblasti protiv zemel’noi politiki pravitel’stva” in A. A. Bulatova, ed. 1917 god v Kazakhstane: 
Dokumenty i materialy (Alma-Ata: Kazakhstan, 1977), 67. 
5 The colonial project was assessed as a failure by many contemporaries, including perhaps most famously Alexander 
Kerenskii in his Duma speech on the uprising of 1916. More recently, some scholars, most notably Daniel Brower, 
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ties with the metropole, the settler population maintained its dominance and preserved 
the colonial status quo. It is revealing that the two main contenders for power in the oblast 
– the self-proclaimed Bolshevik majority of soldiers and landless colonists and the White-
leaning landowning Cossack minority – represented different strata of the colonial 
society. What united the colonists, Cossack and landless alike, was their opposition to the 
native nomads at whose expense they sought to advance their interests and survive in this 
war of all against all. What was Semirechye’s place in the Russia’s “continuum of crisis,” 
which practices and ideas informed the “colonial revolution” in the oblast, and how the 
native society responded to the challenges of the civil war and the continuing dominance 
of the settler communities are the questions that this chapter sets out to address.6  
Picking up where the previous chapter left off, this chapter provides an overview 
of the civil war in the region and its specific trajectory in Semirechye; it examines the 
ways in which the uprising and its suppression affected the region and its population and 
shaped the political contours of the oblast during and after the civil war. In my analysis 
of interregnum Semirechye, I draw on Peter Holquist’s proposition to view “the violence 
of the Russian civil war…as the extension of state practices conceived in the nineteenth 
century and massively implemented in the course of the Great War.”7 I suggest that in the 
context of a settler colony like Semirechye, the civil war resulted in the continuation and 
intensification of the colonial state-building project. The settler society was primarily 
concerned with the preservation of the economic and political privileges it enjoyed under 
the previous regime and engaged in familiar practices of colonial state-building such as 
the extraction of labour and resources from the native population. To quote a Bolshevik 
functionary, Georgii Safarov, what had transpired in Turkestan under the guise of a 
socialist revolution was in fact a “colonial revolution” that is the revolution by the 
colonists, for the colonists.8  
To understand how colonial state-building continued in the absence of central 
government, I focus on the development in Semirechye of what Peter Holquist describes 
as a “parastatal complex” – a “network of semipublic, semistate structures…in which 
society and state were tightly intertwined.”9 I argue that this complex emerged from the 
                                                          
have also concluded that the colonial authorities in Turkestan failed to achieve the goals they set for themselves. 
Brower. 
6 The term “continuum of crisis” was introduced by Peter Holquist to describe the period spanning the Great and civil 
War and the civil war in Russia. See Peter Holquist, Making war, forging revolution: Russia's continuum of crisis, 
1914-1921 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
7 "To count, to extract, and to exterminate: population statistics and population politics in late imperial and soviet 
Russia," 127. 
8 G. I.  Safarov, Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia: Opyt Turkestana (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1921). 
9 Holquist, Making war, forging revolution: Russia's continuum of crisis, 1914-1921, 4. 
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institutions of colonial administration as well as the practices of total mobilization 
employed by the authorities during the suppression of the native uprising and the methods 
of front warfare imported into the region by the returning Russian soldiers. These 
practices and institutions determined the ability of the settler minority to retain control 
over land as simultaneously the key resource in the war-ravaged colony and the state 
territory where colonial sovereignty was upheld.  
In significant ways, the conflict in Semirechye arose from local circumstances. 
The dynamics of inter-ethnic strife established during the rebellion of 1916 carried over 
into the civil war. As in the uprising, land was at the heart of the conflict. At the same 
time, because the competition for land developed along the axes of ethnicity and estate, 
the conflict in Semirechye was simultaneously a civil war, which pitted the Cossacks 
against the majority of colonists, and an ethnic conflict, where the settler population 
competed for land with the native pastoralists.  
Indirectly, the suppression of the rebellion in 1916 had also determined the 
outcome of the civil war in Semirechye. The distribution of arms to the settlers in the 
wake of the uprising and the return of soldiers from the front levelled the balance of power 
between the Cossacks and the peasants. The Bolshevik wager on the strong – the 
numerically superior, armed, and land-hungry peasants and soldiers – was critical to the 
recapture of the region by the Red Army from the Cossack armies.  
In the longer term, the turmoil of the rebellion and its brutal suppression had also 
given rise to native political movements. The so-called “Semirechye question” served as 
the basis for political mobilization of native society and was key to the articulation of 
collective aspirations for national autonomy. The efforts of the indigenous elites to 
reclaim agricultural land lost to the settlers led them to frame the idea of national 
autonomy in both territorial and ethnic terms. At the same time, the ethnicization of the 
political landscape in the colony and the peculiar dynamics of the civil war in Semirechye 
resulted in the fragmentation of the indigenous movement along ethnic lines. Importantly, 
this realignment of the region’s indigenous political movements into ethno-territorial 
blocks at once reflected the existing administrative division and laid the foundation of the 
future ethno-centred republics under the Soviet leadership.  
The most significant development of the civil war in Semirechye, however, was 
the fundamental demographic change triggered by the converging effects of food crisis, 
violence, and forced displacement. Between 1916 and 1920, Turkestan as a whole lost 
nearly a third, or 31.3%, of its nomadic population, whereas the Russian population of 
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the region grew by 12.9%.10 More than half a million nomads perished between 1917 and 
1920.11 The implications of this change were profound; Semirechye had become more 
Russian and less nomadic in the course of the war.  
Drawing on archival records, petitions, and secondary sources, this chapter will 
demonstrate that the conflict in Semirechye was one of the many instances of the civil 
war in the borderlands, which “exhibited particular features” and was “more violent and 
explicitly political…than in the ethnically Russian centre.”12 
 
“The Beggarly and Wretched Existence”: The Nomads in the Wake of the Uprising  
 
The effects of the colonial rebellion rippled across the empire. Tested and battered by the 
rebellion, the colonial administration now faced the court of public opinion among 
Russia’s liberal circles. The first to respond to the reports of atrocities committed in the 
name of the empire was the State Duma. Ever abrasive, the reform-minded members of 
Russia’s ill-fated parliament saw the rebellion as one of many indications of the 
bankruptcy and corruption of the autocratic regime. They also saw in the rebellion an 
opportunity to point a public finger at the misguided and dangerous course that the 
country took under the Tsarist government. On Duma’s initiative, a hastily formed 
investigative commission despatched to Turkestan in mid-August, at the height of the 
uprising in Semirechye. Led by the increasingly popular Alexander Kerensky, who spent 
his youth in Tashkent, where his father was employed as a school inspector, and 
facilitated by the leader of the Muslim faction in Duma, Kutlu-Mukhammad Tevkelev, 
the commission spent two weeks in the region, but did not travel to Semirechye.13  
                                                          
10 Marco Buttino, "Study of the economic crisis and depopulation in Turkestan, 1917–1920," Central Asian Survey 9, 
no. 4 (1990): 165. 
11  ibid. 
12 Alfred J Rieber, "Civil wars in the Soviet Union," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 1 
(2003): 138-39. Although Rieber qualifies only the first “revolutionary” period between 1905 and 1906 as “more violent 
and explicitly political in the periphery,” I believe his conclusion also applies to the civil war in Semirechye. 
13 For a discussion of the political representation of ethnic and religious minorities in the State Duma and the role of 
the Duma as a breeding ground of national elites see Rustem Tsiunchuk, "Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics: The 
State Dumas and the Constitution of New National Elites," in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930, ed. 
Jane Burbank, Mark Von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2007), 366-98. For a discussion of the State Duma policies on Turkestan, see T. V. Kotiukova, Turkestanskoe 
napravlene dumskoi politiki (1905-1917 gg.) (Moscow: OOO "Enter-Grafiko", 2008). On Kerenskii’s formative years 
in Tashkent, see "Sem'ia Kerenskikh v Turkestanskom krae (po dokumentam TsGA Respubliki Uzbekistan)," 
Otechestvennye arkhivy, no. 1 (2009): 60-69. On Tevkelev, see Charles Steinwedel, "Kutlu-Mukhammad Batyr-
Gireevich Tevkelev (1850-?) and Family," in Russia's People of Empire: Life Stories from Eurasia, 1500 to the Present, 
ed. Stephen M Norris and Willard Sunderland (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2012), 189-98. The 
commission was followed at all times by the local okhranka, which reported Kerenskii’s and Tevkelev’s every motion 




The speeches delivered by the members of the commission at a special Duma 
hearing in December the same year put the deficiencies of the autocratic government in 
blunt terms. The responsibility for the crisis in the colony, they claimed, lay with the 
administration whose “incorrect and illegal actions” incited the uprising.14 The litany of 
abuses listed by Tevkelev and Kerenskii at the two Duma hearings spoke in their view of 
the general malaise of the “crippled (“beschinnyi”), vindictive, and centralized 
autocracy.”15 It seemed obvious to most in the Duma that the age of autocratic government 
was over.  
Kerenskii’s passionate critique of the Tsarist regime won him a standing ovation 
and strengthened his influence and reputation. Little, however, came out of the 
commission’s investigation. Earnest as it was, Kerenskii’s outrage served, for all intents 
and purpose, as an indictment of the government, not a proposal for resolution. The 
numerous pleas of the native petitioners from Semirechye and other areas in Turkestan 
beseeching the repeal of General Kuropatkin’s resettlement plan elicited a lukewarm 
response from the Duma. The fire of Kerenskii’s speech fizzled out to an anaemic 
recommendation warning Kuropatkin against making hasty decisions.16  
Whatever the personal inclinations of colonial administrators like Kuropatkin, 
who at times expressed some sympathy for the nomads, the government was neither 
willing nor able to alienate its Russian constituency in the tumultuous periphery. 
Hamstrung by the lack of funds and wary of potential disturbances in the settler society, 
the colonial authorities tolerated, if not indirectly encouraged, the redistribution of the 
nomads’ land and livestock among the settlers. First, it was seen as only fair that the 
colonists who lost their family members and livelihoods help themselves to the Kyrgyz 
property; second, the redistribution of land and livestock decreased the burden of 
compensation on the government; and third, it gave hope that the agriculture of the oblast 
would recover once the settlers put the nomads’ land and animals to good use. A great 
number of stock and land changed hands enriching in the process some of the settlers who 
“doubled and even tripled their property.”17 
                                                          
14 For the full transcript of Kerenskii’s speech, see Dina Amanzholova, ""Takoe upravlenie gosudarstvom – 
nedopustimo". Doklad A. F. Kerenskogo na zakrytom zasedanii IV Gosudastvennoi dumy," Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 2 
(1997): 4-22. For an English summary of the speech, see Sanborn, 183-87. 
15 Brower, 169. 
16 Kotiukova, Turkestanskoe napravlene dumskoi politiki (1905-1917 gg.), 143. 
17 “G. g. komissaram ot Vremennogo Pravitel’stva ot tatarskikh soldat, nakhodiashikhsia na voennoi sluzhbe, 
imeiushchikh zhitel’stvo v sele Tokmak Semirechenskoi oblasti proshenie, 8 maia 1917 g.” in Koigeldiev, 157; 
Nazaroff, 167. “Dokladnaia zapiska chlena Turkestanskogo komiteta O. A. Shkapskogo v Zemskoi otdel MVD o 
situatsii v Semirechenskoi oblasti, 27 iiunia 1917 g.,” RGIA f. 1291, op. 84, d. 57, l. 3 ob. 
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Undoubtedly, the rebellion affected everyone in the oblast, but the nomads bore 
the brunt of the destruction. In the Verny uezd and five volosts of the Pishpek and 
Djarkent uezds, the remaining nomads harvested only a quarter of their sown fields. The 
worst affected were the Kyrgyz of the Przhevalsk uezd whose entire harvest was 
destroyed during the rebellion.18 Ten volosts of the Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds and 
fourteen volosts of the Djarkent uezds retained a third of their herds, while the twenty 
volosts of the Pishpek uezd and nineteen volosts of the Przhevalsk uezd lost all of their 
livestock.19 According to their own estimates, the fleeing nomads lost three quarters of 
their property to the punitive troops and settler militias during the rebellion and the flight 
to China.20 Altogether, the Kyrgyz of the Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds lost a million and 
a half head of sheep and cattle.21 
The Chinese authorities were equally inhospitable to the new arrivals who had to 
buy their way across the border with cattle, opium, and cash.22 Bad weather and lack of 
forage left little hope for the survivors who led “beggarly and wretched existence.”23 By 
January 1917, the refugees from Semirechye lost all of their cattle, 90% of their horses, 
and three quarters of the sheep that they took with them to China. In desperation, many 
of them sold their domestic implements, animals, and even their wives and children.24 The 
native delegates writing to the TurkTsIK (Turkestan Central Executive Committee, the 
Soviet administrative, executive, and legislative body formed in 1919), estimated that 
4,000 women and children from Semirechye were sold in China.25 
Those of the nomads who did not cross into China or returned to Semirechye 
remained subject to the mobilization, which had triggered the rebellion in the first place. 
Of the planned 480,000 workers from Turkestan, the authorities were able to mobilize 
123,205, a quarter of the projected number.26 In an attempt to minimize expenditures, the 
                                                          
18  Iv. Chekaninskii, Vosstanie kirgiz-kazakov i kara-kirgiz v Dzhetysuiskom (Semirechenskom) krae v iiule-sentiabre 
1916 goda (K materialam po istorii etogo vosstaniia) (Kyzyl-Orda: Izd-vo Obshch-va izucheniia Kazakhstana, 1926), 
50. The fields were trampled and torched both by the rebels and the punitive forces and settler militias. Paul Nazaroff 
relates that the settlers “pulled down the buildings, hacked down the trees, dug up the gardens, cut the aryks” and razed 
the native villages “literally to the ground.” Nazaroff, 166. 
19 Chekaninskii, 50-51. 
20 “Zaiavlenie v Prezidium TurTsIKA ot Semirechenskikh delegatov, 27 ianvaria 1920 goda” in Koigeldiev, 190. 
21 A. Shestakov, 15-letie vosstaniia v Srednei Azii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 
1931), 25. 
22 Iz dokladnoi zapiski dragomana Rossiiskogo general’nogo konsul’stva v Kashgare kollezhskogo sekretaria 
Stefanovicha o volneniiakh sredi kirgizov Semirechenskoi oblasti i o begstve ikh v kitaiskie predely, nachalo 1917 g.” 
in Mambetaliev, 108. 
23 “Doklad predsedatelia osoboi komissii, komandirovannoi v kazakhskii krai dlia okazaniia pomoshchi kazakham-
bezhentsam oblastnomu naordnomu komissaru o sostoianii etogo voprosa” in Koigeldiev, 167. 
24 “Protokol voiskovogo starshiny Semirechenskogo kazach’ego voiska Bychkova i dragomana general’nogo 
Kashgarskogo konsul’stva Stefanovicha o polozhenii kirgiz v Kitae, 7-21 ianvaria 1917 g.” in Mambetaliev, 92. 
25 “Zaiavlenie v Prezidium TurTsIKA ot Semirechenskikh delegatov, 27 ianvaria 1920 goda” in Koigeldiev, 191. 
26 P. A.  Kovalev, Tylovye rabochie Turkestana v gody Pervoi Mirovoi voiny: (1916 - mai 1917 gg.) (Tashkent: Gosizdat 
Uzbekskoi SSR, 1957), 82. The recruited labourers from Turkestan were often grouped together with prisoners of war 
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government transferred the cost of mobilization onto the native population, which was 
required to clothe and deliver the workers to the drafting stations. The cost of a set of 
clothes could run as high as 100 rubles. Nor was the transportation provided for the 
drafted workers some of whom had to cross over 1,000 versts (a little over 1,000 
kilometres) to reach the nearest station.27 Similarly, despite the promises of compensation 
for their labour, the administration demanded – as a cost cutting measure – that each 
worker be paid by his own community no less than 300 rubles. The Kyrgyz of Karabalty 
(Kara-Balta in Kyrgyzstan), for example, estimated that they spent between 300 and 400 
rubles per individual worker. It had cost the 50,000 native families of the Aulieatinskii 
uezd 5,000,000 rubles to send 12,000 workers to the rear, none of which was paid for by 
the administration.28 
The forced conscription of workers compounded the economic distress of the 
nomadic population. All the while, the tension between the native and the settlers built. 
Frequent settler attacks on the helpless nomads and continuing seizures of the nomads’ 
remaining livestock brought the native Semirechye to the verge of famine. Soon, in an 
ominous sign of what was to come, the streets of Pishpek became littered with dying 
Kyrgyz. Starving, the Kyrgyz “resembled walking skeletons” and “ate dogs, gophers, rats, 
and frogs.”29
  
The famine ravaging the native communities had not yet struck the settler society. 
Indeed, the beginning of the grain harvesting season, the flight of the majority of the 
nomads to China, and the arming of the peasants had given the settler society some 
reassurance that the authorities would be able to maintain the order. Even this semblance 
of order, however, collapsed when the news of the tsar’s abdication reached Turkestan. 
The period that began with the uprising and continued through the February and October 
revolutions and the ensuing civil war brought untold misery to the far-flung colony.  
 
“Grief, Misery, and the Sea of Tears”: The Nomads Return to Semirechye  
 
The demise of the ailing regime came perhaps sooner than anyone in the colony expected. 
As Marco Buttino cleverly put it, the February Revolution arrived in Turkestan via the 
                                                          
and treated accordingly. The new Murmansk railroad, for example, was constructed with prisoner-of-war labour and 
punitive battalions composed of Uzbeks and Kazakhs. Mortality on the project was immense: 25,000 of 70,000 men 
employed on the project perished. Holquist, ""In Accord with State Interests and the People's Wishes": The 
Technocratic Ideology of Imperial Russia's Resettlement Administration," 171. 
27 “Iz telegrammy general-gubernatora Turkestanskogo kraia A. N. Kuropatkina voennomu ministru D. S. Shuvaevu o 
neobkhodimosti prisylki voinskikh chastei dlia podavleniia vosstaniia v Semirechenskoi oblasti, 17 avgusta 1916 g.” 
28 Galuzo,  57. 
29 S.  Brainin and Sh. Shafiro, Pervye shagi sovetov v Semirech'e (Alma-Ata  1934), 38. 
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telegraph.30 The news of the tsar’s abdication reached the colony in early March 1917 
rousing the settler and the native population alike. Immediately, crowds gathered in the 
streets of the Russian quarters and the native city of Tashkent. The public’s response to 
the declarations of the new order was equivocal at best. While the Russian population 
took the news with caution, the native population grew more hopeful.  
Indeed, the first actions of the colonial authorities in the wake of the February 
Revolution renewed hopes among the native elites for reconciliation and compromise. 
The new authorities ended the ill-conceived conscription of the native labourers and 
allowed those already mobilized to return. In attempt to cast off the image of a loyal 
Tsarist administrator, Kuropatkin commuted the death sentences of the participants in the 
uprising in March 1917.31 At the same time, he telegraphed the local authorities in 
Semirechye and instructed them to stop the persecution of the native nomads for the sake 
of “the speediest pacification of both the Russian and the native population, and for the 
revival of joint brotherly work.”32 The changes that followed the establishment of the 
Provisional Government, however, were bound to disappoint both the settler and the 
native society. On the one hand, the declarations of national equality endangered the 
colony’s status quo and the privileges of the settlers and alienated the colonial society 
from the new government. On the other hand, the inability – and the unwillingness – of 
the Provisional Government to deliver on the promises made to the empire’s minorities 
meant that the hopes of Turkestan’s native population quickly gave way to 
disillusionment and bitterness.  
On paper at least, the new government held to the vision of a democracy. The 
legislation abolishing ethnic and religious restrictions was introduced in March 1917.33 In 
theory, the Provisional Government also extended election rights to the previously 
disenfranchised minorities and reserved a share of seats in local organs of administration 
for non-Russian representatives. In practice, the reservations about granting the native 
population of the colony franchise and equal representation rang as true for the 
Provisional Government and its regional representative body, the Turkestan Committee, 
as they did for the colonial administrators. The fear of renewed protests and the awareness 
of being a minority in the “sea” of natives pitted the liberal leanings of the new legislation 
                                                          
30 Buttino, Revoliutsiia naoborot: Sredniaia Aziia mezhdu padeniem tsarskoi imperii i obrazovaniem SSSR, 95. 
31 Kuropatkin pardoned 320 of the 340 sentenced rebels. Pokrovskii,  64. 
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against the fears of the local settler society. The distrust of the native population was 
reflected in the makeup of the newly appointed Turkestan Committee; of nine members 
only four were Muslim and even fewer – the Kazakh Alikhan Bukeikhanov and 
Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev – were natives of the region. The solution proposed by the 
Turkestan Committee was the familiar colonial maxim of governing the politically 
“immature” periphery with a firm hand. Vladimir Evpat’evskii, one of the five Russian 
members of the Turkestan Committee, had set the tone with the proposal to make a 
“significant departure from the all-Russian norm” and to concentrate administration in 
the hands of the Russian authorities appointed from above.34 Kuropatkin, too, had 
emphasized “the necessity of non-application of the principle of equality to Turkestan, 
lest Turkestan take a step back: the natives will have the majority of votes, and they will 
take everything into their hands, hands, which through our own fault, are not trustworthy.” 
In the same vein, Alexander Kerenskii, who only months ago had criticized the Tsarist 
government for the brutal treatment of the native population, agreed with Kuropatkin on 
the matter, judging that given “the unequal burden of responsibilities…the natives should 
not be given full rights.”35 
The deep-running prejudice and the fear of being swamped by “the seven-million 
strong mass” (according to Kuropatkin) of natives successfully curbed the more 
democratic policies of the Provisional Government in the region. It was, however, the 
decision taken by the members of the Turkestan Committee in April 1917 to proceed with 
the plan proposed by General Kuropatkin to remove the native population of the 
Przhevalsk, Pishpek and in part the Djarkent uezds, that frustrated hopes of the native 
society for resolution.36 The meeting convened in May the same year and chaired, among 
others, by Tynyshpaev, had decreed to ban the returning Kyrgyz from “taking up 
residence in the Issyk-Kul basin and in the areas of…lesser and greater Keben’ (Kemin 
in Kyrgyzstan) and Ak-Piket of the Pishpek uezd until the complete pacification of the 
peasants.”37 The physical separation of the two communities was deemed necessary to 
protect the Kyrgyz from “extreme hostility” of the settlers. Yet, resettling the refugees in 
the largely mountainous Naryn, where, in the nomads’ own words, “no land was suitable 
for grain cultivation” and where stock-breeding alone would not support “the mass of 
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people targeted for resettlement” would condemn the returning refugees to starvation.38 
For the time being, it seemed that, though shaken by the uprising and the revolution, the 
colonial order in the region was preserved.  
In the scheme of things, the decision of the Turkestan Committee merely 
formalized the de-facto new occupation of the nomads’ land by the settlers who were 
prepared to defend their right to own it if necessary. The local authorities, too, considered 
the nomads the guilty party unworthy of owning the land in their possession before the 
uprising. The investigation of the Muslim Regional Committee (“Musul’manskii Kraevoi 
Sovet,” or Tukramus in Russian) concluded that that both the settlers and the local 
authorities found the presence of the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs untenable and downright 
intolerable. The solutions to the refugee crisis voiced by the peasants in conversations 
with the deputies ranged from forced displacement to mass murder. The majority of the 
respondents in Semirechye proposed “starving the Kirghiz to death by famine and famine 
fever (typhus).” Others thought that the Kyrgyz should be evicted into other uezds, or 
even into Siberia.”39 The authorities were equally vengeful; the Przhevalsk Executive 
Committee convened every Sunday to discuss “how and to where to expel the Kirghiz 
and how to punish them.”40 
Despite the complaints and protests of the Tukramus, the Turkestan Committee 
could do little to ameliorate the plight of the nomads. The distance between Tashkent and 
Semirechye coupled with the general state of crisis in the colony invalidated any 
pretensions of Tashkent to authority in the oblast.41 Semirechye remained - and indeed 
often chose to remain – isolated from the authorities in Tashkent. Distrustful of the new 
government and wary of any potential confrontation with the native population, the 
colonial administrators of Semirechye acted on their own initiative and were indifferent 
to the demands and requests of the Turkestan Committee. The first executive organs of 
the new government replacing the colonial administration were formed in Pishpek and 
Przhevalsk already in March 1917, a month before the Turkestan Committee was 
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convened.42 Often, these executive committees (“ispolnitel’nye komitety,” hereafter 
Ispolkom) exhibited remarkable continuity with the colonial authorities that they 
replaced. In Przhevalsk, for example, the membership of the uezd Ispolkom was drawn 
entirely from the settler population of the uezd.43
 
Similarly, the Commissar of the uezd 
and later the oblast, Piotr Shebalin, was a junior supervisor at the Semirechye land 
resettlement party at the time of the uprising.44 
As the region whose settler population suffered most from the nomadic rebellion, 
Russian Semirechye had understandably received the news of the revolution and the 
declarations of national equality with hostility.45 To the settlers, equality with the Kyrgyz 
sounded the renewal of the ethnic warfare for land and water. It was a little surprise, then, 
that when the reports of the Russian consul in Kuldja (city in Chinese Turkestan) about 
the departure from China of “over 6,000 armed Dungans…intent on plundering 
Przhevalsk and Verny” reached Semirechye in early May, the peasants and townsmen of 
the oblast once again took to arms.46 The mobilization of the settler population triggered 
by the rumours of the impending return of the refugees followed the patterns established 
in 1916.  
As during the uprising, in Semirechye, the authorities acted together with the 
settlers to maintain the existing order. On 8 May, 1917, the Przhevalsk Ispolkom ordered 
the immediate mobilization of the settler population and distributed 550 rifles to the 
settlers.47 These rifles came on top of the 8,000 rifles distributed – on Kuropatkin’s order 
– across the region in the aftermath of the uprising.48 As those most affected by the 
rebellion, the Russian population of the Pishpek, Przhevalsk, and Djarken uezds received 
proportionally more guns than any other oblast of Turkestan.49 The concentration of arms 
in the settlers’ hands facilitated what the local authorities perceived to be the task of self-
defence and gave the settlers an advantage in the confrontations with the native 
population. It had also proven crucial to the survival and dominance of the settler society 
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at the time when the central state was largely absent from the region and could neither 
feed nor defend its colonists.  
The 6,000 “armed Dungans” were in reality a ragtag mass of unarmed and largely 
defenceless refugees returning from China. Faced with the mass of refugees, the 
Przhevalsk Ispolkom ordered the immediate mobilization of soldiers, Cossacks, and 
settlers. To prevent the nomads from returning, the Ispolkom dispatched a Cossack 
regiment, several cavalry units and volunteer militias to the mountain passes through 
which the rebels had earlier fled into China.50 Instructed to force the returning nomads to 
surrender their arms and Russian hostages, the soldiers formed a cordon of military posts. 
Troops were stationed at the same mountain passes, through which the rebels had earlier 
fled into China.  
How many refugees returned in spring and summer of 1917 is difficult to 
establish. According to David Budianskii, some 64,000 Kyrgyz and Kazakh refugees 
returned to Semirechye by May 1917.51 Native sources put the number of returned 
refugees as of July 1917 at 69,000.52 Whatever their number, the returnees soon found 
themselves in an impossible position. “The Russians received all the Kirghiz and gathered 
them in one place, neither allowing them into Russia nor back into China.”53 Squeezed 
between the forbidding mountains and the military posts, the refugees were an easy target 
for the soldiers and peasants who exercised their “right of the strong” turning the refugee 
camps into the site of what a group of native intelligentsia described as “a bloody 
bacchanalia.”54 Armed with cannons, rifles, pitchforks, axes, scythes, and stones, settlers 
and soldiers descended upon the nomads.55 Soldiers “formed groups of 20-25 men and 
stripped the Kirghiz of their cattle and other belongings…Peasants gathered in groups 
and rode around robbing and murdering the Kirghiz.”56 Lest the refugees resist the 
marauding soldiers and peasants, the Ispolkom also prohibited the sale of bread to the 
natives.57 
Responding to reports of the continuing assaults on the refugees, on 3 June 1917 
the Turkestan Committee instructed the Russian consul in Kashgar to prevent or delay 
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the return of the refugees to Semirechye: “The return of the Kirghiz in the nearest future 
is undesirable, even if they resettled in Naryn-sands (i.e. the barren, sandy lands of 
Naryn).”
58 Despite the instructions of the Turkestan Committee and the depredations of 
the local settlers, the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs continued to return. Some were able to slip 
through the military posts or bribed their way out. Still others were taken by the peasants 
who were short of labourers. Many others grew sick threatening to spread the epidemic 
further into the settlers’ villages and cities. Yet more pled with the authorities in Tashkent 
and Petrograd. On 12 March 1917, the Kyrgyz of the Pishpek uezd petitioned the 
Provisional Government to “revoke (sic, “otmenit’”)…the violence” and to allow them 
to resettle in the Pishpek uezd.
59
 The same month, the refugees petitioned the Turkestan 
governor-general requesting him to restore the nomads’ right to land and put an end to 
the repressive measures. The petitioners also pointed to the illegality of the actions of the 
local administration, which “continues to enforce the measures of unjust cruelty,” 
including “the liquidation of land holdings” of the nomads, and the deployment of soldiers 
to prevent the refugees from harvesting their fields.
60
 In April 1917, writing on behalf of 
1,200 Kyrgyz households of the Shamshy volost of the Pishpek uezd, the petitioner 
described the plight of the native pastoralists: “the Russian peasants take away our land 
and plough it, they cut down our forest, destroy our buildings, our gardens and clover 




Tukramus continued its quixotic quest to help the refugees by appealing to the 
Turkestan Committee. On 30 June, the deputies of Tukramus informed the members of 
the Committee that “the Kirghiz are being hunted down” and “suffer extreme poverty,” 
causing them to resort to cannibalism. The roots of the issue were obvious: “the Russian 
settlers of Semirechye are armed, while the Kirghiz are not.”
62
 Two weeks later, 
Tukramus convened all Muslims organizations of Tashkent to develop a set of 
“emergency measures” intended to counter the settlers’ violence. Chief among these 
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measures was the disarmament of the settlers, return of fugitive Russian soldiers to the 
army, and the formation and stationing of mixed Russo-Muslim troops in Semirechye.
63
 
Tukramus’ proposal was in part motivated by the decision of the Turkestan 
Committee to retain the Russian troops stationed in Semirechye as the guarantor of peace 
in the oblast.
64
 Of course, the Turkestan Committee had not the slightest intention of 
introducing Muslim soldiers to Semirechye in spite of the presence of Tatar soldiers in 
Tashkent. In an atmosphere of growing suspicion and distrust of Muslims, ethnic Russian 
troops were seen by both the Tashkent government and the settler society not simply as 
the guarantor of peace, but as the guarantor of control over Muslims and safety of the 
settlers. A telegram wired by the Turkestan Committee to Petrograd in early September 
1917 warned the central government of the increased hostility of the native population 
and identified Semirechye (and Khiva) as a particularly bellicose area. Citing reported 
purchases of arms by Muslims and various other – undoubtedly hostile in the authorities’ 
view – “preparations,” the telegram requested from Kerenskii’s government additional 
troops for the defence of the region’s “European population.”
65
 
The authorship of the telegram – by the Committee’s chairman, Vladimir 
Nalivkin, and Turkestan’s District Commander, General Leontii Cherkes – indicates the 
pervasiveness of this distrust. Even the Turkestan Committee’s Muslim members were 
under suspicion. The tone and the message of the telegram also suggests that the influence 
of the Committee’s Muslim members on their European colleagues was negligible; it is 
hard to imagine the Muslim Commissars agreeing to the reinforcement of Russian troops 
in Semirechye. A minority in the Turkestan Committee, they were, in all likelihood, 
outvoted and lacked the means to endorse policies to benefit the native communities. As 
an institution and as a provisional government of Turkestan, the Turkestan Committee 
consistently favoured the settler population, whether in protection, or in provision of food 
and welfare. To cite but one example, where the settlers could claim up to 1,000 rubles 
per household in compensation from a special fund set up by the Provisional Government 
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In a grim irony, the failure of the Turkestan Committee to stem violence against 
the nomads made concerns about native political mobilization a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The native society organized itself in response to the apparent reluctance of the 
Provisional Government to protect the native population and accommodate its needs and 
demands.  
 
New Hope: Political Mobilization in Tashkent 
 
Tashkent, as Adeeb Khalid notes, became the centre of the native population’s newly-
found political freedom after the February revolution. A number of gatherings were held 
in the native part of the city attracting 30,000 men each in the first weeks of March 
alone.
67
 Eager to seize an opportunity a group of native intellectuals known as the Jadids 
(the advocates of “the new method” in teaching) organized in March 1917 city-wide 
elections into Tukramus.
68 Comprised of 48 members, Tukramus, or Shuroi-Islomiia 
(Islamic Council), became the governing body of the Muslims of Turkestan.
69 Soon, 
branches of Shuroi-Islomiia opened in Pishpek, Naryn, and Przhevalsk.
70
 
Shuroi-Islomiia was instrumental in drawing public attention to the unfolding 
drama in Semirechye. Already, in April 1917, the members of the Council gathered to 
discuss the events in Semirechye. A decision was made to launch an official investigation. 
Five groups of four representatives of the Shuroi-Islomiia and representatives of the 
Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies each were dispatched to Semirechye in May.
71 
The results of the investigation were presented at a joint meeting of all Muslim 
organizations of Tashkent in mid-July. The participants of the meeting produced a list of 
measures intended to resolve the crisis. These measures targeted primarily the settler 
population of Semirechye; before any peace could be restored, the meeting concluded, 
the settlers had to be disarmed. At the same time, the troops stationed in Semirechye and 
drawn mainly from the settlers were to be replaced by units dispatched from Russia and 
comprised of both Muslims and Europeans. Finally, the meeting decided to form a 
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commission responsible for the distribution of financial aid to the arriving refugees.
72 
Upon the conclusion of the meeting the participants forwarded the list of demands to the 
Turkestan Committee and the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ deputies.
73
 
The awareness of the events in Semirechye extended beyond the region. The 
attendants of the first all-Russia Muslim Congress in Moscow in May 1917 also expressed 
their support of the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs of Semirechye.
74
 At the second all-Russia 
Muslim Congress in July 1917, the representative from Turkestan, Ubaidulla Khodzhaev, 
raised again the issue of the government’s unresponsiveness to the continuing atrocities.
75
 
In August, Shuroi-Islomiia convened again. Conscious of the impotence – and the 
torpor – of the Turkestan Committee, the Council resolved to send a telegram to the State 
Duma and personally to Kerenskii. A special commission was also formed to collect 
funds for the refugees in Semirechye. Lastly, the meeting decided to organize a mass 
protest in Tashkent in the second half of August to demonstrate solidarity with the 
Muslims of Semirechye.
76 The protest presented the authorities with the most vocal 
expression of the popular discontent with the mistreatment of the native population of 
Semirechye. Thousands of Muslims took their protest to the streets calling for an end to 
“the indignity” and “the atrocities in the Semirechye oblast.” In what many of the 
European dwellers of Tashkent deemed to be a challenge to the Russian authority, the 
protesters marched through the Russian district and converged on the centre of the 
European part of the city. There, the leader of the organizing committee gave a speech 
and called the Provisional Government to action. The manifestation then presented the 
members of the Turkestan Committee with the list of its demands.
77
 
Two days after the manifestation, the demands were put into a formal resolution. 
In addition to urging the authorities to provide food and medical assistance to the 
refugees, the resolution demanded the immediate disarming of the Semirechye’s Russian 
population, withdrawal of the demobilized soldiers, and the introduction of troops drawn 
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in equal proportion from the Muslims and Russian soldiers from outside the region. The 
resolution also called for the restitution of land to the native owners. To oversee the 
implementation of these measures and to ensure the equal representation of the 
Semirechye’s nomads in the administration of the oblast, the signatories to the resolution 
volunteered to elect on behalf of the Turkestan Committee a Muslim representative 
responsible, along with Shendrikov, for the oblast, and to appoint Muslims to the 
committees in charge of refugee affairs. If the authorities failed to enforce these measures, 
the resolution continued, “the Kirghiz and millions of Muslims would not, to the end of 
their lives, forget this villainy and would bequeath it to their offspring.”
78
 
The efforts of Shuroi-Islomiia to help the nomads of Semirechye were cut short 
by the October revolution in the metropole and the ensuing civil war in the region, but 
the Semirechye question continued to inform the political agenda of the indigenous elites. 
The transcript of the fourth congress of Muslims in Turkestan held in November 1917 
suggests that concerns about the displacement of the native nomads and the Bolshevik 
backing of colonists in the oblast were among the key reasons for the establishment of 




In many respects, the plight of Semirechye’s nomads concerned the broader native 
society; at the heart of the issue was land and the rights of the native population to its 
ownership. The economic crisis and the renewed hostilities of the civil war made access 
to agricultural land a matter of life and death. In this sense, national autonomy with its 
privileging of the majority ethnic population within its borders offered an attractive 
alternative to the colonial state and came to be seen as the only means of enforcing and 
protecting the rights of the native majority.  
 
Children of Alash: Political Mobilization in the Steppe 
 
Understandably, concerns about the land seizures and European settlement were even 
stronger in the nomadic areas, where mass colonization had both begun earlier and led to 
a greater number of settlers than in the densely populated oasis areas of Turkestan. The 
displacement of the nomads and colonial settlement of the nomadic lands became the 
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vehicle of political mobilization already in the last decade of the 19th century. The 
emergence of the idea of “homeland” among the emergent class of native politicians and 
intelligentsia was closely tied to a newfound sense of place grounded in the loss of 
ancestral lands.  
The brutal suppression of the rebellion in Semirechye and the resulting 
dispossession of the nomads of their lands led to political mobilization in the former 
Steppe governorate. There, the established native intelligentsia drew on the issue of 
Semirechye’s refugees to both mobilize the nomadic population of the region and to 
establish a nascent national autonomy, named by its founders after the common ancestor 
of the nomadic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, Alash.
80
 
As a party proper, the Alash had emerged only in 1917 (until the February 
revolution the Alash was denied registration as a political party), but as a broader 
movement of the native intelligentsia the Alash had its origins in the 1905 revolution, 
when a group of Kazakh intellectuals became actively involved in political activities and 
sought to establish a Kazakh branch of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party 
(Kadets).81 The Alash leadership was typical of the new generation of indigenous elites 
that sprang up in European colonies and that recognized the technological superiority of 
their colonial master, but abhorred its treatment of the native peoples. The leaders of the 
Alash in the Steppe were, as a rule, Russian-educated and employed in the colonial 
service. Witnesses to the abuses wrought by colonial rule on the native population of the 
region, they sought to improve the plight of their less fortunate compatriots and came to 
see themselves as their representatives before the colonial authorities; several Alash 
leaders were elected to the ill-fated second Duma.  
The uprising of 1916 caught the Alash, in the words of the Kazakh engineer 
Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, “between the hammer and the anvil.” Wishing, on the one 
hand, to satisfy the demands of the government, and to spare, on the other hand, the 
nomads from the hardships of a war in which they had no stake, the leadership of the 
Alash attempted to negotiate with the authorities on behalf of the native pastoralists, while 
simultaneously appealing to the nomads to remain calm and furnish the labourers. 
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Unfortunately, the appeals of the Alash leaders to the tumultuous nomads and their efforts 
to negotiate the conditions of the draft came to naught.
82
 In the uprising’s aftermath, many 
of the Alash members travelled to the cities and locales where the drafted labourers were 
stationed. Their efforts to improve their living and working conditions made them both 
“larger and more popular” with the native labourers.
83
 
More importantly, the issue of agricultural colonization of the nomadic areas, 
which the Alash leaders believed to be the primary reason for the uprising, came to define 
the political agenda of the party.
84
 The demands for the closure of the region to settlement 
from outside as well as the calls for recognizing the right of the nomads to their land and 
self-administration had, in the course of the two revolutions, evolved into a programme 
of comprehensive national autonomy.
85 The Alash welcomed the news of the February 
Revolution because “firstly, it freed the Kirghiz from the oppression and abuse of the 
Tsarist government, and, secondly, strengthened their hope to realize their most cherished 
dream – to govern themselves.”
86 Numerous congresses were convened across the Steppe 
to discuss the shape and form of the future “Kirghiz” (that is both Kazakh and Kyrgyz) 
autonomy. Among the attendees were Kyrgyz representatives from Semirechye, 
including, the future “founding fathers” of Soviet Kirghizia, Abdykerim Sydykov and 
Ishenaly Arabaev, and Diur Soorombaev.
87 In July 1917, the first “all-Kirghiz” Congress 
had established the national party of Alash and charted the course of the Alash within 
Russia. The majority of participants were in favour of a national territorial autonomy in 
a democratic, federative, and parliamentary Russian republic. On the land issue, the 
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Congress resolved to prohibit further settlement of nomadic lands and lands that had been 
seized but not yet settled were to be returned to their original owners.
88
 
The next all-Kirghiz Congress was held in Orenburg in the wake of the Bolshevik 
revolution in Petrograd. The resulting programme upheld the earlier resolution to 
establish an autonomy within the loosely federated Russia, where “every state has its own 
territory, and exercises sovereignty to implement its tasks (suverenno reshaet svoi 
zadachi).”
89
 In theory, the Alash autonomy was a “national-territorial autonomy,” or “a 
single unified entity” uniting “all Kazakh lands… that formed a compact (sploshnaia) 
territory with the predominant Kazakh-Kirghiz population of the same origin (edinogo 
proiskhozhdeniia), single culture, history, and language” and “possessing sovereignty.”
90
 
As an autonomy, the Alash would be governed by a provisional peoples’ soviet and 
possess an independent militia. Land, water, and mineral resources of the Alash autonomy 
were the property of the autonomy. The governing body of the autonomy was to be a 
provisional peoples’ soviet consisting of 25 members, 10 of whom would represent the 
non-Kazakh (and Kyrgyz) population of the autonomy.
91
 
How successful the Alash was is a matter of debate. On the one hand, the nascent 
autonomy was crippled by its lack of resources and its rivalry with the competing White 
and Red armies, which ravaged the native countryside. The uneasy alliances that the 
Alash formed at different times with the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Siberian 
Government in an effort to protect the autonomy had largely failed.
92
 Similarly, the 
control of the Alash only extended to several smaller areas in the inner Steppe. On the 
other hand, the idea of “the unity of the Kazakh-Kirghiz people (narod)” spearheaded by 
the Alash became the foundation of Soviet Kazakhstan.
93 The Alash and many of its 
leaders were co-opted by the ascendant Bolshevik state, which built on the Alash’ 
popularity and expertise. Writing in 1923, Turar Ryskulov, the chairman of the Muslim 
(Regional) Bureau of the Communist Party, remarked that the Alash takeover of the 
Steppe was the only event in the history of the civil war that had any real meaning to the 
Kazakhs many of whom were unaware of the developments in Moscow and Petrograd.
94
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The Revolution Comes East: The October Revolution in Semirechye 
 
Semirechye occupied a peculiar place in the already peculiar borderlands. As a part, at 
various times, of Turkestan and the Steppe governorate, Semirechye stood at the cross-
roads of the two and was amenable to developments in both. At the same time, the 
distance of Semirechye from the main centres of the colony’s native political mobilization 
and the absence of railway meant that Semirechye remained in isolation throughout the 
period of civil war. Semirechye’s isolation was further compounded by the continuing 
ethnic conflict and the ethnic fragmentation of the oblast. As the site of the worst 
hostilities during the uprising of 1916, southern Semirechye, populated mainly by the 
ethnic Kyrgyz, suffered the greatest drop in agricultural production. By 1917, the shortage 
of grain in the Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds reached 2,6 million poods. The Lepsinsk, 
Kopal’sk and some areas of the Verny uezd, on the other hand, produced 3 million poods 
of surplus grain, but getting this grain to southern Semirechye was difficult. 
Communication between Verny and Pishpek depended on animal-drawn transport and 
600 versts (about 640 kilometres) of poor-quality road.
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The conjunction of Semirechye’s geographic terrain and the ethnic tension is 
critical to understanding the political context of the civil war in southern Semirechye. The 
isolation of southern Semirechye and the presence of a large well-armed settler population 
the settlers’ ability to mobilize the colonial institutions and extract resources from the 
native population. They likewise explain why although directly affected by the civil war, 
the Kyrgyz of Semirechye could offer little resistance to the colonists.  
The news of the second revolution in Petrograd, which reached Verny in late 
October 1917, received a warmer welcome in colonial Semirechye than elsewhere in the 
region. There were several reasons for this. First, as Adeeb Khalid notes, the revolutionary 
slogans of “power to local authorities” and “land to those who work it” were particularly 
advantageous to the Russian settlers.
96
 Secondly, the unpopularity of the Provisional 
Government – earned, no doubt, by the toothless declarations of equality with the nomads 
and the failure to feed the colonists and suppress the remaining nomads – ensured that the 
sympathies of the settler majority were on the Bolshevik side. Finally, the social and 
political circumstances conducive to the overthrow of existing authority, conveniently 
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known in Bolshevik parlance as “the revolutionary situation,” formed in Semirechye 
already by summer 1917. Reporting to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in June 1917, 
Shkapskii and Tynyshpaev, noted that the real power in the south of the oblast (Shkapskii 
and Tynyshpaev toured the Pishpek, Przhevalsk, Djarkent and partly Verny uezds) was 
in the hands of informal gatherings (mitingi) of the colonists.  
These gatherings became the ad-hoc foundation of the future Bolshevik 
stronghold in southern Semirechye. They attracted considerable popular support; in 
addition to the landless settlers and soldiers, the gatherings were attended by a diverse 
crowd of supporters, including members of the far-right monarchist Union of Archangel 
Michael, “bar frequenters,” and “various shady characters” (temnye lichnosti). The 
gatherings made “their own laws and policies” (svoi zakony i svoi poriadki) and used the 
slogans of “the will of the people” and “people’s right” to “make arrests and requisition 
goods.”
97 On 9 July, one such gathering marched to the centre of Pishpek, where 3,000 
soldiers and peasants voted in favour of replacing the uezd commissar, and convening an 
uezd-wide congress.
98 A series of unauthorized land seizures then followed in the Pishpek 
and Prezhevalsk uezds.
99
 In Verny, a group of soldiers arrested and requisitioned a 
transport of grain.
100 As discontent grew, women, too, took to the streets. In mid-October, 
a babii bunt led by a group of women and aided by soldiers seized produce from the native 
merchants in Pishpek.
101
 On 18 October, a large gathering of soldiers returning from the 
front and Tashkent took place in Pishpek.
102
 
The authorities scrambled to maintain order. The administration in Verny 
despatched two Cossack sotnias to Pishpek in response to the soldiers’ meeting and put a 
ban on public gatherings. Short of loyal supporters, the Provisional Government in 
Semirechye relied on the Semirechye Cossacks, but they, too, could not control the mass 
of armed soldiers and peasants. All semblance of central power in the oblast had 
disappeared in the winter of 1917. The Provisional Government was still nominally in 
power, but had neither the resources nor the popular support to maintain its hold on 
authority. With the Cossack forces concentrated mainly in the Verny uezd, the Pishpek 
and Przhevalsk uezds were largely left to their own devices.  
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In the fateful months between the tumultuous autumn of 1917 and the declaration 
of the Turkestan Soviet Republic in late spring 1918 the settler society of Semirechye 
increasingly fragmented and mobilized. As the seat of power, Verny became the centre 
of conflict between the Provisional Government supported by the Semirechye Cossacks 
and the nascent Soviets, which emerged from the spontaneous and unauthorized 
gatherings of soldiers and peasants. By early March 1918 power shifted decisively to the 
Soviets. Mere months later, in the summer of 1918, this power was challenged by the 
advancing White Armies, which turned the young Soviet republic into an embattled 
fortress. Desperate to hold onto the region in spite of “the circumstances…threatening to 
tear the republic away from the centre...; the uncovering of counter-revolutionary groups 
in the various places of the republic;…famine in the masses of the poorest population of 
the republic;…and the weak organization of the proletarian masses of the population,” 
the Communist Party of Turkestan declared “the dictatorship of the proletariat.”
103
 
In the absence of central authority and with no standard practices and procedures, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat in Semirechye assumed the familiar features of total 
mobilization first experienced by the settler society during the native rebellion. A network 
of semi-formal and interlocking institutions developed at all levels of authority, from 
village soviets at the lowest level to the mainly urban soviets of soldiers and peasants, to 
the uezd and oblast-level Ispolkoms, and numerous committees in charge of land and food 
supply. The attendant militarization of these institutions allowed the settler society to 
control, manage, and extract resources in the circumstances of war and ethnic conflict.  
The formation of Red Army units in Semirechye began immediately after the 
establishment of Soviets in the uezds of the oblast. In the Przhevalsk uezd, the order to 
mobilize, arm, and train the Red Army units was made by the uezd Ispolkom in May 
1918.
104 The backbone of the Red Army in the oblast were “the Turkestani riflemen” – 
experienced soldiers of peasant stock and with a history of service in the imperial army.
105
 
Of the 19,357 men deployed by the Bolsheviks in the region (with the exception of the 
Orenburg and Ashkhabad fronts), about a quarter, 4,227 men, were stationed in 
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 The majority of these forces were drawn from the settler population of the 
oblast. The local Ispolkoms succeeded in enforcing the nearly universal military 
mobilization of male colonists. In addition to the Red Army units, the Ispolkoms formed 
the paramilitary Red Guards and Communist party militias.
107 New recruits were trained 
and armed.
108
 Munitions were produced locally as well.
109
 
The first actions of the Ispolkoms in the oblast aimed to seize and establish control 
of the meagre resources of the devastated colony. Often, these actions were directed at 
the unarmed native population, who provided a convenient target for the colonists. As in 
1916, the authorities seized the nomads’ land and animals. In June 1918, the Przhevalsk 
Ispolkom seized the landholdings leased by the settlers from the Resettlement 
Administration and the native nomads, thereby making it impossible for the nomads to 
return to their land.
110
 Land was seized by both the authorities and unauthorized settlers. 
In September 1918, the Pishpek Soviet reported about the continuing seizures of land by 
the “the landless city dwellers and peasants.
111
 A month later, in October 1918, the 
Pishpek uezd commissar ordered the distribution of “Kirghiz, public, and state” land to 
the land and water committees formed in the Pishpek uezd.
112
 Where the Kyrgyz were 
allowed to stay on land they already occupied they had to pay a fee “determined by the 
oblast.”
113 The authorities had in effect treated the nomads’ land as no-one’s land, which 
was up for grabs.  
Land was also seized by colonists from other oblasts of Turkestan and refugees 
from European Russia. In August 1919, for example, a group of settlers from the Syr-
Daria oblast moved to the Przhevalsk uezd and forced the Kyrgyz off 9,800 dessiatines 
of land. Short of labour, the re-settlers were able to cultivate less than a tenth, 900 
dessiatines, of the land they seized from the nomads.
114
 Similar seizures of land took place 
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in the Pishpek uezd, where the nomads’ land “was being continuously occupied by the 
settlers from other uezds.”
115
 
The native population also remained a target of forced requisitioning. In the 
months of November and December 1918, for example, the administration of the 
Przhevalsk uezd taxed the wealthy Kyrgyz (how their presumed wealth was measured is 
unclear) and requisitioned manaps’ livestock. In the Pishpek uezd, the local Ispolkom 
levied a one-time tax on “the Muslim as well as the Russian” population of the uezd, 
which in practice amounted to the confiscation of the nomads’ livestock at artificially low 
prices. Pigs, on the other hand, bred exclusively by the Russian settlers, were evaluated 
at the “current” market prices.”
116
 In May 1918, the Przhevalsk Ispolkom expropriated 




As in 1916, the nomads were also required to provide free labour on the farms of 
the settlers whose family members served in the Red Army. Where the native 
communities failed to provide labour, the authorities requisitioned their grain and animals 
to feed the soldiers and their families.
118
 Naturally, the seizures of livestock and grain, 
landlessness, and forced labour led to immense mortality in the nomadic society, thereby 
damaging the colonial agriculture, which had come to rely heavily on native labour. By 
August 1918, the shortage of labour had become so acute that “in view of the beginning 
of the grain harvesting season” and “for the maintenance of the economic life of the 
oblast,” the Pishpek soviet of soldiers and peasants had found the return of refugees from 
China “desirable.” “Full amnesty” would be granted to those of the returning Kyrgyz who 
recognized Soviet power and surrendered arms.
119
 Despite the promises, “the mass 
beatings of the Kirghiz by the peasants of the Przhevalsk uezd” continued.
120
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Competition for resources, particularly land, also split the colonial society. The 
Cossack support of the White cause, their past associations with the old regime, and the 
distinctly Cossack makeup of the White Armies in Semirechye and elsewhere in the 
region, made Cossacks suspect in the eyes of the Bolshevik authorities. At the same time, 
the vast tracts of land in Cossack ownership pitted the townsmen and landless settlers of 
Semirechye against the Cossacks. Armed with the rhetoric of class struggle, the 
authorities requisitioned grain and animals from the Cossack settlements. In the spring of 




By December the same year the villagers of Belovodskoe had had enough. Joined 
by the Dungans of the neighbouring settlements who were similarly targeted by the 
Pishpek soviet and emboldened by the rumours of an approaching Czechoslovak legion, 
the villagers occupied Pishpek on 14 December.
122
 Less than ten days later, on 23 
December the combined forces of the Red Army and local militias drove the villagers 
back to Belovodskoe. By 26 December Belovodskoe was captured and the rebellion was 
put down.
123
 As a reward to the settler militias who participated in the suppression of the 
revolt, the Pishpek Ispolkom redistributed among them grain and rice seized from 
Belovodskoe and the Dungan villages.
124
 The Belovodskoe revolt had important 
implications for the land and water reforms of 1921-1922 in Semirechye. As the next 
chapter will show, the reforms – aimed at equalizing the land rights of the native 
population with those of the colonists – targeted primarily the Cossack settlements. The 
transfer of land under the Cossack settlements to the native population was effectively a 
punitive campaign against the group that had shown itself to be disloyal to the new 
regime.  
As bruising as the events in Belovodskoe were to the nascent Soviets in the oblast, 
the biggest threat came from outside. In the spring and summer of 1919, the retreating 
Annenkov armies and Irgash’s basmachi bands armies put pressure on southern 
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 A state of siege was declared in the Przhevalsk uezd in May 1919.
126 In a 
move suggesting the desperation and complete exhaustion of the settler population, the 
Semirechye authorities began the mobilization of groups considered hostile, including 
“Cossacks, former officers and military administrators, and those Muslims who served in 
the rank of the old army.”
127
 Although the Pishpek uezd military commissariat completed 
the mobilization of 340 Muslims (likely Tatars) of the uezd in Agust 1919, the 
mobilization campaign among the natives failed.
128
 The following month, the Turkestan 
Revvoenkom (Revolutionary Military Council) reported to Moscow that “the attempts to 




The labour mobilization had similarly “existed on paper only.” The terrified 
nomads refused to work on the settlers’ fields and fled, making it impossible for the 
colonists to harvest their fields.
130 The flight of the natives in the face of growing demand 
for manpower and soldiers had convinced the administration to take a more conciliatory 
stance towards the nomads. Although a comprehensive campaign to rehabilitate the 
refugees and the native population at large did not start until 1920-1921, some native 
communities received limited food assistance in 1919. In April 1919, for example, the 
authorities distributed grain and barley among the poorer peasants of Sretenskoe and the 
Kyrgyz of the Djamansartovskaia volost.
131
 
The softened stance of the local soviets in 1919 portended a general shift in the 
Soviet policies towards the non-Russian minorities during the first decade of Soviet rule. 
The continued resistance of the native population to the Soviet power, understood, 
justifiably, by the native society as rule by Russians, had brought recognition that the use 
of violence and repression was damaging the prospects of the region’s integration, 
                                                          
125 Pokrovskii, 233.  
126 “Iz prikaza operativno-politicheskogo shtaba oborony przheval’skogo uezda ob ob”iavlenii g. Przheval’sk i 
Przheval’skogo uezda na osandom polozhenii, 28 maia 1919 g.” in Karakeev and Zima, 128-29. 
127 “Prikaz semirechenskogo oblastnogo revvoensoveta i ispolkoma o mobilizatsii v krasnuiu armiiu, 30 iiulia 1919 g.” 
in ibid., 146-47. 
128 “Donesenie pishpekskogo uezdnogo voenkoma semirechenskomu oblrevvoensovetu ob otpravke mobilizovannykh 
kommunistov v Tashkent i na severnyi semirechenskii front, 4 avgusta 1919 g.” in ibid., 148. 
129 “Iz doneseniia revvoensoveta i glavkoma voisk Turkrespubliki glavkomu voisk RSFSR o voenno-politicheskom 
polozhenii v Turkestane, 17 sentiabria 1919 g.” in ibid., 57. One of the biggest issues was that even the mobilized 
Muslims could not understand their Russian instructors and asked to be trained in their mother tongue. “Soobshchenie 
VIII s”ezdu sovetov Turkrespubliki ot nachal’nika eshelona, dostavivshego v Tashkent 428 mobilizovannykh 
pishpekskikh kommunistov” in ibid., 58-59. 
130 Zhantuarov, 226. 
131 Even then, the Kyrgyz received proportionally much smaller amounts of grain and barley. Every settler received a 
little over 0,6 poods of grain and slightly less than 0,3 poods of barley, whereas every Kyrgyz received 0,1 poods of 
grain, 0,01 poods of millet, and 0,01 poods of barley. “Protokol zasedaniia belovodskogo raionnogo komiteta bednoty 
o raspredelenii konfiskovannogo khleba, 3 aprelia 1919 g.” in ibid., 191.  
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reconstruction, and development. How the new government sought to mend the broken 
relations with the native population and initiate “socialist construction” in the region is 
the subject of the next chapter.  
 
Semirechye, “the Broken Trough” 
 
The peculiarity of southern Semirechye extended beyond its geographic isolation. The 
background of southern Semirechye’s native elites was equally distinctive. The 
leadership of the Pishpek branch of the Alash, which opened in June 1917, in particular, 
warrants a closer look. For one, the surviving members of the Pishpek Alash – many of 
the Alash members in the Przhevalsk and Pishpek uezds were executed by the uezd 
Ispolkoms in 1918 – came to play a crucial role in the political development of the oblast 
under the Soviet administration. Secondly, the Pishpek membership of the Alash was 
qualitatively different from its Steppe counterpart. Unlike the Russian-educated Kazakh 
elites, the Kyrgyz members of the Alash were of manap background, received traditional 
religious education, combined sometimes with several years of instruction in one of the 
Russo-native schools of the oblast, and often did not speak Russian.
132
 Their position in 
relation to the colonial authorities differed markedly, too; where the Kazakh leaders of 
the Alash were employed in the colonial administration in professional capacities 
(Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev was a railway engineer and Alikhan Bukeikhanov was an 
editor in a number of Kadet newspapers) and represented the Steppe in the short-lived 
Dumas, the Kyrgyz members of the Alash occupied lower-level elected positions of 
volost heads and translators.  
Lastly and very significantly, with the exception of the future chairman of the 
Semirechye Oblast Committee (Obkom), Abdykerim Sydykov, and unlike the Kazakh 
leadership of the Alash, nearly all of the manap members of the Pishpek Alash took part 
– and in many cases, led – the uprising and escaped to China to avoid persecution. 
Ishenaly Arabaev, a prominent and very active Kyrgyz member of the Alash, is 
particularly illustrative of the difference between the two groups. Arabaev received 
religious education in Ufa and for a few years before his return to the home village in the 
Przhevalsk uezd worked as an editor in the Alash newspaper “Kazak.” A co-author of the 
reformed Arabic alphabet for Kyrgyz and Kazakh speakers, Arabaev opened a new 
method (Jadid) school in the Tonskaia volost of the Przhevalsk uezd in 1912. During the 
                                                          




uprising he fled to China with his volost. Arabaev’s experience was by no means unique. 
Indeed, the experience of exile and persecution was universal among the Kyrgyz members 
of the Alash and across the wider native society of southern Semirechye.  
For the Kyrgyz of Semirechye, exile became a source of collective solidarity, an 
ethnic marker, which separated the Kyrgyz from other peoples of the region.
133 The sense 
of the physical and emotional displacement engendered by exile and amplified by the 
continued persecution at the hands of the colonists prompted the development of a strong 
emotional attachment to the ethnic “homeland” in Semirechye and led the native elites to 
formulate territorial claims to this homeland.
134 The geographic isolation of southern 
Semirechye had further reinforced collective ethnic identity. The distinctive tropes of loss 
and survival in the collective petitions of the Kyrgyz of Semirechye and reflections of the 
native elites on the civil war in Semirechye highlight the emotional charge of the 
emergent ethnic identity while simultaneously reconstructing the social context in which 
this identity was articulated.
135
 
The critical article by Akhmet Baitursynov – one of the leaders of the Alash – 
remains perhaps the best known assessment of the October revolution and the civil war 
in Semirechye and the Steppe from the perspective of native intelligentsia.
136
 The 
revolution, wrote Baitursynov, “terrified the Kirghiz (Kazakhs) with its external 
manifestations. What the Bolshevik movement was like in the central parts of Russia was 
unknown to the Kirghiz. But in the peripheries it was accompanied by violence, looting, 
abuses, and a peculiar dictatorial power. In short, the (Bolshevik) movement in the 
                                                          
133 Jipar Diushembieva examines oral poems of the uprising of 1916, commemorated in the unofficial communal 
histories of the Kyrgyz as Urkun, or exodus, to argue that these poems “communicated a strong sense of Kyrgyz 
identity, by stressing the differences between the Kyrgyz and the other ethnic groups of Semirech’e, and by expressing 
deep longing for the lands of Issyk Kul and Jeti Suu…considered the land of the Kyrgyz.” Duishembieva,  205. 
134 Again, Diushembieva’s thesis explores how a deeply-held and territorially-oriented sense of collective belonging 
among the Kyrgyz developed within the Russian imperial context through the efforts of the Kyrgyz poets and 
intellectuals during the late tsarist period.” 
135 For a discussion of the response of the native intelligentsia and akyns, native folk bards, to the rebellion, see 
Duishembieva,  199-220. 
136 What makes Baitursynov’s piece particularly interesting is that it was intended as criticism from within the party 
ranks. By the time he wrote the article, Baitursynov had joined the Bolsheviks and called onto other Alash members to 
recognize the Soviet power. Baitursynov’s critique was in fact a common, if not dominant, view shared by many of the 
Communist party leaders at the same time. The best known examination of the October revolution as “the colonial 
revolution” is given in Georgii Safarov’s “Kolonial’naia revoliutsiia: Opyt Turkestana” published in 1921. It is 
tempting to see the works of Safarov and a handful of native activists like Baitursynov as an outgrowth of revolutionary 
idealism facilitated by the initial openness of post-revolutionary political life. There certainly was a sense of earnestness 
to Safarov’s examination of the inequalities that attended the revolution in Russia’s colonies, but, as Adeeb Khalid 
correctly points out, Safarov was critical of local Russian “revolutionaries,” but not of Soviet power. Adeeb Khalid, 
"Between Empire and Revolution: New Work on Soviet Central Asia," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History 7, no. 4 (2006): 867. If anything, Safarov helped the party absolve itself of the crimes committed in its name 
against the native population of Turkestan during the civil war and immediately after. A common claim that the Soviet 
power did not come to the region until after the land and water reforms of 1922-23 when a large portion of the lands 
seized by the colonists was returned to its native owners helped the Soviet government distance itself from the violence 
of the re-conquest of Central Asia.  
102 
 




A lesser known but equally scathing assessment of Bolshevik rule in Semirechye 
is given in the March 1919 resolution adopted by the Alash’s Semirechye Oblast 
Committee. Authored by Ibraim (Ibragim) Dzhainakov, whose ethnic background 
remains a point of contention between Kazakh and Kyrgyz historians, the resolution 
blames “the pitiful, wretched, and impoverished” state of “the previously bountiful and 
wealthy” oblast under “the arbitrary rule (svoebraznoe khozianichan’e) of the Semirechye 
Bolsheviks.” As the result of continuing “to this day… mass executions [of the native 
population], including children and women, rapine, and the general destruction of 
property, livestock, and farm implements, and other depredations” the native population 
of Semirechye was “positively vanishing.” “Of all the groups of population” Dzhainakov 




The resolution was made all the more poignant by the failure of the Alash to act 
on the tragedy unfolding in the Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds. The fate that befell the 
Pishpek branch of the Alash and other “Muslim institutions” in the southern Semirechye 
reflects the state of isolation and helplessness of its Kyrgyz, Dungan, and Taranchi 
population. Formed in June 1917, the Pishpek Alash had survived for a little over a year 
and was disbanded by the Bolshevik authorities in September 1918. A number of the 
Kyrgyz Alash activists, including a prominent manap Diur Soorombaev, were killed the 
same year by the head of one of the Red Army units, a certain Pavlov.
139
 The remaining 
activists were forced to recognize the Soviet power and corralled into a newly established 
“Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee.”
140 A similar fate awaited other indigenous political 
organizations, such as the Shuroi-Islomiia, “the Tatar Ittifak and the Kirghiz Soviet of 
Proletarians,” all of which were shut down in September 1918.
141
 
A group petition written by one of the rebellious manaps Mambetaly Muratalin in 
January 1920 similarly implies that the Kyrgyz of Semirechye were affected more than 
                                                          
137 Baitursynov,  1. 
138 “Postanovlenie Semirechenskogo Oblastnogo Kirgizskogo Komiteta Alash, 17 marta 1919 g.” in Koigeldiev, 176-
77. 
139 “Proshenie vozhdiu Rossiiskoi revoliutsii tovarishchu Leninu ot grazhdan: Dzhunusa Baidzhanova, Eshenali 
Arabaeva, Isaka Shaibekova, Isametdina Shabdanova, Dautkula SHigaeva, Atakhana Tezekbaeva, Sultangazy 
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Tokmakskogo i Pishpekskogo uezdov Semirechenskoi oblasti, 1 maia 1920 g.” in ibid., 199. 
140 Zhantuarov, 97-98. 
141 “Iz protokola zasedaniia ispolnitel’nogo komiteta soveta narodnykh deputatov Pishpekskogo uezda o zakrytii vsekh 
burjuazno-natsionalisticheskikh musul’manskikh uchrezhdenii, 20 sentiabria” in ibid., 141. 
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others. The petition lists six Kyrgyz volosts of Shamsinskaia, Buraninskaia, Tynaevskaia, 
Nurmambetovskaia, Baiseiitovskaia, and Issygatinskaia, and a single Kazakh volost of 
Kulboldinskaia as most “devastated in terms of land and economy.” Although addressed 
to the Turkestan Executive Committee (TurkTsIK), the petition does not differentiate 
between “the time of Nicholas,” which the petitioners compare to “the time of the 
Egyptian pharaoh” in an obvious biblical reference to Moses’ exodus, that of the 
Provisional Government and of the Soviet authorities, under which “the Kirghiz were left 
naked and barefoot…starved to death and were dispersed across the uezds – their land 
occupied by Russian settlements.”
142
 
Another petition – addressed to “comrade Lenin” – seeks “to remind the Supreme 
authority of the Russian Socialist Republic of the calamities and privation that befell the 
Kirghiz proletariat.” Signed by Ishenaly Arabaev and several manaps, most notably the 
Shabdanov brothers, and the representatives of the Dungans and Taranchis of the 
Przhevalsk, Naryn, Tokmak, and Pishpek uezds, the petition is appreciative of the efforts 
of the Special Commission charged with the task of aiding the returning refugees. At the 
same time, the petitioners are highly critical of the Bolshevik government in Semirechye; 
they ask themselves “if the Kirghiz of the Semirechye oblast use the freedom of the estate 
(class) revolution” and respond that they do not “for they do not have it.” They detail the 
various abuses perpetrated by the new authorities and “the Bolshevik bosses” (glavari in 
the original, literally “bosses of Bolshevik mobs”), including the executions of “the 
smartest and most honourable among the Kirghiz” and the murderous actions of the 
settlers, who killed the returning Kyrgyz “at first convenience” and “to the last man.” One 
of the more interesting passages in the petition describes strategies of survival employed 
by the Kyrgyz who “put a watchman on every clearing and every hill and if a Russian 
appeared…hid in holes underground, dressed their wives and daughters in rags, and 
smeared ash and soil on their heads and faces, so that they appeared loathsome and 
wretched to the eye.” The petition repeatedly portrays “the Kirghiz of Semirechye, 
especially of the Przhevalsk and Pishpek uezds” as “most constrained and oppressed in 
relation to the land question.” To resolve this “unhappiest and neediest state” of affairs 
the petitioners request that Lenin disarm the settlers and replace the Red Army units 
drawn from the settlers with units from central Russia.
143
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In addition to bringing to light the specific experience of Semirechye’s native 
nomads in lieu of other written sources, these petitions and reports provide factual data, 
which paint a rather damning picture of the economic and social disruption in the oblast. 
From these petitions and reports we learn, for example, that by July 1917 more than half, 
or 83,000, of 164,000 nomads who fled to China, had died of starvation, exposure, and 
diseases.
144
 In the winter of 1918, “thirty Kirghiz died daily.”
145 We also know that little 
had changed for the Kyrgyz under the Bolshevik government. The settlers continued to 
raid the returning Kyrgyz in 1919 and had killed – with the help of the Red Army – 10,000 
Kyrgyz and Kazakhs; “the Reds wiped out entire auls (native villages).”
146
 
The government figures confirm the scale of devastation. Between 1917 and 1920, 
the Naryn uezd (formed in the aftermath of the uprising) lost 63.4% of the livestock 
population while the Pishpek uezd lost 43.6%.
147
 By 1920, the livestock population of 
southern Semirechye shrank to 46.7% of the 1914 population.
148 Altogether, the Alash’s 
Semirechye Oblast Committee put the losses of the native nomads in Semirechye at 900 
million rubles.
149 The agriculture of the region suffered a similar decline. Where in 1915, 
there were 640,000 dessiatines of sown land and 9,2 million heads of livestock, by 1920, 
there were only 300,000 dessiatines of sown land and 2,6 million heads of livestock. The 
productivity of sown areas had also dropped; a dessiatine sown in 1920 yielded only half 
of its pre-war harvest.
150
 
The consequences of this drop were dismal, if expected. Reporting on famine in 
Semirechye, Turar Ryskulov noted that among the nomads “the loss of life to famine and 
epidemics varies between the different regions from 25 to 50%. Only one tenth of 
livestock remains…The de-population has reached such a degree that in some localities 
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Despite the general economic crisis in the oblast, famine had mostly affected the 
native population. Undeterred by the starving Kyrgyz, the stream of settlers continued to 
trickle into Semirechye. By 1919, seven new settlements had sprung up in the Przhevalsk 
uezd alone. The attraction of lands cleansed of their native inhabitants attracted settlers 
from across the country; the settlers continued to “arrive in waves daily” (plyvut i plyvut 
s kazhdym dnem).
152 Both the new and established settlers depredated on the nomads. A 
circular letter sent to the uezd, volost, and village Ispolkoms in January 1919 reported that 
“the politically ignorant (nesoznatel’nye) citizens of some of the settlements in the 
Semirechye oblast form groups of 4-5 men, and, armed with rifles, raid the neighbouring 
auls, where they commit various abuses against the Kirghiz, harass, plunder, and 
sometimes even kill.”
153
 As the next chapter will show, this convergence of land, 
ethnicity, and conflict continued well into the first decade of the Soviet rule in the region. 
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Chapter IV  
 
Semirechye, the Frontier of the Revolution 
 
Coercion and mass mobilization, as we have established in the previous chapters, are 
critical to the establishment and maintenance of political regimes. Their use by the three 
successive governments – first, by the Tsarist authorities, then, by the Provisional 
Government, and, finally, by the Bolsheviks – underscore their importance both in 
warfare and state-building. The civil war in Semirechye is a good illustration of how the 
Soviet parastatal complex emergent from the colonial institutions and practices of total 
war employed coercion, repression, and mobilization to seize control over the key 
resources of the oblast and assert authority over its native and settler population.  
But the war had also shown that coercion alone was insufficient to sustain the 
fledgling Soviet state and its institutional network in the region. First, the marginalization 
and exclusion of the native population from state-building made impossible the 
mobilization of the Semirechye’s nomads for the task of state building, economic 
development, and defence. Second, the distance of the region from the Bolshevik centres 
of power in central Russia and the fact that though armed, the settler population on which 
the Soviet authorities came to rely, constituted a minority, prompted the new government 
to adopt policies aimed at “making Soviet power close and native to the peasantry of non-
Russian nationalities.”1  
The reintegration of the region into the reformed and reorganized Russian state 
testifies to the ability of the Soviet regime to co-opt the indigenous elites and overcome 
resistance in the native countryside. How this was accomplished is the subject of this 
chapter. Substantively, this chapter is an examination of the productive, or positive, 
dimensions of Soviet power. Where the previous chapters examined the repressive 
instruments of imperial and later Soviet state-building in the Semirechye, this chapter 
analyses the efforts of the Bolshevik government to fashion popular loyalties through the 
implementation of targeted programmes aimed at “implanting national Soviet statehood 
(gosudarstvennost’)” among the non-Russian peoples of the empire.2  
Of particular interest to me are the critical junctures in the political development 
of Semirechye in the first decade of Soviet power: the policies of decolonization, most 
                                                          
1 B. Chokushov, Klassovaia bor'ba v kirgizskikh ailakh v pervye goda sotsialisticheskikh preobrazovanii (1918-1924 
gg.) (Frunze: Kirgizskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1970), 46.  
2 “The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East, May 22, 1925,” in J.  V.  Stalin, Works, vol. 7 
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1954), 138.   
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notably, the land and water reforms of 1921-1922; the campaign of national delimitation, 
which had divided and consolidated the native pastoralist population of Semirechye into 
geographically circumscribed ethno-territorial units. These, I argue, were critical to 
Soviet state-building – or “socialist construction” to use the Soviet term – in the oblast 
and the region in general. The redistribution of land and the demonstrative expulsion of 
Cossack colonists helped the regime attract considerable support among the native 
population and retaliate against a social group with a record of anti-Soviet resistance and 
suspected cross-border ties. Similarly, the cultivation and fostering of the institutional 
trappings of a modern nation-state and ethnic identities generated broad social support for 
the regime and consolidated the political boundaries of the state. 
In my analysis of the inter-war political history of Semirechye I proceed from the 
argument made by Peter Sahlins that “the creation of the territorial state constituted one 
component of the modern nation-state; the emergence of national identity formed 
another.”3 The land and water reforms and the national delimitation of the region helped 
cement the connection between the territorially anchored national republics and a sense 
of ethnic belonging.  
To understand why the Soviet government sought to enforce ethnic solidarities, I 
situate the Soviet project of nation-building in the historical – rather than ideological – 
context. In addition to concerns of domestic stability, the Soviet government also had to 
contend with cross-border threats. The perceived hostile “encirclement” of the young 
Soviet state made political loyalties of the borderland population a matter of state security. 
The cultivation and management of national institutions and sentiments was 
fundamentally a boundary-building project aimed at mobilizing the population of the 
ethnically diverse and politically volatile region for the purposes of state construction. In 
simple terms, institutionalized ethnic identities lent legitimacy to the Soviet nation and 
state-building projects; they bolstered as well territorial claims on behalf of the Soviet 
government and helped assimilate the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional population into 
the highly centralized state.  
While not denying the importance of Marxist doctrine to the Bolshevik regime, I 
see it “as one of a range of transformational ideologies and agendas.”4 The inter-war 
                                                          
3 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 
1989), 7. 
4 Hoffmann, 3. On other works placing Soviet “modernity” in the pan-European context, see David L Hoffman and 
Yanni Kotsonis, Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 2000); Michael David-
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Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); "Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar 
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Soviet policies of development and nationalization in Semirechye constitute therefore an 
instance of “Soviet social intervention” that formed a part of “one particular constellation 
of modern state practices that arose in conjunction with ambitions to refashion society 
and mobilize populations for industrial labour and mass warfare.”5 As such, the policies 
of the Soviet government in Semirechye sought to forge the native pastoralists of the 
region into a highly productive and loyal population whose service to the state was 
voluntary and drew on the civil and political consciousness of Soviet citizens.  
Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate that the Bolshevik practices of state 
and nation-building were informed by the principles that also guided the officials of the 
colonial administration and the Provisional Government. Like the Tsarist authorities and 
the Provisional Government before, the Soviet leadership sought to exert control over 
land – as simultaneously a natural resource and a marker of the state’s political boundaries 
– through the redistribution of land and delimitation of boundaries.  
Underlying this chapter’s discussion of nation and state-building in Soviet 
Semirechye are the concepts of nationalism and identity elaborated by, among others, 
Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Ronald Suny, who argue that national identities 
are socially constructed, or imagined, to use Anderson’s term, through print culture and 
mass education.6                                                      
 
From Rebels to Citizens 
 
Perhaps the single most important – and contentious – question that historians of the 
Soviet nationalities policies have sought to answer is the question of why the Bolshevik 
leadership sought to develop and promote institutional forms of statehood and national 
consciousness among the empire’s minorities. Terry Martin and Ronald Suny have 
convincingly demonstrated that the Bolshevik leadership took this decision in response 
to the ascendant national movements in the national borderlands of the former Tsarist 
                                                          
Conjuncture," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2, no. 1 (2001); Peter Holquist, "" Information Is 
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(Princeton University Press, 2012). On the Soviet nationalities in comparative perspective, see Peter A Blitstein, 
"Cultural Diversity and the Interwar Conjuncture: Soviet Nationality Policy in Its Comparative Context," Slavic Review  
(2006).  
5 Hoffmann, 2. 
6 Terry Dean Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2001); Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).  
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empire.7 The concern of the Soviet leaders with the growth of nationalism translated into 
a policy of concessions to and accommodation of non-Russian movements and elites. 
Although largely in agreement with Martin’s suggestion that in formulating 
nationalities policies, the Soviet leadership sought to counter national aspirations of the 
empire’s minorities, I propose to highlight certain nuances of Soviet nationalities policies 
by placing their development in the broader historical context. I argue in particular that 
the promotion of the empire’s inorodtsy subjects to Soviet citizens should be seen less as 
simply an extension of the politics of concessions and accommodation, than a project of 
state-building in the ethnic peripheries of the state.  
I distinguish several strategic and political factors that influenced Bolshevik 
thinking on the question of national minorities. First, the civil war had severely truncated 
the former Tsarist state; by 1921 Russia had relinquished vast territories stretching from 
Finland to Bessarabia and shrunk, as the result, to its nineteenth century borders.8 Second, 
the ethnic mobilization of the empire’s minorities engendered by the civil war gave rise 
to a multitude of national movements that the Bolsheviks had to contend with even in the 
territories under the Red Army’s sway. Third, the rapid expansion of imperial Russia in 
the decades before the war reduced the share of the “Great Russian” (i.e. Slavic 
population inclusive of Ukrainians and Belarussians) population to 44% of the empire’s 
total population by the turn of the twentieth century.9 Fourth, the loss of productive 
population, Russian and non-Russian alike, resulted in the decline of agricultural 
production. As the population of central Russia and the national peripheries succumbed 
to famine and violence, the government was left with little to feed the Red Army and 
defend Soviet Russia. Finally, the inter-state rivalry between the Soviet Union and the 
hostile “capitalist” nations meant that although the Soviet state “happily emerged from 
the condition of civil war, the danger of attack from without was by no means excluded.”10 
Tackling this danger would not be easy. Speaking in 1920, the then commissar of 
nationalities, Iosif Stalin, insisted that in conditions of Soviet Russia’s dependency on the 
                                                          
7 The argument is now new and has been made by a German historian, Gerhard Simon, in his book on “Nationalism 
and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society” 
already in 1986 (though it became available in English only in 1991). Gerhard Simon, Karen Forster, and Oswald 
Forster, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-
Stalinist Society (Westview Press Boulder, 1991). At the same, Martin’s magisterial work cannot be reduced to this 
simple interpretation. Like Francine Hirsch and others, Martin also argues that to a considerable extent, the Soviet 
nationalities policies were grounded in the Marxist doctrine of class equality transposed onto the multi-ethnic 
population of the former empire. Martin; Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge & the Making 
of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).  
8 Robert Auty and Dimitri Obolensky, Companion to Russian Studies: Volume 1: An Introduction to Russian History, 
vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 19-20.  
9 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Volume 1: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 (New York: Penguin, 2014), 11. 
10 “The Union of the Soviet Republics, Report Delivered at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, December 
26, 1922, “ in J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 151. 
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borderlands’ “raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs” the only way “to carry the revolution 
through to the end” was the establishment of “definite relations, definite ties between the 
centre and the border regions of Russia, ensuring an intimate and indestructible union 
between them.”11 The Soviet nationalities policy was intended to do just that. The 
simultaneous integration of the peoples and territories of the former empire into Soviet 
Russia on a more egalitarian basis allowed the Soviet state to mobilize broad support, pre-
empt claims of various national movements, and draw on the “support of the peasant 
East” and its “essential resources.”12 The sensitivity of the Bolshevik government to 
developments abroad suggests that the Soviet nationalities policies drew in equal measure 
on the efforts of the Soviet government to attract popular support and to counteract 
foreign influences. In essence, the Soviet nation-building arose from the convergence of 
domestic challenges and the geopolitical concerns of the Bolshevik leadership. The 
equalization of the native peoples of the borderlands, their increased political 
representation, and the state-sponsored development of republican economies ensured the 
cohesion and unity of the “new mighty union state” against the “external danger.”13 
Soviet Central Asia engendered most of the Soviet leadership’s concerns about 
security. Hardly a unified whole before the revolution, Turkestan emerged deeply divided 
and fragmented in the wake of the civil war. Like elsewhere in the country, this 
fragmentation gave rise to a number of conflicting and disputed ethnic and political 
loyalties as well as nascent forms of nation and statehood, such as the Alash Orda and the 
Turkestan (Kokand) Autonomy. In many ways, the Bolsheviks benefitted from this 
political and military disarray of the forces on the ground. Rather than lose the breakaway 
peripheries to what the Soviet leaders saw as the rival – and hostile – states and 
movements, they forged alliances with the indigenous elites, thereby presenting the 
Soviet state as the champion of the national cause and pre-empting the claims of these 
groups to represent the native population.14  
While this fragmentation proved useful during the civil war, it severely limited 
the Bolsheviks’ ability to govern the region in its aftermath. The economic dislocation 
                                                          
11 Joseph Stalin, The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question Russia, October 10, 1922 in J. V.  
Stalin, Works, vol. 4 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), 363-64.  
12 Ibid., 363. 
13 Joseph Stalin, “The Union of the Soviet Republics, Report Delivered at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of the 
Soviets, December 26, 1922,” in Stalin, 5, 158.  
14 Terry Martin in particular argues that the Bolsheviks were alarmed by the rise of nationalism and national “bourgeois” 
movements, which they saw as a threat to the Soviet Russia. More pointedly, Stephen Kotkin argues that the Bolsheviks 
had to contend with the fait accompli of national autonomies. He writes that “in the face of hostility from both hard-
line Bolsheviks opposed to nationalism at all and national-minded Bolsheviks opposed to centralization” Lenin and 
Stalin “groped toward a workable federalism consonant with Marxist tenets, faits accomplis on the ground, and 
geopolitics.” Kotkin, Stalin: Volume 1: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928, 422-27.  
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and the physical displacement of the native pastoralists resulted in the constantly shifting 
population. In 1920 alone, 63,000 Soviet citizens had crossed the border from Semirechye 
into China.15 The flight of the native population pointed to the problematic nature of the 
boundaries and the population’s ability to defy and negotiate the authority of the state.  In 
the fraught atmosphere of inter-state competition, the unauthorized flow of people and 
goods across the border came to be seen as a security threat.  
The borderland position of Soviet Central Asia created additional complications 
as the new government struggled to control the border and curtail cross-border 
movements. The financial hardship also weighed heavily on the ability of the government 
to defend the border. By 1925, the USSR’s eastern frontier region, which stretched for 
5,000 kilometres from Naryn to the Caspian Sea, was manned by two border detachments 
and three border command posts.16 Between February and October 1922, the border 
forces of Soviet Kazakhstan and Kirghizia killed or detained 4,756 persons attempting to 
cross the border.17 Furthermore, the proximity of Chinese Turkestan and Afghanistan to 
Soviet Central Asia with which they shared cultural and economic ties as well as the co-
ethnic and co-religionist populations made the task of building “the unassailable fortress” 
of Soviet Turkestan simultaneously more difficult and more urgent.18 
The international environment in which the Soviet Union operated also played a 
critical role in the formulation of nationalities policies. In significant ways, the Bolshevik 
leaders tended to view domestic and foreign threats as mutually constitutive and 
reinforcing. This was, for example, the case with the native basmachi (from Turkic 
basmak - to hit) guerrilla movement, to which the Soviet government routinely attributed 
connections to “the imperialist nations” of Europe, which were “conducting a policy of 
encircling the USSR from the East (China, Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey).”19 As “the 
hirelings” of the Soviet Union’s “worst enemy” – “the capitalist world” – “orchestrated 
from abroad,” the basmachi, who briefly united under the leadership of the renegade 
Turkish General Enver Pasha, engendered the Soviet government’s concerns about 
                                                          
15 Kamoludin Nazhmudinovich Abdullaev, Ot Sin'tsziana do Khorasana: Iz istorii sredneaziatskoi emigratsii XX veka 
(Dushanbe: Irfon, 2009), 277.  
16 TsPA FSB RF f. 14, op. 4, d. 1, l.89-90 in Vladimir Vasil'evuch Tereshchenko, "Krasnoznamennyi Vostochnyi 
Pogranichnyi Okrug," Armiia i obshchestvo no. 1 (2014): 50; "Istoriia sozdaniia i okhrany Sredneaziatskoi granitsy 
SSSR," Vestnik arkhivista no. 2 (2013): 148-62.  
17 TsPM FSB RF dok. F. DNV-1634, s.90 in "Krasnoznamennyi Vostochnyi Pogranichnyi Okrug," 51.  
18 “Stenograficheskii otchet 1 uchreditel’nogo s”ezda Sovetov KAO, mart 1925 g.,” TsGA KR f. 20, op. 1, d. 14, l. 202 
19 For a typical report on the “counterrevolutionary” connections of the basmachi with the British see “Iz doklada 
nachal’nika Bukharskogo oblastnogo pogranichnogo otriada o vrazhdebnoi deiatel’nosti kontrrevoliutsionnoi 
emigratsii, 25 noiabria 1923 g.” in P. I.  Zyrianov, Pogranichnye voiska SSSR 1929-1938: Sbornik dokumentiv i 
materialov (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 597-98. Joseph Stalin quoted in Kotkin, Stalin: Volume 1: Paradoxes of Power, 
1878-1928, 739. Tajik historian Kamoludin Abdullaev argues that neither the White Armies, which had fled to 
neighbouring Chinese Turkestan, nor any anti-Bolsheviks forces in the West seriously considered the basmachi as a 
potential ally. Abdullaev, 303.  
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foreign intervention in the region.20 A 1922 OGPU (Joint State Political Directorate, the 
secret police agency, which replaced Cheka in 1922) report described the basmachi 
movement as an “open war” against the Soviet state.21  
In Semirechye, the basmachi threat was less pronounced than in the Ferghana 
Valley. The presence of a large and well-armed settler minority curbed any attempts of 
the native population to offer armed resistance. Nevertheless, the porous border with 
Chinese Turkestan, which had become a safe haven for 13,000 White Cossacks and many 
thousands of Kyrgyz and Kazakhs gave the authorities ample reason for concern. Between 
August and November 1924 the Soviet border guards clashed 36 times with illegal border 
crossers in the Jarkent uezd alone.22 Added to this was the continuing ethnic conflict 
between the colonists and the natives, which threatened to undo the successes of the Red 
Army in the oblast and made impossible the mobilization of native society for “socialist 
construction.” 
 
Colonialism in Reverse: Land and Water Reforms of 1921-22 
 
The land question remained by far the thorniest issue facing the Soviet authorities in the 
oblast. Years of devastation had rendered vast tracts of land unproductive; by 1920 the 
sown areas in Semirechye contracted by 60% compared with the pre-war levels.23 The 
loss of nearly half, 46.5%, of the oblast’ population of livestock also boded ill for the 
heavily pastoralist economy of Semirechye.24 At the same time, the continuing stream of 
refugees from famine-ravaged central Russia put additional pressure on the strained 
resources of the region. The war had significantly expanded the number of new arrivals 
from European Russia. In as little as a decade, the Russian population of Semirechye 
nearly doubled from 175,000 settlers in 1911, to over 300,000 settlers in 1921.25 In the 
Przhevalsk uezd, where the native uprising had claimed lives of more than 3,000 settlers 
in 1916, the European population grew by roughly 13%, from 69,107 persons to 76,389 
                                                          
20 “Privetstvennoe pis’mo pervomu s”ezdu Kara-Kirgizskoi AO ot komandirov i kursantov, nakhodiashchikhsia v 
national’noi voennoi shkole Srednei Azii, mart 1925 g.,” TsGA KR f. 20, op. 1, d. 14, l. 109 in Zyrianov, 41. On the 
basmachi see Martha B Olcott, "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918–24," Soviet Studies 33, no. 3 
(1981); Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 
1990), 33-44.  
21 “Obzor politiko-ekonomicheskogo sostoianiia RSFSR za mai-iiun’ 1922 g.,” TsA FSB f. 2, op. 1, d. 794, l. 273 ob., 
accessed 16 March, 2015. http://istmat.info/node/22798. 
22 TsPM FSB RF dok. F. DNV-1634, s.90 in Tereshchenko, "Krasnoznamennyi Vostochnyi Pogranichnyi Okrug," 51. 
23 “Stenograficheskii otchet 1 uchreditel’nogo s”ezda Sovetov KAO, mart 1925 g.,” TsGA KR f.20, op.1, d.14, l.66 
24 Ibid. 
25 Genis,  44, 46.  
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persons, between 1917 and 1920.26 Similarly, the Pishpek uezd whose population shrank 
by 21.28% between 1917 and 1920 had experienced a significant growth in its European 
population, which increased by 12.65%.27 
The effects of economic dislocation were shouldered mainly by the native 
population of the oblast. Despite the overall contraction in the sown area, the area sown 
by the settlers in 1920 increased, if insignificantly by 0.83%, or 447 dessiatines.28 In 
contrast, the land area cultivated by the Kyrgyz in 1920 fell to a quarter of the acreage 
under the settlers’ crops.29 The Kyrgyz of the Bystrorechenskaia volost of the Pishpek 
uezd, for example, held on average 1,4 dessiatines of irrigated land, while every settler 
household in the same volost owned 4,1 dessiatines.30 Forced off their land, the Kyrgyz 
grew increasingly dependent on their herds. Between 1917 and 1920, the share of the 
farming Kyrgyz households dropped by roughly a quarter, from 7,734 to 5,989 
households.31 The fall in livestock, however, made the prospects for survival of the native 
nomads even more tenuous. The overall decrease of 46.5% in the oblast’s livestock 
population belied the dramatic decline of the nomadic herds by 67.4% between 1917 and 
1920.32 
Expectedly, the increased competition for land resulted in a continuing surge of 
violence. The authorities recognized both “the extraordinary complexity of the land issue 
in the Semirechye oblast” and the resulting “extreme aggravation in the relationship 
between the settler and the native population.”33A typical secret police (OGPU) report at 
the time read that “the conflict between the Kirghiz and the Russian peasants reached the 
greatest proportions in the Dzhetysu (Semirechye) oblast. Here, the antagonism expresses 
itself in every possible way.”34 How disruptive this antagonism was to the Soviet project 
of post-war reconstruction in the region emerges in the March 1922 resolution of the 
Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party (hereafter KPT) on the Semirechye 
question, which concluded that the continuing land seizures by the newly arrived settlers 
                                                          
26 “Kharakteristika zaveduiushchego Urabkri,” AP RK f. 666, op. 1, d. 198, l. 26 in F. N. Miimanbaeva, "Zemel'nyi 
vopros vo vzaimootnosheniiakh pereselencheskogo i kirgizskogo naseleniia Semirech'ia posle Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii,"  
(2012), http://www.rusnauka.com/11_NPE_2012/Istoria/1_108425.doc.htm. 
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28 Ibid.  
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30 Ibid., 16. 
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can lead to “very serious complications, including civil war.”35 A secret police report 
from the same year had similarly identified “the antagonism between the Russian settlers 
and the indigenous peasants” as one of the two “principal obstacles to the establishment 
of Soviet power.”36 
The ethnic nature of the conflict over land also undermined the prospects of 
indigenous support for the regime. The broad significance of the land issue was readily 
recognized by the oblast and union authorities; the oblast Ispolkom had explicitly linked 
the land question to “the nationalities policy of the Soviet government.”37 An oblast 
meeting of Semirechye’s authorities in November 1920 put the concerns of the authorities 
in even more straightforward terms; “from the first days of the revolution to this day, the 
Russian population (of the oblast) considered Soviet rule to be the rule by the Russians 
in the interests of the Russians.”38 The strong identification of the new government with 
“Russian national domination (zasil’e)” fed into the festering discontent of the native 
nomads, creating pockets of resistance to the authorities in the native countryside.39 
For the native elites, too, the land question was the most pressing issue on the 
political agenda. Speaking on behalf of the “Kirghiz” (that is both Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) 
Akhmet Baitursynov of the former Alash Orda contended that “until the Kirghiz are 
treated differently by the Russians they will – regardless of class divisions – remain 
distrustful of the Russians. To prove that they are the liberator of the exploited nations, 
the proletariat of the Russian nation, which for centuries plundered and oppressed the 
Kirghiz, must show in practice that they are not their (the exploited nations’) new enslaver 
whose only wish is to replace the Tsarist administrators.”40 
In response to the continuing “national antagonism” and with a view to drawing 
the support of the native communities, the Soviet government launched a campaign of 
decolonization in 1920. In Semirechye, the state-led efforts to equalize the native 
population’s land access became the centrepiece of this campaign.41 Openly 
demonstrative – and often violent – the land and water reforms were designed, to quote 
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Lenin, to “win the confidence of the natives” and to show in practice, as Baitursynov had 
insisted, that the Soviet authorities “were not imperialists.”42 In this regard, the reforms 
were an astounding success; observations by visiting party members and secret police 
reports suggest that the campaign served to solidify the position of the new government 
in the native countryside.  
Whether reaching accommodation with the native population was the only 
objective of the land and water reforms, however, begs a question. The fact that only a 
fraction of confiscated land was transferred to the native population and that the Soviet 
leadership chose to resettle the evicted Russian peasants elsewhere in Semirechye rather 
than deport them suggests that the authorities were not solely driven by considerations of 
justice. Instead, alongside the concerted efforts to demonstrate their commitment to 
redressing the past wrongs, the Soviet leaders sought to extend control over resources and 
the subject population of the region.43 The land and water reforms helped the authorities 
accomplish several goals at once. First, the dissolution of the European settlements 
provided the regime with the key natural resource in the oblast – land – and enabled it to 
impose political control on the settler population. Second, the selective targeting of the 
Cossack and starozhil (i.e. long-term settlers, who arrived in the oblast before 1905 
Stolypin reforms) settlements, which openly sympathized with the White Armies during 
the civil war, and the punitive tone of the campaign of expulsion indicate that the 
government used the land and water reforms to punish the segments of settler population 
suspected of disloyalty. Third, by redistributing the land and reorganizing and 
consolidating the land holdings along ethnic lines the Soviet leadership laid the 
foundation for future campaigns of national delimitation and collectivization.  
At the same time, the abrupt end of the reforms revealed the regime’s continuing 
reliance on the Russian population for producing grain and maintaining military control 
over the national periphery. As the next chapter will show, the implications of this implicit 
Russocentrism for nation-building in Soviet Semirechye, and indeed, elsewhere in the 
national republics and autonomies, were far-reaching and led both to readjustments in the 
nationalities policies and the increased identification with the Russian “core” of the Soviet 
Union.  
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Although a decree calling for the equalization of the Russian and native land 
holdings was adopted at the Ninth Turkestan Congress of Soviet in September 1920, the 
actual implementation of the reforms did not start until half a year later, in January 1921.44 
The reforms set four basic tasks of: 1) liquidating the non-working (netrudovye) kulak 
and bai farms and redistributing land between the landless and land poor peasants 
according to the set “labour norm”; 2) equalizing the rights of native and settler 
populations to land and water through the confiscation of excess land; 3) restoring land 
seized by the settlers in the wake of the 1916 uprising to their native owners; and 4) 
parcelling land and assisting settling nomads in transition to sedentary farming.45 The 
reforms were implemented in the course of two stages.46 During the first stage, from 
December 1920 to September 1921, the authorities repossessed and redistributed the land 
of the targeted settlements. The second, land management (zemleustroistvo) stage of the 
reforms was not accomplished until after the collectivization in the first half of the 1930s.  
The redistribution of land was a violent affair. The teams charged with the task of 
redistributing land were formed from the military detachments and Extraordinary 
Political Land Management Troikas (Chrezvychainye politicheskie zemelustroitel’nye 
troiki).47 Understandably, few, if any, peasants were willing to move and leave their 
animals and property to the much hated and maligned nomads. Resistance to expulsions 
took many forms. Some settlers chose to burn their houses down and to damage the 
farming equipment rather than see it being used by the Kyrgyz. Others took to arms to 
defend their property. In the settlement of Georgievka in the Pishpek uezd a group of 
Russian settlers threw a bomb at the building of the local Ispolkom and carried off the 
farm inventory that they were earlier forced to give away.48 Still others forcibly evicted 
the newly settled Kyrgyz from their settlements as soon as the land management troikas 
left the area.49 
Eviction, however, did not involve deportation from the oblast; the settlers were 
as a “general principle” resettled in the starozhil settlements in the same or neighbouring 
uezds.50 The 198 families of Bogoslovskoe in the Jarkent uezd, for example, were 
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resettled in Uspenovskoe, Georgievskoe, and Chernorechenskoe settlements of Pishpek 
uezd.51 The 215 households of Iur’evskoe (Iur’evka hereafter) of Tokmak volost were 
resettled in Dmitrievskoe, Krasnorechenskoe, Ivanovka, Belyi Piket, Bystrorechenskoe, 
and Novopokrovskoe.52 In the Naryn uezd all Russian settlements were consolidated into 
a single settlement of Kochkorka comprised of 38 families.53  
The Cossacks of Semirechye were the only category of the Russian settler 
population to be expelled from the republic.54 The anti-Bolshevik stance of the 
Semirechye Cossacks during the civil war and their participation in a series of armed 
uprisings in Semirechye made them an unwelcome presence in the eyes of the authorities. 
The fact that the Cossacks were well armed added to the concern of the central 
government; the 1920 report of the Central Committee (TsK) of the Communist Party of 
Turkestan described the Cossacks of Semirechye as “armed and ready to openly rebel.”55 
The openly vindictive rhetoric used in the resolution passed by the Semirechye oblast 
Ispolkom in March 1922 discloses the rationale of selective targeting: “the settler and 
Cossack poor are themselves at fault in that they stood with (vmeste i za odno) kulaks and 
were punished as a result.”56 Even then, the deportation was not wholesale; the decisions 
to deport were made on a case by case basis.57 The “personal” nature of the deportations 
suggests that the total number of deported was low.  
The total number of evicted was, of course, much larger. By the end of April 1921, 
the authorities disbanded 14 settlements in the Przhevalsk (later, Karakol) uezd, 12 
European settlements in the Pishpek uezd, and 1 settlement and 10 farms in the Verny 
uezd. More than 800 European households comprising approximately 4,500 people had 
been expelled from the 14 settlements in the Karakol uezd, freeing 25,000 dessiatines of 
land. In their stead the authorities resettled nearly twice as many returning refugees from 
China. 8,000 Kyrgyz were settled in twenty “sedentary points” formed in the settlements 
cleared of their Russian inhabitants.58 Exactly how many settlers were expelled is unclear. 
Based on archival research in Kazakhstan, Niccolo Pianciola suggests that altogether 
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1,798 European households were expelled in the Karakol and Pishpek uezds.59 My own 
research in the archives of Bishkek suggests that a total of 2,631 households, or 15,381 
settlers, were evicted.60 
Estimates of the actual amount of confiscated land also vary. According to the 
report of the Karakol land settlement party (pozemel’no-ustroitel’naia partiia) only 
58,164 dessiatines of land were confiscated from the settlers of the Przhevalsk (Karakol) 
uezd.61 Niccolo Pianciola suggests that altogether 133,432 dessiatines of land were seized 
by the authorities in the Pishpek and Przhevalsk uezds.62 Other sources give a higher 
number of 198,602 dessiatines of arable and over 200,000 dessiatines of rain-fed land.63 
Still other, mostly Soviet, sources refer to more than one million dessiatines confiscated 
in Semirechye and Syr-Daria oblasts.64 The likely explanation for the difference in 
numbers is that the highest estimates indicate the amount of occupied – and cultivated – 
land projected by the government for use by both the native and settler land societies and 
individual farms. In 1925, for example, the authorities delimited 1,204,733 dessiatines of 
land in the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast for this purpose.65 That did not mean, 
however, that the occupants of this land were displaced to free land for native 
communities.  
In fact, the native communities were allocated only a fraction of the seized land. 
Only 15,000 dessiatines of land had been distributed among the Kyrgyz in the Przhevalsk 
uezd by March 1922. About 7,500 dessiatines of arable and the equivalent amount of rain-
fed land were transferred to the Kyrgyz of the Naryn uezd in the same period.66 A larger 
share of the confiscated land was transferred to the Land State Properties 
(Gosudarstvennye Zemel’nye Imushchestva, hereafter GZI) fund established in 1922 as 
the umbrella authority for the management of land reserves.67 Of the total 58,164 
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dessiatines of land repossessed by the troikas in the Przhevalsk uezd, for example, only 
35,653 dessiatines were transferred to the Kyrgyz; the rest became the property of the 
fund.68 By 1922, the GZI fund had 108,528 dessiatines of land.69 By 1925, the fund grew 
to 315,602 dessiatines of prime agricultural land.70 In total, only about a third, or 578,481 
dessiatines, of the 1,722,625 dessiatines of land, seized by the authorities in the whole of 
Turkestan, were distributed among the native communities.71 
Despite the inadequate land distribution – only 6,000 native households received 
land – the campaign had naturally triggered a flood of requests for land.72 Sixteen 
thousand petitions were filed in the uezds of Naryn and Pishpek alone in 1921.73 It had 
also succeeded at rallying native support for the regime. In 1921, the plenipotentiary of 
the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party (hereafter VTsIK) to 
Turkestan, Adolph Ioffe (Joffe) telegraphed Moscow with the news of the 
“unprecedented, incredible, utterly inconceivable enthusiasm of the Kirghiz masses.” 
According to Ioffe, “the mood among the Kirghiz poor in Semirechye…was the first and 
strongest impression of Semirechye, [it is the kind of] impression that made even the 
horrors of the economic ruin, the dangers of national strife and enmity…pale in 
comparison.”74 
Eager to seize on the momentum and galvanize grass-roots support for the Soviets, 
the authorities launched a comprehensive public awareness campaign. As a part of the 
campaign, hundreds of meetings were held in the native settlements across the oblast. In 
the Pishpek uezd alone, 54 meetings took place over the course of winter of 1920-21.75 
At the same time, the administration attempted to mobilize the indigenous communities 
by enlisting them in a labour union of the “poor, landless, and middle” peasants. Founded 
in 1920, the Koshchi (plowman) union was expected to take over some of the functions 
of the local government by “taking active part in the work of creating organs of Soviet 
rule in the localities.”76 By the end of March, Naryn district had around 2,300 registered 
members, Pishpek district had 4,700, and Karakol had 1,037.77 By 1922 Koshchi had 
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90,000 members in Semirechye alone.78 As the first mass organization in the native 
countryside, Koshchi provided a useful – and sometimes the only – propaganda venue 
with a captive audience.  
Receiving land, however, was not unconditional. Land was redistributed in order 
of priority. The first to receive the confiscated land were the Kyrgyz refugees returning 
from China. They were followed by native farm labourers and landless sedentary Kyrgyz 
and Kazakhs.79 Whatever their category, however, all the petitioners were required to 
settle down and take up farming. The decree adopted by the VTsIK in May 1923 “On the 
mandatory compact inter-settlement land use in the nomadic and semi-nomadic areas of 
the Turkestan ASSR” limited land grants and assistance to “detached” (obosoblennyi) 
groups of households forming a compact, ethnically homogenous land society (zemel’noe 
obshchestvo).80  
The decree had simultaneously sought to settle the nomads and group the newly 
formed land societies on the basis of ethnicity. Between 1923 and 1924, 273 land societies 
with the population of 50,248 households were registered in the 14 volosts of Kyrgyz 
Semirechye.81 By 1923, all settlements in seven (of the total eight) volosts of the Karakol 
uezd had been grouped into land societies according to the ethnicity of the villagers. 70 
land societies were indigenous and 25 were European.82 In 1924, of the 233 land societies 
180 were Kyrgyz.83 The forced evictions of the settlers and their subsequent resettlement 
in the starozhil villages facilitated the formation of larger mono-ethnic settlements and 
separation of the native and European population. By the end of 1924, 23,000 households, 
or more than two thirds of the 34,000 households covered by the land management 
campaign, were Kyrgyz.84  
In their decision to allocate land to native communities transitioning to settled 
agriculture the authorities built on an implicit assumption that the nomads had little choice 
but to settle down. There was a good reason to believe so as few refugees had enough 
animals to continue stockbreeding. The conditions under which the reforms were 
implemented were, however, far from conducive to farming. The absence of draft animals 
and a dire shortage of farming tools and seed material made the prospect of settling 
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unrealistic for the majority of Kyrgyz. By 1 July 1921, 12,900 Kyrgyz households were 
formally settled, but over half of them continued to practice seasonal migrations.85  
The land reforms had furthermore eroded the government’s attempts to push 
through the sowing campaign. Deterred by the prospect of losing land, the Russian settlers 
of Semirechye had refused to grow or harvest grain. The Kyrgyz, on the other hand, had 
no seeds or tools to grow it. In 1924 the Agricultural Commissariat reported a steep drop 
in grain production in Semirechye, where the sown grain crop had declined from 740,000 
dessiatines in 1913 to 284,000 in 1924.86 By 1925, the mean crop failure reached 18% 
and up to 35-40% in some areas, creating a shortage of 331,180 poods of grain.87 In a 
bitter remark, Ioffe, who had earlier recognized the positive effects of the reforms, had 
now described their outcome as “land mismanagement (rasstroistvo).”88  
“Land mismanagement” was not the only outcome of the reforms. The discontent 
of the settler population with the expulsions and land seizures threatened to spill over into 
riot. Writing to Lenin in February 1922, Ioffe noted that “according to the chekist (from 
Cheka, “Extraordinary Commission,” the first Soviet state security organization founded 
in December 1917) reports we can expect peasant uprisings in Semirechye this spring.”89 
In August 1922, the OGPU reported the emergence of settler gangs, concluding that their 
slogans of “away with the confiscations and land reforms” and “beat up the communists!” 
could be successful given “the agitated state” of the settler society.90 The resolution of 
the Semirechye oblast Ispolkom in March 1922 admitted that the reforms “pitted the 
settler peasantry against the Soviet government.”91 
The stream of alarming reports caused uneasiness in the party ranks. In a sharp 
criticism of the reforms, Ian Rudtzutak (Janis Rudzutaks), the former chairman of the 
party’s Turkestan Bureau (Turkbiuro), had called the reforms “a veritable crusade against 
the Russian population.”92 Wary of potential disturbances and concerned with the steep 
decrease in grain production, the party leadership attempted to defuse the tension by 
issuing a statement directed at the local authorities in charge of the reforms as well as the 
settler society. Adopted in August 1921, the directive maintained the importance of the 
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struggle against colonialism, but emphasized at the same time that this struggle should 
not be waged at the expense of the “(European) base of the republic from which the bulk 
of the Red Army divisions are drawn.” “The land reforms,” continued the directive, 
“should be implemented and all the traces of predatory (land) seizures should be 
liquidated too, but not by replacing the farmers with nomads. Although the war should be 
waged against anti-Soviet elements, overly primitive and careless measures should not 
drive away the population of entire oblasts.”93  
In the course of three years, between 1922 and 1925, the Bolshevik leadership 
moved from ideological pronouncement to concrete actions. By the summer of 1922 the 
land and water reforms in Semirechye were officially over. The decree signed by the 
Sredazbiuro on 18 July 1922 ended the resettlements and expulsions. A month later, to 
put to rest the rumours of further evictions the authorities circulated an address to the 
peoples of Semirechye. The message of the address was unequivocal; the rumours of 
continuing expulsions were the work of “the White Guards” and “from now there would 
no longer be expulsions and confiscations.”94 At the same time, the government also 
announced the extension of land grants to the returning Red Army soldiers, settlers born 
in Semirechye, peasants, and refugees from Russia who arrived in the oblast before 
December 1924.95 
Despite these measures the continuing stream of settlers from the famine-stricken 
Volga region put pressure on the authorities to accommodate the new arrivals. By 1925, 
the number of settlers in need of land grew to 5,500 households of 23,000 men, women, 
and children.96 To alleviate the chronic need in land, the VTsIK issued in March 1925 an 
additional 70,000 rubles for the settlers “who were affected by the incorrect partitioning 
(razdelenie) and expulsions.”97  
More importantly, the growing need for grain had prompted the party leadership 
to implement concrete measures designed to revive the settler economy. One such 
measure was the establishment in December 1924 of the Plenipotentiary Land 
Management Commission (Osobaia Komissiia VTsIK po zemleustroistvu KAO i iuzhnykh 
gubernii KSSR, or simply Osobkomzem). The Commission supervised and facilitated the 
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distribution of land to the settlers. The first actions of the Commission signalled a reversal 
of the land and water reforms of 1921-1922. The Commission ordered the Pishpek uezd 
authorities to allocate land for the settlers from “the landholdings of the adjacent Kirghiz 
(land) societies.”98 Similarly, in July 1925 the Presidium of the VTsIK ordered the 
Kirghiz Oblast Ispolkom “to return to the expelled citizens of Iur’evka in a month’s time 
the buildings, farms, and land that they previously owned.”99  
In an equally drastic measure, the Osobkomzem castigated the Pishpek Land 
Management Party for “the utter outrage” committed by the Party during the land and 
water reforms and arrested the Party’s chief supervisor for the “crimes” committed.100 
The demonstrative arrest of the head of the Land Management Party suggests that the 
authorities attempted to send a message to the settler society that the expulsions of 1921-
1922 were “excesses” committed by the oblast and uezd authorities. A marked shift in 
the official rhetoric about the settlers, whose role was elevated to that of “cultured forces” 
– “the working peasant” who could “bring culture” to the agriculture of the oblast and 
“invigorate the Kara-Kirghiz (Kyrgyz) peasant” – also points in this direction.101  
The revision of the land reforms between 1924 and 1925 restored the rights of the 
settlers to the land.102 Ultimately, the authorities prioritised the grain-growing Russian 
settlers over the native pastoralists. There were good reasons for this. First, as sedentary 
farming communities European settlements represented, in the eyes of the party 
leadership, a more productive group. Secondly, in the absence of the loyal native society 
– with the exception of a small group of native intelligentsia, native society had remained 
largely indifferent to or resentful of the Bolshevik government – the Russian colonists 
remained the base of Soviet power in the region. Alienating the Russian population of the 
region was not something the Soviet leadership could afford. As the next chapter will 
show, the continued association of the regime with the settler population was a source of 
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A Homeland for the Kyrgyz: The National Delimitation of Semirechye  
 
It is impossible to discuss the rationale of the Soviet national-territorial delimitation in 
Central Asia without providing at least a cursory overview of the current state of 
scholarship on the subject. Contemporary English-language historiography of Soviet 
national delimitation emphasizes both the participation of the native elites in the nation-
building process and the political imperatives of the Soviet leadership to conciliate the 
ethnic minorities of the former empire, to modernize their largely peasant economies, and 
to showcase their efforts across the border.103 Certainly, the active participation of 
indigenous leaders in national delimitation and nation-building suggests that the 
Bolsheviks were not averse to co-opting local interests and that although the Soviet 
nation-building project was “directed” by the Bolshevik leadership it was also “co-
authored” by the indigenous elites. 
The example of the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast (hereafter Kirghiz AO) is 
particularly illustrative of this argument. Unlike the delimitation of “Uzbekiia, Kirghiziia 
(i.e. Kazakhstan), and Turkmenia” envisioned by Vladimir Lenin already in 1920, the 
formation of the Kirghiz autonomy was neither given nor inevitable.104 Carved out of the 
geographically divided Semirechye and the Ferghana valley, the Kirghiz AO made little 
sense as an economic or administrative unit. The claims of ethnic distinctiveness were 
equally shaky, as the shared lifestyle and linguistic proximity of the Kyrgyz and the 
Kazakhs led many European and native functionaries alike to argue that the former were 
in all likelihood an offshoot of the latter. Yet, the progression of the Kirghiz AO from an 
autonomous oblast to a fully-fledged union republic suggests that the Soviet leaders found 
the arguments, advanced by the indigenous elites, in favour of its creation sufficiently 
convincing. Examining these arguments will help us observe some of the overlooked 
aspects of national delimitation.  
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To understand the complexities of Soviet national delimitation we need to look 
beyond the domestic challenges to the regime and consider the prevailing international 
environment of the time and the challenges that it presented to the Bolshevik government. 
In this respect, the Soviet boundary and nation-making can be read as an attempt by the 
Soviet government to reorient the population of the national peripheries away from 
competing models of political development. As a positive form of state intervention, 
Soviet nation-building, which has been famously described by Terry Martin as 
affirmative action imperialism, was employed to mobilize the native population for the 
purposes of state-building. Building on Martin’s suggestion that “the intersection between 
nationalities and foreign policy” was one of the factors at the basis of the Soviet state 
sponsorship of national consciousness in the national peripheries, I argue that the security 
of the union state was an additional concern of the Soviet government. Through the 
demarcation of both national borders and identities, the Soviet campaign of national 
delimitation increased the military security of the state.105 
My argument rests on the assumption that nationalism is essentially boundary-
making.106 Nations, as Benedict Anderson has famously argued, are imagined, but so are 
the borders. National identities draw borders where physical markers, such as rivers and 
mountains, are absent. By making ethnic boundaries explicitly political, the Soviet 
leadership consolidated the territorial boundaries of the union state while at the same time 
integrating and enclosing the national periphery. The sponsorship of ethnic identities tied 
to national territories established in the course of national delimitation helped the Soviet 
government to fix, stabilize, and consolidate the volatile borderland. 
Similarly, the identification of territory with ethnicity had effectively naturalized 
the political boundaries of the state and extended the task of maintaining and protecting 
borders to the “titular nationalities” of the republics. The perceived “ownership” of the 
national state and its territory cultivated by national delimitation both enforced the 
boundaries of the state and mobilized the indigenous population for the two-tier task of 
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state and nation-building. I draw both on the explanatory notes of a group of native 
administrators who lobbied for the establishment of the AO and official decrees and 
resolutions to highlight the connection between nation-building in the region and border 
security and state maintenance.  
A discussion of the grass-roots initiative for national autonomy warrants an 
examination of the emerging national identity underpinning this initiative. A cursory 
survey of academic literature on the formation of national identities in Central Asia 
reveals a lack of consensus on the origins and maturity of the ethnic identity uniting the 
indigenous pastoralists of Semirechye and the Ferghana Valley. The question essentially 
boils down to whether the people that we know today as Kyrgyz identified themselves as 
such before the Soviet-sponsored project of nation-building. Between the claims of the 
artificial “constructed” nature of the nation that did not exist prior to the revolution and 
the essentialist claims of a long history of the nation’s existence, I hold that although a 
form of ethnic solidarity was taking shape among the Kyrgyz of Semirechye on the eve 
of the Uprising of 1916 – the rebels clearly targeted their victims on the basis of ethnicity 
and religious affiliation – the idea of an ethnic Kyrgyz autonomy crystallized only in the 
course of the Soviet campaign of nation-building. In other words, the implementation of 
Soviet nationalities policies created conditions under which the concept of a separate 
Kyrgyz autonomy could emerge among the native elites.  
The idea of a separate Kara-Kirghiz autonomy was first floated in an informal 
conversation between a group of like-minded native officials and the members of the 
Turkkomissiia (the Turkestan Commission), Georgii Safarov and Sultanbek 
Khodzhanov, during their visit to Semirechye in 1921.107 It was not until 1922, however, 
that the group raised the question of Kyrgyz autonomy at the official level. In important 
ways, the proposal for autonomy took shape in opposition to the planned transfer of the 
Semirechye and Syr-Daria oblasts of the Turkestan ASSR to the Kirghiz (Kazakh) 
ASSR.108 Seeking to intervene with the transfer, the group, headed by the then chairman 
of the Semirechye oblast Ispolkom Abdykerim Sydykov, referred the proposal to the 
Communist Party of Turkestan (KPT). In their proposal the group employed several lines 
of arguments. First, there was an economic argument. “The dispersed state of the Kirghiz 
population” argued the group “did not allow to satisfy in full measure the cultural and 
economic needs of the working masses of the Kirghiz.” In the second instance, the group 
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cited the “continuing and worsening antagonism between the different groups of Kazak 
(Kazakh) and Kirghiz (party) workers” as an additional argument for a separate 
autonomy. Lastly, the group turned to the issue of domestic security. A Kyrgyz autonomy, 
they argued, would facilitate the liquidation of the basmachi movement in the Ferghana 
Valley – home to a sizeable Kyrgyz minority.109  
The KPT heeded the request. On 25 March 1922 the members of the KPT 
officially declared “the formation of the Mountainous oblast,” representing “one of the 
more consistent applications of…national self-determination in the communist and Soviet 
meaning of (national) self-determination.”110 The new “Mountainous” autonomy 
included the Pishpek, Karakol (former Przhevalsk), and Naryn uezds, and the 
mountainous district of the Aulie-Ata uezd. The question of Ferghana Kyrgyz would 
remain open until “the complete pacification of the oblast.”111 The resolution of the KPT 
interfered, however, with the plans of the Commissariat of Nationalities, headed by Iosif 
Stalin, which had similarly resolved to transfer Semirechye to the purview of the Kirghiz 
(Kazakh) ASSR. The two plans came head to head in June 1922. Alerted by the telegram 
informing the Commissariat of the establishment of the Mountainous Kara-Kirghiz 
autonomy, Stalin contacted the Turkestani Bureau (Turkbiuro) demanding an explanation 
as to “who was the congress permitted by, who were the organizers, and what was the 
nature of the congress.”112 Stalin was apparently bewildered by the unauthorized nature 
of the congress and had effectively vetoed the establishment of the autonomy.  
In retrospect, the first attempt at autonomy was successful even though it cost the 
native officials dearly – the KPT was thoroughly purged – and failed to achieve its 
objective. The group succeeded at preventing the transfer of Semirechye and Syr-Daria 
to the Kirghiz (Kazakh) ASSR; both oblasts remained in the Turkestan ASSR. Equally 
importantly, the vocal demands for a separate territory agreed with the overall objectives 
of the nationalities policies. As later developments would show, the authorities were not 
in principle opposed to the idea of a Kyrgyz autonomy. What the Soviet leaders, and 
Stalin personally, took issue with was what they perceived to be the conspiratorial and 
overly independent way in which the resolution for autonomy was made. Damaging as it 
was for their careers, the affair proved beneficial for the native administrators, too; they 
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honed their arguments and came to recognize the decisive voice of the centre in matters 
of autonomy.  
A new opportunity for achieving autonomy presented itself two years later, in 
January 1924. As national delegates had come to the negotiating table from every corner 
of Central Asia negotiate the division of “nationally heterogeneous” (natsional’no-
raznorodnyi) Turkestan ASSR into “nationally homogeneous” (natsional’no-
odnorodnye) states, the Kyrgyz delegation decided to address the central authorities 
directly.113 A note was passed to the Central Committee (TsK) of the VKP(b). Wary of 
raising the ire of the Commissariat of Nationalities again, the authors of the note made no 
demands for autonomy. Instead, they appealed to the government’s declared commitment 
to national equality. In no unclear terms the note stated that “the Kara-Kirghiz people 
form a separate nation equal to other nationalities (Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tajiks, and Kaisak-
Kirghiz (Kazakhs)” and should be treated as such. Similarly, the note also linked national 
existence to the Communist cause. “No (party) worker who thinks in the Communist 
way” could deny, according to the authors, the “reality of the Kara-Kirghiz” nation.114  
The note clearly paid deference to the communist ethos and demonstrated the 
ability of its authors to harness “Soviet speak,” but, ultimately, it was the realignment of 
local interests with those of the central state that decided the fate of autonomy. By arguing 
vehemently that the Kara-Kirghiz constituted a “real,” readily identifiable nation 
occupying a well-defined territory the group linked the issue of national autonomy with 
the Soviet project of state-building in the peripheries. On 28 April 1924 the Central Asian 
Bureau (Sredazbiuro) of the VKP(b) resolved to delimitate the region into five separate 
national territories, one of which was the Kara-Kirghiz AO.115 
The formation of the Kara-Kirghiz AO in 1924 and the later trajectory of its 
political development demands a closer look at the role of the security concerns of the 
Soviet authorities in nation-building. Well-guarded and well-defined borders form the 
foundation of any modern state. The Soviet Union was no exception. Despite the 
pronouncedly cosmopolitan rhetoric of class solidarity, the Soviet Union also sought to 
                                                          
113 “Postanovlenie TsIK Turkestanskoi ASSR, data neizvestna,” TsGA KR f. 20, op. 1, d. 11, l. 248 
114 The list of the demands made by the delegation reads as follows: “1) to recognize the Kara-Kirghiz people as a 
separate nation equal to other nationalities (Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tajiks, and Kaisak-Kirghiz [Kazakhs]; 2) to engage the 
representatives of the working Kara-Kirghiz more widely in the organs of party and state power; 3) to allocate state 
funds for cultural and educational work among the Kara-Kirghiz toilers in their native language, primarily for the 
publication of textbooks and manuals.” TsGA PD KR, f. 391, op. 3, d. 68, l. 7. in Z. Kurmanov, V. Ploskikh, and D.  
Dzhunushaliev, eds., Kyrgyzy i Kyrgyzstan: opyt novogo istoricheskogo osmysleniia (Bishkek: 1994), 153-81.  
115 True to the unsuccessful 1922 proposal for a separate Kara-Kirghiz autonomy, the establishment of a Kara-Kirghiz 
autonomy pre-empted the demands of the basmachi groups for national autonomy and helped deprive them of local 
support. According to secret police reports from April 1925, “the separation of the population from the basmachi – 
facilitated by the national delimitation – is most obvious among the Kyrgyz. (“Iz obzora Politicheskogo upravleniia 
Turkestanskogo fronta sostoianiia bor’by s basmachestvom, 15 aprelia 1925 g.,” in Zyrianov, 619, 24.  
129 
 
enforce and protect its borders. The need for well-protected borders emerges clearly, for 
example, in the celebratory remark of Iosif (Juozas) Vareikis, a one-time secretary of the 
KPT Central Committee put in charge of national delimitation, about the “new state 
borders of independent Soviet republics” that will spring “tomorrow across the valleys 
and mountains of Central (Sredniaia) Asia!”116 Similar preoccupation with borders is 
apparent in a suggestion of one of the members of the commission for national 
delimitation that “one or two years will be needed to set stability on the external borders 
of the Republics” and that no changes should be made to them in the meantime.117  
The establishment of national autonomy emboldened the native administrators. 
Soon after the national delimitation the leadership of the new autonomy mobilized again 
to push for republican autonomy. In November 1925, the oblast Ispolkom convened to 
discuss the possibility of a Kara-Kirghiz autonomous republic. After “taking into 
consideration the economic and political significance of the KAO in the RSFSR” as well 
as the “national-territorial density (kompaktnost’)” of its population, the Ispolkom 
resolved to establish a Kirghiz autonomous socialist republic.118 The resolution 
demonstrated the knack of the oblast leadership for framing local ambitions in terms that 
resonated with the central authorities. The emphasis on population density and the solidity 
of the ethnic boundaries exploited Moscow’s concern for border security.  
The IV Congress of the Soviets of Kirghizia upheld the proposal. The first 
secretary of the Obkom (oblast committee) of the Kirghiz AO, Nikolai Uziukov, expanded 
on and merged the demographic and geographic arguments for autonomy: “While our 
population currently numbers 800 to 900 thousand people, we have on the other side, two 
million of our kin (literally, “blood brothers”) in China and other countries exploited by 
the imperialists…We border on one side with China, and on the other – with other 
monarchic countries…and the significance of our oblast is in no way inferior to that of 
other republics of Central Asia.119  
Similarly, concern for border protection was implicit in the request filed by the 
oblast Ispolkom with the TsIK (Central Committee)of the RSFSR in December 1925. The 
petition stressed the geographic position of the oblast – on the border with China – the 
length of the border and the oblast’s proximity to “Afghanistan and Hindustan” to 
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advocate for the transition. Raising the status of the oblast to that of an autonomous 
republic, the petition continued, would “attract the attention” of “the neighbouring 
exploited nationalities of the East,” of whom 300,000 were ethnic Kyrgyz and over three 
million were their “kin,” and “give an impulse to the self-mobilization 
(samodeiatel’nost’) of the masses in the economic sphere and in Soviet construction.” 120 
The petition also emphasized the size and the significance of the oblast’s economy, which 
comprised 100,266 farming and 51,135 stockbreeding households.121 
Like the petition, Sydykov’s “A Brief Sketch of the History of the Kirghiz People” 
published in February 1926 sought to convince the central government of the urgency of 
greater autonomy for the Kyrgyz. In addition to providing a survey of the ancient history 
of the Kyrgyz and listing the key differences distinguishing the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs – 
including “anthropological measurements” – Sydykov pointed to the large ethnic Kyrgyz 
population of the Xinjiang province of China and Afghanistan. He estimated that the 
Kyrgyz of Xinjiang make up 22 volosts of 345,000 persons. Combined with the Kyrgyz 
of Afghanistan whose number he describes as “sufficiently large,” “the Kirghiz abroad” 
constituted, according to Sydykov, “a rather significant population” of two states, 
therefore “demanding great attention in the political sense.”122 
The petition and Sydykov’s article were well received in Moscow and two months 
later, in February 1926, the TsIK approved the proposal to form an autonomous Kirghiz 
(Kara was dropped as a part of the colonial heritage) Socialist Republic (ASSR). Citing 
the oblast’s “large territory, significant distance (otdalennost’) from the centre and its 
frontier position – Kirghizia was one of the oblasts extruding far into the east” – the XIII 
all-Russian Congress of Soviets (S”ezd sovetov) upheld the TsIK’s resolution to grant the 
KAO the status of an autonomous republic in April 1927.123 In arguing for an elevated 
status for the Kirghiz AO, a member of the Kyrgyz delegation to the Congress, described 
the oblast as “the revolutionary advance outpost of the Soviet Union in the depths of 
Central Asian East.”124 The welcoming telegram sent by Stalin to the party committee of 
the new republic affirmed the centre’s recognition of the republic’s special place in the 
Soviet family: “The Kara-Kirghiz oblast that rests, with one of its halves, against the 
Chinese Turkestan, and looks through the Hindu Kush onto the Great Hindustan with the 
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other half, occupies a special place in the task of spreading the Soviets’ ideas in the 
East.”125 
While the transformation of the autonomous oblast into an autonomous republic 
proved a smooth undertaking, the status of a fully-fledged union republic that Sydykov’s 
group hoped for remained aspirational until the second half of the 1930s. Because union 
republics enjoyed better financial assistance and broader powers, becoming one was 
difficult. But this did not stop Sydykov and the group of native functionaries that 
coalesced around him from lobbying for the establishment of Kyrgyz autonomy from 
attempting to further the cause of a fully-fledged socialist republic for the Kyrgyz. Of 
particular interest for my analysis are two letters written by Sydykov’s closest ally, Iusup 
Abdrakhmanov, the chairman of the Sovnarkom (Soviet of People’s Commissars) of the 
Kirghiz ASSR, to Stalin. Addressed personally to Stalin, the letters betray the sense of 
urgency of the native leadership and reflect the well-honed arguments about the 
autonomous republic’s strategic significance to the Soviet Union.  
The first letter, dated November 1929, establishes the Kirghiz ASSR’s “special 
position” that “follows both from its economy and its geographical location.”126 
Abdrakhmanov’s primary concern is the “triple subjugation” of the republic’s economy 
and administration to the executive bodies of the RSFSR, the regional administrative 
system, and to the union-wide institutions. He sees the solution to the issue in the 
transformation of the ASSR into a Soviet republic. Shy of using the republic’s frontier 
position as his main argument Abdrakhmanov, nonetheless, hints that the failure to solve 
the issue and the resulting lack of economic development “not only impacts negatively 
on the masses of peasants in the republic but also weakens our influence on those Kirghiz 
who live on the other side of the border, in China.”127 As a final argument for the new 
status he refers to the Kirghiz ASSR’s “national makeup (70% Kirghiz), its foreign policy 
significance, and economic potential.”128  
Whether Stalin responded to the letter remains unknown, but a similarly styled 
letter written by Abdrakhmanov half a year later, in April 1930, suggests that he did not. 
Although the second letter is considerably shorter than the first one, Abdrakhmanov once 
again raises the issues of administration and economic development. This time, however, 
the letter pays closer attention to the “foreign policy significance of the transformation of 
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Kirghizia into a Union Republic.” Rather explicitly, Abdrakhmanov draws a parallel 
between the inadequate administration of the Kirghiz ASSR, which “shares a border with 
Western China of more than 800 kilometres,” and the military security of the Soviet 
Union. The neighbouring “Kashgar-Uch-Turfan province of China, populated primarily 
by Uyghurs and Kirghiz,” he warns, “was penetrated by English imperialism” and “can 
become a base for English imperialism to make an assault on Soviet Central Asia.” The 
transformation of the Kirghiz ASSR into a Union Republic would serve “as the best 
agitation possible…against the predatory designs of English imperialism” and 
“strengthen the sympathies” of the native population of Chinese Turkestan towards the 
Soviet Union.129 No evidence of a response from Stalin is to be found in Adbrakhmanov’s 
personal diaries. Stalin’s official writings are similarly silent on the subject.  
Abdrakhmanov’s efforts, however, were not for naught. Although his pleas 
remained unanswered, his work, like that of his colleagues, laid the foundation of the 
union republic and for a “homeland” for the nomads of Semirechye and the Ferghana 
Valley. Ultimately, the competency of his efforts ensured that in 1936 the Kirghiz ASSR 
became one of the 15 constitutive republics of the Soviet Union. Abdrakhmanov’s own 
role in the cultivation of the sense of national belonging was critical, but it led eventually 
to his demise. Along with other members of the group that first voiced the idea of a 
Kyrgyz autonomy, Abdrakhmanov was arrested and executed during the party purges of 
1936-38 and indicted for bourgeois nationalism.130 In a great irony, his death and the 





This chapter examined the first efforts of the Soviet leadership to recruit the native 
nomads of Semirechye for the Bolshevik cause by redistributing agricultural land seized 
from the Cossack settlers during the land and water reforms of 1921-1922. While the 
reforms had helped to rally support of the native communities for the regime they had 
                                                          
129 Ibid, 187-88.  
130 Altogether, about 100 senior officials, including Sydykov and Abdrakhmanov, were executed on charges of 
conspiring against the Soviet state and forming “the counter-revolutionary socialist-Turan party.” Little is known about 
the party and there are good reasons to believe that the party did not in fact exist. This is the conclusion reached by 
Pavel Diatlenko. P. I.  Diatlenko, "Uroki proshlogo ne zabyty: put' ot "Sotsial-Turanskoi partii" k partii "Turan"," 
Vestnik KRSU, no. 7 (2008). Svetlana Ploskikh, on the other hand, believes that “an embryo” of the party existed and 
that it united indigenous party workers discontented with Soviet policies in the republic.S. V.  Ploskikh, 
Repressirovannaia kul'tura Kyrgyzstana: maloizuchennye stranitsy istorii (Bishkek: Ilim, 2002), 189-205.  
131 T.  Koichuev, ed. U istokov kyrgyzskoi natsional’noi gosudarstvennosti (Bishkek: Ilim, 1996), 292.  
133 
 
also put the Soviet administration in Semirechye in a precarious position as the majority 
of Red Army soldiers in the region hailed from the settler society. Coupled with the 
drastic drop in agricultural production – the newly settled nomads had neither animals 
nor instruments or seed material to grow crops – the growing fears of settler rebellions 
led to the reversal of the reforms in 1924-1925.  
 The second half of the chapter focused on the lobbying of the native elites for the 
establishment of an ethnic Kyrgyz autonomy. As this chapter demonstrates, the Kyrgyz 
officials, most notably Iusup Abdrakhmanov and Abdykerim Sydykov, honed their 
rhetoric in support of the Kyrgyz autonomy by appealing to the security concerns of the 
central government. Citing the frontier position of Semirechye and the presence of a 
numerically significant Kyrgyz population in China whose sympathies could be swayed 
by hostile powers to hurt the Soviet interests in the region, Abdrakhmanov and Sydykov 
sought to influence the decision-making in the centre. In the final analysis, despite the 
initial setbacks and the personal price they had to pay for their presumed transgressions, 

























Defending the Revolution: The “Great Turn” in Soviet Kirghizia  
 
National delimitation was the watershed event in the modern history of Central Asia; it 
had fundamentally reshaped the political geography of the region and ushered it into a 
distinct modern period characterized by the increased integration of local societies into a 
framework of a modern – and modernizing – political system based simultaneously on 
mass support and institutionalized coercion. National delimitation was critical to this 
process. The 12 June 1924 decree establishing the five Soviet republics and autonomies 
completed the de-jure incorporation of Central Asia into the Soviet state. With its 
uncompromising stance on the centralization of authority, the decree also bound the 
newly established republics politically and administratively to the union-wide 
administrative institutions while at the same time promoting the ethnic particularism of 
national cultures. This chapter takes over where the previous chapter left off and focuses 
on the continuing efforts of the Soviet leadership at the administrative, political, and 
ideological “merging” (sliianie) of Central Asia with Soviet Russia.   
Covering the period of the “Great Turn” (velikii perelom) from the second half of 
the 1920s until the latter half of the 1930s, this chapter examines the defining moments 
of the second decade of “socialist construction” in the Kirghiz ASSR. In focus in this 
chapter are the campaigns of administrative division known as regionalization 
(raionirovanie) and collectivization. By placing collectivization, raionirovanie, and the 
pre-war historiography of the uprising of 1916 against the background of a looming war 
and domestic crisis, this chapter argues that security concerns were central to the broad 
modernization drive, which encompassed the creation of socialized agriculture, territorial 
restructuring, and ideological centralization.  
More broadly, this chapter is an attempt to examine the continued and intensified 
consolidation of the Soviet state in the Central Asian borderlands. In approaching 
regionalization and collectivization as a means of expanding state control into the 
countryside and extracting resources, I argue that both should be understood as an 
exercise in territorial and population management. First, by dividing the territory into 
ethnically homogenous territorial and administrative units with the express purpose of 
facilitating “peaceful cohabitation” (mirnoe sozhitel’stvo) of the settler and native 
population, raionirovanie had legitimized and institutionalized the settlers’ control of 
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contested resources.132 The formation of the Frunze (former Pishpek) European canton 
had effectively created an autonomy within an autonomy and enhanced the central state’s 
political control of the republic by giving the Bolshevik leadership capacity to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of the republic on behalf of the European population. At the same 
time, raionirovanie had preserved the hierarchic and asymmetric pattern of resource 
distribution and consumption established under the colonial administration. As the 
“titular nationality” of the canton and volosts occupying some of the most fertile land in 
the region, the settler population enjoyed access to better agricultural land and state 
services.  
Second, in proposing that collectivization grew out of the political, economic, and 
ideological crisis in the second half of the 1920s, I argue that in the context of the national 
periphery the collectivization drive sought to extract resources from and extend control 
into the native countryside yet untouched by “revolutionary development.”133 The 
implications of this drive were twofold. On the one hand, the mobility of the pastoralist 
population of the republic, which took flight in response to the repressive policies of the 
central state, prompted the Soviet leadership to forcibly settle the Kyrgyz in collective 
farms. Sedentarization was therefore employed both to fix and stabilize the native 
population at the local and state level and to make the nomadic society more governable. 
On the other hand, collectivization aimed to extract resources from the pastoralist 
economy by seizing nomadic livestock and converting pastures into fields and nomads 
into peasants.  
Collectivization had broad repercussions for the native pastoralists. The failure of 
the land and water reforms of 1921-1922 to provide sufficient land, seed material, and 
equipment to the returning nomads meant that the majority of Kyrgyz continued to 
practice pastoralism. At the same time, the double burden of livestock requisitions and 
grain procurement quotas levied on the Kyrgyz forced the nomads to sell their livestock 
for grain. The resulting shortage of meat and grain mostly affected the native population 
of the republic; between 1932 and 1933, approximately 25,800 Kyrgyz succumbed to 
famine.134  
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A significant part of the collectivization campaign was the dispossession of the 
so-called bai-manap households (a rather loose grouping of wealthy livestock owners, 
bais, and native elites, manaps). The expulsion and deportation of several hundred bai-
manap families from the republic was in many ways similar to the earlier expulsions of 
the Semirechye Cossacks during the land and water reforms of 1921-1922. Similarly to 
the Cossacks, bai-manaps were seen by the authorities as disloyal and suspect. The bai-
manaps’ reported support for the basmachi movement and their cross-border ties with the 
Kyrgyz of China played into the security anxieties of the Soviet leadership.135 
Compounding the distrust of the government was the bai-manaps’ alleged influence over 
the indigenous communities, which hampered the sovietisation of the native 
countryside.136 In the context of Moscow’s perceptions of international hostility bai-
manaps came increasingly to be viewed as a potential threat that had to be eliminated.  
 
The Soviet Fortress: The War Scare and Domestic Crisis 
 
The decision to launch “the violent assault on the countryside,” to quote Lynne Viola, 
emerged in the context of a crisis in diplomatic relations that began in 1925 and intensified 
towards the end of the decade. The initial impetus to growing apprehension among the 
Soviet leadership about challenges to the Soviet Union was sparked by the Locarno 
Treaties signed, without Soviet Russia’s participation, between Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Italy in October 1925.137 Although Locarno did not 
directly infringe on Soviet interests in its immediate European neighbourhood, the 
Bolshevik leadership came to view Locarno as “a direct threat.”138 This threat perception 
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was not entirely unfounded: to start with, none of the signatory parties was sympathetic 
towards Bolshevik Russia; furthermore, the treaties realigned the balance of power in 
Europe, tilting it against the Soviet Union; and finally, the possibility of similar pacts 
being concluded with the breakaway Eastern European nations along the Soviet borders 
had the potential of making “the hostile capitalist encirclement” of the USSR a self-
fulfilling prophecy.139  
Equally importantly, Locarno had driven home to the Bolshevik leadership the 
painful weakness of the Soviet Union’s industrial capacity and the stark deficiencies of 
the Red Army. Speaking at the TsK (Central Committee) plenum in January 1925, Stalin 
reminded the audience that “if war begins, then we must not sit with folded arms, we must 
act, but act last” and “this is demanded” of the USSR by “the international situation.” “To 
throw the decisive weight on the scales” and prepare the country “for everything,” Stalin 
concluded, the Soviet Union should first and foremost “lift the Red Army to the requisite 
heights” by “shoeing and clothing it, training it, improving its technology, improving its 
chemical weapons, aviation.”140 
Catching up with the capitalist West would not be easy. The pitiful state of the 
Soviet military and navy was made glaringly obvious by a report presented by the then 
People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (NKVM) Mikhail Frunze to the 
Politbiuro in late March 1925. Some of the more serious issues included the poor material 
provision of the Red Army, its obsolete armaments, lack of training, and the defeatist 
“peasant” mood among its soldiers.141 Frunze’s predictions were reiterated a year later by 
the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Mikhail Tukhachevsky; if war began, Tukhachevsky 
emphasized, the Soviet military industry would be able to produce only 29% of the 
required rifle rounds and 8.2% of the shells.142  
“The international situation” continued to slowly deteriorate over the next year. 
The British decision to break off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia in the wake of 
the Soviet involvement in the General Strike of May 1926 and the growing concerns of 
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London with the Soviet Union’s potential invasion of India, fuelled by the skirmishes on 
the Soviet-Afghan border, drew conflict closer to Soviet Central Asia.143 
It was in 1927, however, that the security anxieties of the Soviet leadership 
reached their fever pitch. A series of diplomatic blunders, including most notoriously a 
British raid on the office of the All-Russian Co-operative Society (ARCOS) in London, 
the attack of the Kuomintang government on its Communist allies in China, and the 
murder of a Soviet plenipotentiary Piotr Voikov in Warsaw, combined to produce a 
domestic crisis in the Soviet Union, convincing the party leadership and the country as a 
whole that “war was inevitable.”144 Rumours of war led to a panic in the countryside, 
where peasants, fearing starvation, refused to sell grain and livestock to the cities. The 
resulting grain procurement crisis meant that the central government secured only one-
third of its annual domestic requirements.145 
Although far removed from the centre, Soviet Central Asia was as rife with 
rumours as central Russia. How pervasive the war scare was in the country’s Asian 
borderlands is demonstrated in an OGPU report dated August 1927, which suggests that 
“lively discussions about the possibility of war” were being recoded “in all segments of 
the Kirghiz (Kazakh) population (vsemi sloiami kirgizskogo naseleniia).”146 A July 1927 
report had similarly reported that manaps of Kalininskaia and Tolkanovskaia volosts of 
the Kirghiz ASSR held a meeting where those in attendance discussed the upcoming “war 
between England and USSR,” concluding that the silence of Soviet power in response to 
“the bullying (izdevatel’stva) by other powers” was indicative of its “weakness” and 
“fear.”147 Anti-Soviet agitation was reported across the region. As the June 1929 OGPU 
report shows, rumours of war persisted well beyond the immediate crisis, inciting “cases 
of terror” and mass protests, of which there were 14 (12 “terror cases” and 2 mass 
protests) that month in the Kirghiz ASSR alone. According to the same report, bais and 
manaps urged their kinsmen to prepare for the war of “Japan, China, and England” against 
the USSR “in advance” and “not to give Soviet power men and horses.”148   
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While recording the discontent of the native population, these reports also point 
to the growing distrust of the national borderlands. In Central Asia, this distrust was 
driven by the revival of basmachism and cross-border flight of native communities in 
response to the expulsions of rural elites (e.g. the bai-manap campaign) and the general 
tightening of Soviet control over the native countryside. The re-emergent basmachi 
groups in the south of the Kirghiz ASSR enjoyed a degree of popular support in native 
society and coordinated their actions with other groups in the republic and beyond. A 
local basmachi leader, Istambek Chanybekov, for example, was found to have a letter 
from Kurshirmat, one of the most powerful basmachi leaders, calling onto all former 
basmachi to “fight for “Islam.”” Chanybekov also sought arms and supplies from other 
basmachi groups in the north of the republic (Talas canton).149 By November 1929, the 
OGPU counted over a hundred active participants in coordinated armed resistance in 
Kyzyl-Jar, Ketmen-Tiube, and Bazar-Kurgan districts.150 Adding to the growing 
apprehension of the central government was the mobility of various basmachi groups. A 
long border with China provided a convenient escape route for those dissatisfied with the 
regime and a springboard for basmachi attacks. Attacks from across the border were 
frequently launched by Janybek Kazy, a bii of Basyz tribal lineage and the former head 
of the Ak-Dzharskaia volost of the Osh uezd under the tsarist administration.151 
Throughout winter 1929, Janybek Kazy, together with his fellow basmachi leader Iarmat 
Maksum, launched attacks on Soviet personnel and administration in Kyzyl-Kiia and 
Uzgen districts along the border with Chinese Turkestan.152  
The growth of anti-Soviet resistance in the national borderlands alarmed the 
Bolshevik leadership, sparking fears of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. In an effort to 
rein in the “national deviations” in the union republics, Moscow had adopted a tougher 
stance on real and suspected dissent from the policies of the centre.153 Although 
korenizatsiia continued and even expanded, expressions of national sentiments that 
“assumed the character of a struggle against Moscow in general, against Russians in 
general, against Russian culture and its highest achievement – Leninism,” thereby 
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“weakening the unity of the working people of the different nations of the USSR and 
playing into the hands of the interventionists,” were unconditionally condemned.154 
Moscow’s growing suspicion of the national republics had similarly led to an in 
increased identification of the centre with the “Russian core” of the Soviet state.155 As the 
possibility of war loomed larger, the “Russian proletariat” was accorded a vanguard role 
in the union state, a “recognized leader that is carrying out the most revolutionary active 
policy.”156 As the largest ethnic group occupying the industrial and agricultural heartland 
of the country, the Russian population of the Soviet Union fulfilled the role of “ethnic 
glue” holding the Soviet state together both in symbolic and physical terms. Thus, 
between 1926 and 1939 the number of ethnic Russians outside of the RSFSR increased 
from 5,1 to 9,3 million, while their proportion in the total Soviet population outside the 
RSFSR grew from 8.6% to 14.9%. Soviet Central Asia was the largest gross recipient of 
migrants from European Russia, receiving in total 1.7 million people.157  
In the Kirghiz ASSR, the influx of migrants from European Russia resulted in the 
decrease of the relative share of the “titular nationality” in the total population of the 
republic. In 1926, Kyrgyz population stood at 66.6%.158 By 1939, the share of ethnic 
Kyrgyz fell to a little more than half, or 51.7%, of the total population. At the same time, 
the European (Russian and Ukrainian) population of the republic increased from 17.3% 
of the total population in 1920 to 18.1% in 1926 to 30.2% in 1939.159 The rapid growth 
of the European population, concentrated mainly in the north of the republic, solidified 
Soviet power in the volatile borderlands, but also posed a challenge to the authorities to 
solve the lingering discontent of the Russian population of the republic with the land and 
water reforms of 1921-1922.  
 
Regulating the Inter-Ethnic Conflict: the Administrative Regionalization  
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Ethnicity, as the previous chapter has established, was the main organizing principle of 
the Soviet Union. Ethnicity was reified at the international boundaries of the Soviet 
Union, at the boundaries separating the Soviet republics and autonomies, and even at the 
level of republics where ethnic minorities formed self-governing territorial units – 
national soviets – administered separately from the titular nationalities. It is the drawing 
of intra-republican boundaries that I would like to examine here.160  
My argument addresses the domestic aspect of the national delimitation – the 
extension of territorial autonomy to the ethnic minorities within the Soviet republics in 
1925-1926. I argue that the reorganization (raionirovanie) of the administrative divisions 
of the republics and the merging and consolidation of the republics’ diverse ethnic groups 
into the territorially bound and ethnically homogenous national soviets continued the 
ethno-territorial trajectory of Soviet state-building in the peripheries. Similarly, ethnic 
conflict – though not expressly manipulated by the Soviet leadership – was crucial to this 
process. It legitimized government’s seizure of and control over land and population and 
justified state intervention in the domestic affairs of the republic. At the same time, the 
establishment of national soviets, whose representatives routinely bypassed the 
republican authorities and addressed the central government with their concerns, put a 
check on the centrifugal inclinations of the republican leadership. The national soviets 
had in effect acted as a counterbalance to the ethno-centric “deviations” of the indigenous 
elites and maintained the primacy of union interests.  
Terry Martin argues that the initial drive for the regionalization had come mainly 
from the economic planners, but led eventually to the “conjunction of economic and 
national” principles.161 The raionirovanie materials compiled by the Oblast Committee 
for Regionalization of the KAO (Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast, later ASSR) suggest that 
the opposite was the case in Soviet Kirghizia. The second Meeting of the Special 
Commission for the Regionalization of the Central Asian Bureau (Sredazbiuro), 
convened to discuss the raionirovanie issues in the KAO in June 1926, had acknowledged 
that in light of “the extreme dearth of data, and the absence of knowledge (neizuchennost’) 
about the nomadic and semi-nomadic districts,” the regionalization of Kirghizia “cannot 
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be recognized as economic.”162 What the actual objective of raionirovanie was is spelled 
clearly in the resolution of the Congress, which suggests that the regionalization 
constituted the institutional “consolidation (oformlenie) of cohesive (tselostnye) units 
bound by cultural, economic, and lifestyle conditions,” for the purposes of “resolving the 
national question through the delimitation of national minorities into self-administered 
units.”163 Put simply, the goal of raionirovanie in the Kirghiz ASSR was “the peaceful 
coexistence of the European and Kirghiz population” of the republic.164  
On the eve of the regionalization, the republic was divided into 4 districts 
(okrugs), 72 volosts, and 437 village soviets. In terms of ethnic distribution, a 
considerable number of the volosts were “mixed” (smeshannyi) meaning that they had 
both native and Russian or Uzbek village soviets and that all village soviets in one volost 
were administered by a single volost Ispolkom: in the Frunze okrug out of 18 volosts 8 
were Kyrgyz, 4 European, and 6 mixed; in the Karakol okrug out of 16 volosts 9 were 
Kyrgyz and 7 mixed; in the Osh district there were 10 Kyrgyz, 1 Uzbek, and 8 mixed 
volosts; in the Djalal-Abad okrug 11 volosts were Kyrgyz and 8 mixed.165 The 
ethnographic map of the republic before the regionalization suggests that although the 
removals and resettlements of the Russian population in the course of the land reforms 
consolidated the Russian population in larger settlements in the Frunze and Karakol 
okrugs, there was a considerable interspersion of native and Russian land-holdings. An 
additional complication arose from the fact that some volosts were excessively large and 
administered as many as 25,000 people, while others were too small and catered to the 
needs of only 3,000 people.166  
For the authorities these irregularities presented certain issues. For one, the 
administrative division of the republic made little sense in the framework of centralized 
economic planning. Because the volosts did not reflect the ethnic division of labour, the 
grain-growing peasant settlements were grouped together with the cattle-breeding 
villages of the Kyrgyz.167 Secondly and equally importantly, the existing administrative 
division was found to be inconsistent with the Soviet nationalities policies. Like the 
colonial administration before, the Soviet leadership conceived of social conflict both in 
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geographic and ethnic terms. Territorial interactions of ethnic groups came to be seen as 
the major source of ethnic strife. Like Tsarist officials, the Soviet administrators, too, saw 
the solution in the ethno-territorial segregation of the region’s ethnic groups. In practice, 
however, by linking land ownership to ethnicity the government fostered competition 
between ethnic groups for resources.168 The association of resources with ethnicity meant 
that political demands were, by default, economic and, conversely, economic interests 
became, by definition, political. The resulting rise in the number of ethnic conflicts in the 
republic registered in the wake of the land and water reforms of 1921-1922 was a logical, 
if unpleasant, outcome of nationalities policy.169  
An equally important corollary of the institutional framework where claims to 
resources were necessarily based in ethnicity was the emergence of a hierarchy of what 
can be termed ethno-economic interests. As a group engaged in grain production, 
favoured by the state over cattle breeding, the Russian settlers had greater bargaining 
capability than the native population. By capitalizing on their role as farmers and Red 
Army soldiers, Russian peasants were able to gain access to resources that the native 
pastoralists were often denied. To properly understand the rationale of regionalization we 
thus need to examine the peasants’ negotiations with the authorities. One way to glean 
the peasants’ attitudes to Soviet policies in the region, where the government was 
dependent on the settlers for military security and food production is by looking at their 
letters to the central institutions. Encouraged by the authorities as a means of gauging 
public attitudes, these letters provided grassroots feedback on the government’s measures 
(letters were usually sent either to the “Peasant newspaper” (Krest’ianskaia gazeta) or 
Mikhail Kalinin, himself of peasant stock and a designated “peasant elder” of Soviet 
Russia.170 A large number of these letters came from the national republics including the 
Kirghiz ASSR. One such letter was written by certain E. F. Filippov of the Novorossiiskoe 
village in the Pishpek okrug. Typically for this kind of letter, the letter describes the 
unfairness of the land and water reforms of 1921-1922, when the villagers were forced to 
give up their land and 320 draft animals to the Kyrgyz. The villagers, Filippov then 
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continues, were denied legal recourse and left on the brink of starvation, while the land 
transferred to the Kyrgyz “lay vacant.”171  
Peasant demands for justice and the recognition of their role as both Red Army 
soldiers – letter writers from the region frequently emphasized their service in the army 
– and grain-growers reveals that, in significant ways, the interests of the Russian 
minorities coincided with those of the central state.172 It would be safe to say that in the 
Kirghiz ASSR the impetus for regionalization came from the Russian settlers as well as 
the union authorities. The regionalization was intended to solve two separate but closely 
related issues. Officially, the goal of the regionalization was to resolve the lingering ethnic 
conflict and improve the functioning of the republic’s economic and administrative 
structures. Implicitly, regionalization was also intended to rectify the “excesses” of the 
earlier land and water reforms of 1921-1922 and boost the grain production.  
A series of similarly named commissions and resolutions convened and approved 
by the Soviet leaders between the second half of 1924 and 1927 indicate that the 
authorities connected the issue of land ownership with ethnic hostilities. They blamed 
poor harvests on the “mismanagement (neuregulirovannost’) of land and national 
relations.”173 The vagueness of official statements obscured their actual views on the 
issue. The fall in grain production convinced many in Moscow that the Russian minority 
in the region was “eternally persecuted” and was in need of protection.174 At the second 
Kirghiz oblast party conference in 1925, the chairman of the Planning Commission, Iakov 
Gil’pershtein addressed the issue of grain shortage in terms of the need to regulate and 
properly organize land ownership without discriminating against “cultured” Russian 
households. He emphasized that the republic could potentially produce up to 30 million 
poods of grain and feed the entire region. Currently, however, the situation was dire – the 
ASSR produced only 2 million poods a year – and “many cultured households already 
sent petitioners to find new land” outside of the republic. Unless the central authorities 
intervened, Gil’pershtein warned, agriculture would continue to “decline.”175 
The government moved swiftly. Already, in May 1925, the TsK VKP(b) passed a 
resolution calling on the republican authorities “to implement measures for greater 
involvement of national minorities, particularly Russian, in the task of soviet construction 
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by establishing self-governing administrative units within the Kirghiz republic.”176 In 
June the same year, a special Commission for regionalization instructed the Obkom of the 
Kirghiz ASSR to “liquidate national tensions through the separation (vydelenie) of 
national minorities into self-governing districts, volosts, or, at the very least, if their 
numbers are small or if their settlements are interspersed with those of others 
(cherespolositsa), to separate them into dedicated village soviets with administration and 
education conducted in native tongues.”177  
Apparently, the republican authorities were too lax in implementing the reforms 
because in May, 1926 TsK once again pointed to “certain abnormality in the relations 
between the nationalities,” expressed in fistfights, murders, and the flight of peasant 
settlers from the republic, and castigated the Kirghiz Obkom, describing its efforts at 
reconciling the conflicting nationalities as “utterly unsatisfactory.”178 The 
recommendations that the TsK made repeated the earlier instructions to improve inter-
ethnic relations through the creation of independent administrative units in the Kirghiz 
republic.179 A few months later, in November 1926, the TsK’s instructions assumed 
legislative power as VTsIK decreed to resolve “the land and water relations among the 
population (especially along inter-ethnic lines).”180 
To a considerable extent, regionalization was facilitated by the existing territorial 
distribution of the Russian settlements, which reflected the patterns of settlement under 
the colonial administration, but was also the result of population removals and 
resettlements undertaken in the course of the land and water reform of 1921-1922. In 
essence, the regionalization was the continuation of the Soviet policies of ethno-territorial 
consolidation at the local, republican level. Where the national delimitation enforced the 
national boundaries of the Soviet republics the regionalization drew the ethnic boundaries 
within the republics.  
The regionalization was implemented in December 1926. The new administrative 
structure of the Kirghiz ASSR was three-layered. The largest administrative unit was a 
canton, cantons were further divided into volosts, which in turn were divided into national 
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soviets. Altogether, 7 cantons, 52 volosts and 455 village soviets were formed.181 The 
new volosts and even cantons were remarkably homogenous in their ethnic makeup. 
Frunze canton – the seat of the autonomy’s government – was nearly completely 
European. Out of 45 village soviets in the Frunze canton 36 were Russian. Likewise, 
Russians constituted a majority in the cities of Frunze, Tokmak, and Karakol and the 
surrounding areas, all in the north of the country. 81.4% of the republic’s entire European 
population lived in these areas.  Of the 11 volosts with the predominantly Russian 
population 5 volosts were 90 to 100% Russian and Ukraininan, 4 volosts were 75 to 90% 
Russian and Ukrainian, and 2 volosts were 65 to 75% Russian and Ukrainian. Altogether, 
these 11 volosts were home to 81.2% of the republic’s European population. Kyrgyz 
constituted an ethnic majority in the 41 volosts of the republic. Out of 41 predominantly 
Kyrgyz volosts 30 volosts were 90 to 100% Kyrgyz in their ethnic makeup, while the 
remaining 11 volosts were 60 to 90% Kyrgyz. Altogether, the 41 native volosts comprised 
97.1% of the entire Kyrgyz rural population.182  
Although the regionalization was implemented in December 1926, the actual 
restructuring of the native and European land holdings took a few more years to complete. 
The shortage of arable land continued to be an issue. This time, however, the government 
sought to placate the Russian minority. By 1927, the authorities came to speak openly of 
the need to compensate the Russian settlers affected by the 1921-1922 land and water 
reforms and give them equal access to land. In February 1927, a new commission was 
formed at the VTsIK’s behest to investigate peasant complaints. The commission 
concluded that the “excesses” of the land and water reforms of 1921-1922 led to a 
situation where a considerable number of Russian peasants did not receive land in 
compensation. At the same time, the commission accused bai-manaps of instigating 
ethnic violence. To address the issue of land shortages and to put an end to the ethnic 
strife the Commission recommended the dekulakization of bai-manaps and land 
settlement for poor and landless Russian households who arrived in the republic before 
14 September 1925.183  
The majority of such households were concentrated in the north of the republic; 
300 of these households, according to the estimates of the Commission, were located in 
the Karakol canton, 37 in the Frunze canton, and 104 in the Jalal-Abad canton in the 
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south.184 Because land was in high demand the settlement of peasants was often carried 
out at the expense of the interests of the Kyrgyz. Land tracts disputed by the native and 
settler communities were as a rule transferred to the latter. One of the particularly 
contentious instances of such transfer that signalled the reversal of the land and water 
reforms of 1921-1922 and raised an outcry among the native leadership involved the two 
villages of Iur’evka and Baitik-Pavlovka in the Frunze canton. The tensions surrounding 
Iur’evka and Baitik-Pavlovka, both of which were subject to removal under the 1921-
1922 reforms, were brought on by the refusal of the villagers to leave and the attempts of 
district authorities to evict them by force.185 After a series of violent standoffs and a 
stream of appeals to the central authorities – that culminated in the personal visit of 
Iur’evka’s “peasant representative,” Semion Rubak, to Stalin in January 1927 – the 
conflict was settled in favour of the villagers.186  
In retrospect, the conflict seems to have been blown out of proportions by the local 
and union authorities alike. Its implications, however, were far-reaching. In addition to 
the distrust between native leaders and their European colleagues that the conflict 
engendered, it effectively marked the restoration of political rights and privileges of the 
Russian settlers. The ability of peasants to intervene and even effect change in the 
republican politics alarmed the indigenous leadership of the ASSR. A letter by Iusup 
Abdrakhmanov, the then deputy chairman of the republican Ispolkom, to Stalin suggests 
that the native administrators attempted to sway the party leaders to their side. In the 
letter, Abdrakhmanov recognizes the land shortage experienced by peasants but attributes 
it to the large numbers of newly arrived settlers as well as the population’s natural growth 
and the continuing transfer of land to the GZI (the State Land Properties). Similarly, 
Abdrakhmanov warns against the resettlement of Russian households in their previous 
places of residence for two reasons. First, it would indicate “the factual revision of the 
results of the land reforms.” And, second, “it would, in practice, lead to the incitement of 
ethnic antagonism between the Kyrgyz and the Russians, which is politically inadmissible 
in the current conditions.” Any solution to the issue, he concluded, should therefore take 
account of “national factors (natsional’nye momenty).”187 
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Abdrakhmanov voiced his arguments again at “Ryskulov’s meeting of national 
minorities” (Ryskulovskoe soveshchanie natsionalov) the same year.188 With 
characteristic directness, he claimed that “there are a great many of deficiencies in the 
relations between the national peripheries and the central organs of the RSFSR.” In 
particular, he pointed to the centre’s tendency to intervene on behalf of the Russian 
population: “It often happens that the claims of Russian petitioners from the national 
peripheries are considered more important than the claims of official organs of the same 
autonomous republic, and in every single case, we (the republican authorities) are 
brutalized by the VTsIK and the Narkomats (People’s Commissariats), which creates an 
intolerable mood (nevozmozhnoe nastroenie).”189 
Dramatic flourishes aside, in both his letter and his speech, Abdrakhmanov had 
correctly diagnosed the preferential treatment of the peasant settlers by the government 
and the resulting neglect of the native communities. The inequality that it produced was 
both spatial and ethnic. The Kyrgyz volosts and cantons were less developed and received 
fewer investments. As a case in point, Abdrakhmanov cites the share of the agricultural 
credit received by the Russian peasants of the Frunze canton, who accounted for roughly 
11% of the total population, but received 44% of the credits. On the other hand, the 
Kyrgyz who made up 70% of the republic’s population received only 5% of the credits.190  
The political ramifications of such an asymmetrical distribution of resources were 
significant. Instead of giving the native and settler population equal access to economic 
and political decision making, the regionalization heightened the existing regional and 
ethnic inequalities and concentrated political and economic power in the Frunze canton. 
As the seat of the republic’s government, the canton wielded more power and had more 
leverage with the central authorities than the Kyrgyz cantons. Russian deputies of village 
soviets comprised the absolute majority of national minority deputies. There were 1,145 
Russian deputies in comparison to only 524 Uzbek deputies, who constituted the second 
largest minority.191  
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Economically, too, the European canton punched above its weight. The formation 
of mainly European national soviets on the basis of access to the irrigated agricultural 
land favoured settlers over the native population.192 The effects of the concentration of 
prime agricultural land in the hands of the European population are particularly obvious 
when one examines ethnic variations in grain and meat consumption. In 1926, for 
example, the Kyrgyz consumed on average anywhere between 8.0 (in the Chui canton) 
and 4.31 (Naryn canton) poods of grain per person. The Europeans of the republic, on the 
other hands, consumed between 15.57 (Karakol canton) and 12.7 poods of grain. Meat – 
the nomads’ proverbial diet – was hardly a staple on the Kyrgyz table. In 1926, the 
pastoralists of the republic ate at best 2.23 poods of meat (Naryn canton) per person and 
as little as 0.42 poods of meat at worst (Talas canton), while the settlers consumed 
between 2.5 (Talas canton) and 1.32 poods (Frunze and Karakol cantons).193  
As the main grain-producing area of the republic with the highest income, the 
canton was both wealthier and had a more influential voice in the republican decision-
making bodies.194 Furthermore, the territories administered by the Russian minority 
soviets were better developed and boasted more industries than the Kyrgyz soviets. The 
unequal rates of industrial development carried into the post-Stalinist period. In 1970, the 
so-called “North-Kirghiz Economic Region” (Severo-kirgizskii ekonomicheskii raion) 
produced over three quarters of the republic’s industrial output.195 Ultimately, the 
regionalization had re-established the ethnic hierarchy that had characterized the region 
under the colonial administration.  
 
Assault on the Native Countryside: The Collectivization Campaign  
 
When approaching collectivization in the pastoralist areas of Soviet Central Asia it is 
instructive to remember that collectivization in the context of nomadic areas of the region 
was, in practice, not one but three parallel campaigns of debaization (the confiscation and 
deportation of the bais and manaps, sedentarization and collectivization.196 In significant 
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ways, the collectivization of the native countryside was similar to the collectivization of 
peasantry in European Russia. Certainly, Lynne Viola’s argument that collectivization 
was a tool of state-building also applies to the Kirghiz ASSR.197 To understand why the 
Soviet leadership was willing to incur the human and monetary costs of the campaign in 
the volatile borderlands I propose to situate collectivization as well as debaization and 
sedentarization, in the broader context of the Soviet-state building project in the national 
peripheries.  
I argue that collectivization was designed to extract resources from the native 
population of the republic and bring the nomads under the purview of the state. Because 
the Kyrgyz were mainly engaged in pastoralist livestock breeding, their settlement and 
socialization into state-controlled agriculture could be accomplished only through forced 
removal of livestock. By dispossessing the wealthiest members of the nomadic 
communities of their animals, the authorities accomplished two goals at once. First, they 
succeeded in transferring the pastoralist economy’s resource base from the native society 
to the central government, thereby forcing the nomads to settle and take up farming. 
Second, by forcibly settling the native pastoralists, the government was able to better 
control the highly mobile communities and make them “more readily identifiable and 
accessible to the centre,” to borrow James Scott’s formulation.198 Inevitably, the seizure 
of resources from the native pastoralists impacted on their economic well-being and led 
to the destruction of the pastoralist economy.  
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The collectivization drive in the Kirghiz ASSR began with the campaign of 
debaization, which sought to strip native bais and manaps of their wealth and influence 
in the native countryside.199 The Soviet authorities held a deeply-seated hostility toward 
clan and tribal affinitions. As local figures of traditional authority, manaps were believed 
to be particularly adept at manipulating these ties at the expense of the Soviet state-
building efforts.200 In 1925, for example, the Kirghiz Oblpartbiuro (Oblast Party Bureau) 
reported that in the past year, bais and manaps increased resistance to the Soviet 
authorities and used kinship ties to “seize control of the village.”201 Similarly, the first 
secretary of the Kirobkom, Vladimir Shubrikov emphasized that “in our conditions, 
kulaks (bai-manaps were believed to be the native equivalent of kulaks) are far more 
dangerous for us than in any other area of the Union, because here, the kulak had not been 
subjected to the revolutionary onslaught (natisk) and the revolutionary limitation of his 
exploitative possibilities.202 Extending the presence of the state to the native countryside 
thus became one of the government’s central goals.  
The first measures targeted at suppressing the “prosperous elements” and their 
perceived “corrupting influence on the poor and agricultural proletariat (batrachestvo)” 
were adopted in 1925 and consisted of a propaganda campaign.203 A year later, in 1926 
the republican Obkom circulated a letter of instructions to the district party committees 
on the measures to be implemented to curb manaps’ influence, including sending 
agitators to the countryside, purging and imposing patronage over village party cells, and 
purging “Koshchi,” the union of the poor and agricultural labourers, of class-alien 
members.204 
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The measures had temporary and limited effect, and by 1927, the debaization 
campaign took on a more repressive tone.205 The policies enforced by the authorities in 
the period between 1927 and 1933 were intended not only to limit the manaps’ influence, 
but also to destroy them as a social class. This was to be accomplished through the 
disenfranchisement of manap households, their deportation and confiscation of their land 
and animals. The category of manaps was rather broad and included any nomadic 
household with more than 400 – or 300 for semi-nomadic areas – head of cattle, including 
sheep and goats, as well as those households whose members occupied a privileged 
position under the tsarist government or were implicated in “anti-Soviet activities.”206  
The first group of 20 manap households was deported from the republic in 1927 in 
accordance with the resolution adopted at the congress of Soviets of the Kirghiz ASSR. 
The resolution to expel “the largest cattle breeders from among the native population, 
which maintain the semi-feudal, patriarchal and tribal relations, and…impede the 
sovietization of aul (native village)” was upheld again in November 1928 by the TsIK 
and Sovnarkom of the Kirghiz ASSR.207 Between 1927 and 1929, 65 manap households 
were deported and their properties confiscated.208 
Inevitably, the deportations and expropriations triggered a wave of discontent and 
violent protests. In October 1929 alone, the OGPU registered five groups with 281 
members conducting “anti-Soviet agitation.” The native population also engaged in 
“terroristic acts” (terakty) – assaults on Soviet administrators, threats, and arson. 
According to the same OGPU report, eleven cases of terrorism were registered in July, 
five cases in August, and two in September of 1929.209 The authorities blamed resistance 
on manaps. In March 1929 the republican Ispolkom complained that “the implementation 
the directive of the Obkom about the comprehensive agitation-explanatory work on the 
tasks and significance of the expulsions was inadequate. As the result, there were cases 
of incorrect attitudes to the expulsions by the toilers of aul who considered the 
confiscation of manaps’ properties and their expulsions as detrimental to the kinship 
group (rod).”210  
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In practice, the discontent was caused in equal measure by the expulsions and 
livestock and grain requisitions, which had begun a year earlier in 1928. In need of grain 
to pay for industrialization, the authorities began to tighten control over the countryside. 
Collectivization recommended itself on several levels; as an instrument of state control 
collectivization allowed the government to extend political and administrative dominance 
over the countryside while, at the same time, ensuring the procurement of grain. 
Collectivization was both costly and difficult. In the context of the nomadic regions of 
Central Asia, it was doubly so. Because the pastoralists traditionally practised seasonal 
migrations, making it impossible for the state to assert control over individual groups and 
the population at large, collectivization in Soviet Kirghizia (and Kazakhstan) was 
accompanied by a campaign of forced sedentarization.  
The authorities framed both collectivization and sedentarization in terms of 
overcoming nomadic backwardness; they would “lift the cultural level and the material 
wellbeing of the people, and ensure the fastest rates of economic reconstruction in order 
to abandon the inefficient subsistence and semi-subsistence economy.”211 Similarly, the 
settlement of the native nomads would smooth “the irregularities (sherokhovatosti) and 
deficiencies (nedostatki) of the Kara-Kirghiz people – namely, their movements and 
migrations (kochevki i perekochevki), which impact negatively on the development of 
agriculture and are at odds with land management goals.”212  
Official optimism notwithstanding, the reality on the ground was sobering. In 
1927, 62% of all Kyrgyz households were nomadic or semi-nomadic. Furthermore, they 
dominated – quantitatively, if not qualitatively – the republic’s economy. In 1925, for 
every hundred 100 households, 79 households were Kyrgyz. Of these 79 households, 51 
were nomadic or semi-nomadic and only 28 were sedentary.213  
Despite the prevalence of nomadic households, the republic’s more temperate 
climate and availability of water made it one of the prime locations in the region for grain 
cultivation. A 1926 VTsIK brief suggests that the central authorities planned to increase 
grain cultivation in Central Asia by expanding grain growing area by 396,600 hectares of 
which 107,300 hectares, or 27% of the total, were to be cultivated in the Kirghiz ASSR.214 
The actual increase exceeded the proposed benchmark by almost 70,000 hectares; 
altogether, in 1927, the increase in the grain cultivation area measured 176,600 
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hectares.215 Despite – or perhaps due to – the increase, land productivity suffered a 
marked fall. The grain harvested in 1927 in the republic was 800,000 tonnes short of the 
projected amount.216  
The diminishing harvests did not stop the authorities from seeking to expand grain 
cultivation. In January 1930, the EKOSO (Central Asian Economic Council), the main 
executive body regulating the economy of the region, instructed the republican authorities 
to increase the grain growing areas by 12%.217 Kirghizia was expected to furnish eight 
million of the total thirty million poods of grain grown in the region.218 The growing 
demand for grain coupled with the pressure to supply more forced the republic’s state 
organs to requisition more grain and introduce faster rates of collectivization, which in 
turn led to more resistance on the part of the native pastoralists. Once again, the authorities 
squared in on manaps: “sedentarization is hampered by the semi-feudal bai-manap brass 
(verkhushka) of the nomadic aul who see in sedentarization the loss of their opportunities 
to exploit and their kinship rights to manage land and animals of the nomadic society.”219  
Beginning from 1929 the bai-manap campaign resumed and intensified, leading to still 
more deportations and confiscations. Altogether, in the course of the campaign, the 
authorities liquidated and deported 497 manap households acquiring in the process 
45,777 hectares of arable and 22,831 hectares of rain-fed land, and subjected 3,447 kulak 
and manap households to the confiscation of “excess” land, animals, and farm 
inventory.220  
In what amounted to a double assault on the native countryside, the authorities 
also forcibly seized and “collectivized” the nomads’ land and livestock. By October 1928, 
287 kolkhozes were formed, comprising 5,730 households. In a year, their number grew 
to 747 collective farms covering 19,602 households. Altogether, by February 1931, 
66,618 households were collectivized.221 The livestock population in the kolkhozes’ 
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ownership grew from 8,100 head in 1928 to 24,000 head in 1929.222 By February 1931, 
29% of the republic’s households and 52.5% of cultivated land were collectivized.223 The 
collectivization of livestock somewhat lagged behind with 36% of horses, 20% of cattle, 
and 26% of sheep and goats collectivized. In less than a year, however, collectivization 
of livestock caught up. By December 1931, 40% of sheep, 50% of horses, and 39.9% of 
the cattle population of the republic were collectivized.224  
Collectivization rates were unequal across the ethnic groups. Archival data 
suggest that the pastoralist communities were the primary target of collectivization. While 
roughly half of the grain and cotton-growing households were collectivized, the 
pastoralist areas experienced collectivization at much higher rates. Where the European 
village soviets of Arkhangel’skoe, Mikhailovskoe and Oktiabr’skoe were collectivized 
by 47.48, and 39% respectively, the neighbouring semi-nomadic village soviet of Toguz-
Toroo was 90% collectivized. 225 
Collectivization was expected to be completed by autumn 1933, but like 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the collectivization drive in the Kirghiz ASSR slowed 
down towards the second half of the decade.226 By 1935, 70.8% of households and 84.7% 
of cultivated land were transferred to the collective farms.227 Poorly provisioned and 
subjected to frequent requisitions, many of the newly established kolkhozes were not 
viable without state support. A meeting held by the republican Obkom admitted that “the 
kolkhozes organized before spring 1930 united poor (bedniatskii) households, were 
consumptive in nature, and did not play any measurable role in agricultural 
production.”228  
The more immediate and visible outcome of collectivization was the drop in 
livestock population. As collectivization had funnelled more land and animals towards 
the state, the livestock population dwindled. The loss of animals began in 1927 and 
continued until the end of the next decade. Over half a million livestock was lost between 
1927 and 1928.229 Between 1929 and 1930 the population of cattle fell by 24.4%, horses 
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by 18.5%, and sheep and goats by 15.5%.230 By 1934, only 2,100,000 head of livestock 
remained of 7,715,000 head counted in 1928, indicating a loss of 73%.231  
How to explain such a dramatic fall in the livestock numbers? The official 
explanation pointed to manaps, who sold and slaughtered animals, as the main culprit. 
While the sale and slaughter of animals did indeed take place, it cannot account for such 
a massive loss. In fact, a great many livestock were slaughtered simply to avoid starvation. 
To explain the high mortality of the livestock we need to look at both the impact of 
collectivization and sedentarization on native society and the attendant circumstances that 
contributed to it.  
Nomadic economy, as Niccolo Pianciola argues, is different from sedentary 
farming in that a group of households, rather than a single household, form the productive 
unit. Nomadic communities pooled resources to weather the hardships of the pastoralist 
lifestyle, such as droughts, early frost, harsh winters etc. The bulk of these resources was 
provided by the richest members of the group – bais and manaps.232 According to the 
1927 statistical survey, manaps constituted 9.8% of the total Kyrgyz population, but 
owned 59.7% of all livestock.233 The removal and dispossession of bais and manaps had 
therefore robbed entire communities of the means of survival. Furthermore, the expansion 
of grain cultivation affected almost exclusively the native population. Because the 
Russian settlers were already engaged in grain growing any expansion of grain cultivation 
had to be made at the expense of pasture land and hay growing areas.  
To a certain extent, the grain quotas succeeded in making the nomads grow grain. 
Faced with the forced requisitions, the majority of Kyrgyz bartered their animals for grain 
and expanded grain cultivation to fulfil the quotas. This left them, however, woefully 
unprepared for any exigency that could and did arise in 1927, when the early frosts, 
known in Kyrgyz and Kazakh as jut, led to a massive die-off of animals. In itself, jut was 
not necessarily a curse; hay was traditionally grown by the pastoralists of Central Asia to 
supplement or replace grazing in the winter time.234 In 1907, for example, the Kyrgyz of 
the Przhevalsk uezd (Karakol canton in 1927) and the Pishpek uezd (Frunze canton) 
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harvested over 4 and 7 poods of hay per head respectively. In comparison, in 1927 the 
Kyrgyz of the Naryn canton harvested only 0.6 poods of hay for every animal they had.235  
Predictably, the loss of animals, which the nomads used to exchange for grain 
resulted in the famine that primarily affected the native population. By 1933, the famine 
had become noticeable enough for the OGPU to report about the mass border-crossings 
into China and recognize the “mass excesses and abuse” of local authorities as one of the 
two main causes of the "food supply difficulties.”236 Some families voted with their feet. 
Three hundred Kyrgyz families from the Alai valley (in the south of the republic) fled the 
country in 1933, taking with them 30,000 sheep and 15,000 cattle.237 Mass crossings to 
China became commonplace.  In July 1933, the OGPU reported that 40-50 kolkhozniks 
(collective farm workers) attempt to cross the border daily, an unknown number cross it 
illegally.238  
The estimates of the loss of human life as the result of famine suggest that the 
famine claimed lives of every sixth and every nineteenth ethnic Kyrgyz in the Frunze 
canton and in the Issyk-Kul basin.239 Compared to the mortality among the native 
population of the neighbouring Kazakhstan, the scale of famine in the Soviet Kyrgyzstan 
appears relatively small.240 Its long-term impact, however, was significant. Demographic 
statistics shows clearly that the Kyrgyz suffered disproportionately from the exigencies 
of collectivization; from 1926 to 1959 the Uzbek and Tajik population of the Kirghiz 
ASSR more than doubled, growing by 105% and 115% respectively. The Kyrgyz 
population, on the other hand, grew only by a quarter, or 25%.241 The collectivization had 
therefore been implemented at the expense of the native nomads, who both paid for – by 
providing the bulk of the resources – and fell victim to it.  
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As Lynne Viola reminds, 1927 was a transitional year for the Soviet regime.242 It brought 
the closure of the NEP and marked the beginning of the “Great Turn” in political and 
economic life of the union republics. In practical terms, the “Great Turn” entailed both 
the consolidation of state authority in the rural society and the breakneck industrialization 
financed though the extraction of resources from the peasant countryside. In order to 
achieve these objectives in the largely pastoralist countryside of the Kirghiz ASSR, the 
central government forcibly sedentarized nomadic communities by seizing their livestock 
and land as a part of the campaign of debaization. At the same time, to boost grain 
production, the Soviet leadership revised the land and water reforms of 1921-1922, 
restoring land ownership rights to the European population of the republic. Combined 
with the concentration of irrigated agricultural land in the hands of the settlers, 







                                                          





Between Nation and Revolution: the Soviet Historiography of the Uprising of 1916 
 
In addition to boundaries nations also need national histories. In the young Soviet republic 
of Kirghizia national history was written around the tragic events of 1916. Indeed, the 
commemoration, if not celebration, of the uprising occupied a significant, if not central, 
place in the public and political life of the republic. As “the uprising of national 
liberation,” urkun – exodus, as it was colloquially known among the ethnic Kyrgyz – was 
the subject of a range of academic as well as general audience publications. In addition 
to published archival documents, a number of monographs and numerous articles in 
scholarly periodicals, educational booklets and articles in the republican print media, the 
events of 1916 provided the plot for several historical novels in Kyrgyz published before 
the war, including “Adzhar” by Kasymaly Baialinov, published in 1928, Aaly 
Tokombaev’s “The Bloody Years” (“Kanduu zhyldar”) released in 1935, “A Long 
Journey” (“Dolgii put’”) by Mukai Elebaev, published in 1936, and a relatively popular 
novel in Russian by Dmitry Furmanov – a one-time head of the Revolutionary Military 
Council (Revvoensovet) in Semirechye who put down the 1920 garrison uprising in Verny 
– titled simply “The Mutiny” (“Miatezh”), among many others. The first Kyrgyz operetta 
“Life, Not Death” (a rather awkward Russian translation of the original Kyrgyz “Adzhal 
Orduna” – “In Place of Death”) had likewise centred around the uprising of 1916. The 
operetta, first staged in 1937, had clearly targeted the more cultured urban audience. To 
reach the countryside, a simpler stage piece was composed and staged by the “kishlak-
village” theatre of Kolpakov. Similarly, a lot of effort and financing had gone into 
organizing the 10th, 15th, and 20th anniversaries of the uprising.  
In light of such a literary and cultural cornucopia of works devoted to the rather 
disagreeable topic of the inter-ethnic conflict, the question arises as to why the events of 
1916 were put at the foundation of the national identity in inter-war Soviet Kirghizia? I 
draw on Stephen Kotkin’s suggestion that “the revolution was…consolidated by the 
skilful cultivation of a renewed national identity” to argue that the Soviet historiography 
of the uprising of 1916 was crucial to the co-production of ethnic and political loyalties 
in early Soviet Kyrgyzstan.1 As such, the Soviet historiography of the uprising of 1916 
was an integrative mechanism that combined class loyalties to the self-proclaimed 
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workers’ and peasants’ state with loyalties to an ethnic group and “homeland.” Although 
– as the next chapter will demonstrate – the merging of the two forms of self-identification 
was not seamless, the historiography of the uprising, which should be more properly seen 
as a complex of informational and educational practices of shaping, enacting, and 
actualizing new forms of collective Soviet identities, successfully reconciled the rhetoric 
of class and nation.2 
The urgent need to attract the population of national peripheries to the 
implementation of broad social transformations prompted the authorities to identify 
effective means of mobilization. The Soviet historiography of the uprising became one 
such means. It is possible to distinguish two formative periods in the historiography of 
the rebellion: until the end of the 1920-s and from the early 1930s until the end of the 
decade. The first period offered a fundamentally nationalist understanding of the rebellion 
and engaged in sharp criticism of imperial Russia and Russian settlers. This early Soviet 
historiography of the uprising of 1916 and other national movements in general emerged 
primarily as a response to the urgency of shaping collective forms of identity within the 
framework of institutionalized national autonomies. The convergence of nation and class 
in the course of the second stage of Soviet state-building, discussed in the next chapter, 
ushered in campaign of total mobilization demanding complete identification of 
individual Soviet ethnic republics, or “homelands,” with the common Soviet fatherland 
(otechestvo).  
The writing of national histories was an indispensable part of the Soviet policies 
of nation and state-building in the region. As an instrument of political consolidation in 
the ethnically diverse national peripheries of the USSR, national histories were designed 
to cultivate a sense of belonging and involvement in the revolution and personal 
responsibility for national and, by extension, socialist construction. The conscious turn to 
the past in the framework of nation-building in the borderlands points to the 
instrumentalist approach of the Soviet leadership to the pre-revolutionary history of the 
region; state sponsored understanding of the past facilitated state building and generated 
popular loyalties for the regime.  
The choice of the uprising of 1916 as the foundation of the national identity of the 
Soviet Kyrgyz appears illogical given the efforts of the Soviet authorities to build a multi-
ethnic state and curtail ethnic conflicts. Yet, the emotional charge – the uprising had 
occupied “a bright place” (iarkoe mesto) in the history of the Kyrgyz – the uprising’s 
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mass nature (massovost’), and its popularity among all Kyrgyz (obshchenarodnost’) 
made it an attractive vehicle for popularizing the idea about the revolutionary nature of 
national movements and their merging with the socialist revolution.3 The central role of 
the uprising in the implementation of early Soviet nationalities policies is reflected in the 
resolution of the special commission convened on the eve of the uprising’s tenth 
anniversary. “The tenth anniversary of these events is of great significance for Kirghizstan 
and may be a good moment to instil nationalities policies of Soviet power into the 
consciousness of the broad toiling masses of Kirghizstan.” 4 “In the territory of 
Kirghizstan,” the resolution continues, “the events were most important, in other areas of 
the former Dzhetysu (Semirechye) oblast the uprising was of a less intense nature. 
Therefore, these events affected the Kyrgyz people more than anyone else. In the history 
of the Kirghiz, 1916 occupies a very bright place.”5 
In the official interpretation, the uprising appears as both national and – owing to 
its anti-colonial nature – revolutionary.6 “The uprising of the native peoples of Central 
Asia in 1916” informs one of the articles published as a part of the celebration of the tenth 
anniversary of the uprising, “was a broad mass movement against the colonial policies of 
Russian imperialism,” which “should be written into history with capital letters like 
revolutionary movements in the history of Russia.”7 
The adroit blending of the rhetoric of nation and revolution in the resolution is 
illustrative of the logic of early Soviet nation-building, according to which “the 
recognition of national autonomy (natsional’naia samostoiatel’nost’) by revolutionary 
Russia will succeed better at giving (the native peoples) access to Russian culture and the 
ideas of the Russian revolution, than any forced implantation (vnedrenie) will be able to 
do.”8  
What is particularly noticeable about the early Soviet historiography of the 
uprising is the emphasis on nation, rather than class, although class analysis was to 
become dominant already by the end of the decade. Indeed, in 1920s the uprising is 
understood first and foremost as a national movement caused by “the desire of the 
oppressed nationality to overthrow – through independent and mass struggle – the yoke 
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and chains of slavery and pave the way to the political freedom of the nation, to self-
determination and economic independence.9  
In a strong indication of the highly politicized nature of national historiographies, 
a number of early analyses of the uprising are authored by the native leaders of the Central 
Asian republics, such as Iusup Abdrakhmanov and his Semirechye-born Kazakh 
colleague and friend, Turar Ryskulov, the then deputy chairman of the Council of 
People’s Commissars. Reflecting on the uprising, Abdrakhmanov, who wrote widely on 
the subject both as an academic and as a politician, gives an essentially nationalist 
interpretation of the uprising by suggesting that the uprising was directed against “the 
dominant nationality.”10 Ryskulov’s assessment of the rebellion is equally nationalist: 
“the contradictions resulting from the tsarist colonial oppression served as the 
reason…forced the native toiling masses to rise, first of all, against the Russian 
authorities. Moreover, in their attacks the rebels did not distinguish between Russian 
tsarist officials and Russian peasaponts and workers, and secondly, the rebels attacked 
the native wealthy only insofar as they were accomplices or supporters of Russians. All 
this shows that the uprising was directed against Russians in general.”11  
In an even more nationalist interpretation of the uprising, some historians paint a 
flattering portrait of the pre-revolutionary indigenous elites, many of whom were co-
opted by the Soviet government. A historian from the “centre,” Andrei Shestakov 
describes the leaders of the uprising, many of whom were of manap background, as “the 
oldest, most experienced people trusted by the masses.”12 Piotr Galuzo, a well-known 
authority on Turkestan, assigns manaps the role of initiators (zastrel’shchiki) of the 
“national-revolutionary movement.”13 
In the final analysis, the identification of nation with revolution legitimized the 
revolution as an institutional recognition of the “national autonomy” of the non-Russian 
minorities. According to Shestakov, the uprising “expanded the political horizons of the 
native population” and prepared it for the revolution, which “cut the economic knot tied 
in Central Asia by the tsarist government.14 Read this way, the revolution, which, as 
Akhmet Baitursynov has rightly noted, terrified the native nomads, emerged as the 
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continuation of the struggle for national independence and ties “the revolutionary struggle 
for socialism with the revolutionary programme in the national question.”15 
Beginning from the first half of the 1930s national historiographies experienced a 
gradual but significant shift.16 Moscow’s expectations of a future war had made national 
and ethnic allegiances and political loyalty to the regime an immediate and pressing 
concern. In preparation for war, the central government pursued campaign of popular 
mobilization, which blended national and pan-national Soviet identities. The drastic 
turnabout in national historiographies of the Soviet republics in the second half of the 
1920s and early 1930s is a comprehensive example of the ideological campaign to write 
national histories consistent with the larger history of the Soviet Union. By the beginning 
of the second decade of Soviet rule, the official historiography of the uprising of 1916 
was, like many other national historiographies, subsumed into a grand narrative of the 
gathering of the Soviet Union’s multi-ethnic population within a collectively shared 
homeland. The goal of this radical shift, which saw many historians struggle to cope with 
the new agenda, was to create intra-state loyalties and secure political cohesion of the 
union state while obscuring cross-border solidarities. As such, the changing national 
historiographies positioned individuals within nations and nations within the Soviet 
Union, in an attempt to establish – through the common narrative of revolutionary 
struggle – close ties between the centre and the periphery.  
Under the combination of encouragement and coercion, historians in the Soviet 
Union’s national republics began to incorporate the formula of class struggle into their 
analyses of national movements. In this new take on national movements, class struggle 
paralleled and often eclipsed the narrative of national struggle that dominated national 
historiographies of the previous decade. Where national historiographies of the NEP 
(New Economic Policy) understood the revolutionary struggle of the Tsarist Russia’s 
minority peoples as first and foremost a national struggle between the colonists and the 
native peoples, for national historiographies of the Great Turn class struggle was the main 
driving force of the revolution both in the centre and in the borderlands. Although 
arguments of national struggle had not been entirely dismissed, they were embedded in a 
broader account of the revolution. The sense of national belonging developed by national 
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historiographies of the 1920s melded with a new unifying narrative of class struggle that 
sought to inculcate a strong sense of Soviet citizenship.  
In approaching the shift in national historiographies in general and the 
historiography of the uprising of 1916 in particular, I propose to take seriously the terms 
employed by the participants of the debate. In their professional capacity, Soviet 
historians merged scholarly pursuits with political activism.17 Their attempts at 
establishing a definitive analysis of the uprising were driven equally by the political 
objectives and the revolutionary ethos of transformation while simultaneously trying to 
balance their personal beliefs with the demands of the central state. That history was 
highly politicized in the Soviet Union is hardly a secret.18 Yet, it also offered personal 
rewards to those who wrote it. By pointing to the historical injustices, the native 
communists like Abrakhmanov sought to improve the plight of their kinsmen; to the 
historians from the centre, history bore evidence to the progressiveness of the Soviet state, 
which had abandoned the imperial ways of its predecessor. That the scope of the debate 
widened and the personal stakes involved grew higher toward the closure of the second 
decade of Soviet power is a testament to its importance.  
As “a mighty weapon of civic upbringing (grazhdanskoe vospitanie),” history 
served the practical purpose of institutionalizing new ways of thinking and creating the 
generation of “unwavering revolutionaries.”19 Similarly to the collectivization drive and 
the programme of rapid industrialization, the rewriting of national histories was a part of 
the state-sponsored campaign to strengthen domestic cohesion in the face of looming war. 
Although the war scare of 1927 did not materialize, war, in the Soviet leadership’s view, 
was a matter of time and preparation to war – a matter of survival. The need for the 
political consolidation of the vast and ethnically diverse country compelled the regime to 
look for the new universal language of mobilization. Soviet patriotism became such a 
language and history was its tool.  
The notion of the native land, the “socialist fatherland,” whose “independence” 
was assured by the joint efforts of Soviet power and the “vast masses of workers and 
peasants,” was first spelled by Stalin in 1931. In his address to the best-performing 
industrial personnel of the country, Stalin expatiated on the new doctrine in unequivocal 
terms. “In the past,” Stalin explained, “we had no fatherland, nor could we have had one. 
                                                          
17 On Soviet historians, see K. F Shteppa, Soviet Historians and the Soviet State, John Barber, Soviet historians in 
crisis, 1928-1932, George Enteen, Soviet Historians and the Study of Russian Imperialism; The Soviet scholar-
bureaucrat, and Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship  
18 According to Lowell Tillett, “because of the Bolshevik identification with the historical process, history is both more 
political and more vital than in other societies.” The Great Friendship, p.5   
19 Pravda, 1930, quoted in David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism, p. 31  
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But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of 
the people, we have a fatherland, and we will uphold its independence.”20  
The universalism of the socialist culture did not, however, mean the abrogation of 
korenizatsiia and Soviet nationalities policy in general. Instead, the Soviet Union would 
“develop the national culture of the peoples of the USSR, their national languages, 
schools, press, and so forth, on the basis of the Soviets,” and by so doing, “adapt” the 
national culture “to the interests and requirements of socialist, to the interests and 
requirements of the proletarian dictatorship, to the interests and requirements of the 
working people of all the nationalities” of the country.21 Indeed, as Stalin reasoned on the 
eve of the war with Nazi Germany, “combining a healthy, properly understood 
nationalism with proletarian internationalism” would most effectively rally the peoples 
of the Soviet Union to the defence of their socialist fatherland. As such, “proletarian 
internationalism should be grounded in such a nationalism in the individual 
countries…Between nationalism properly understood and proletarian internationalism 
there can be no contradictions.”22  
In essence, this “revolutionary patriotism” was a form of civic nationalism aimed 
at the solidarization of the population of the national republics with each other and the 
state in general. By combining the revolutionary rhetoric and the appeals to national 
sentiments, the Stalinist patriotism sought to mobilize the population for the purposes of 
defence of both the national and common, Soviet “fatherland.”  
Soviet historians were given the task of harmonizing national historiographies and 
developing an image of the fatherland formed as the result of the historically determined, 
joint struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union for class and national liberation. Merging 
class struggle with national struggle was not easy and demanded compromises and 
conscious omissions on the past of historians. Often, these omissions and compromises 
were made after active interference of the central government, which sought to correct 
and excise the ideologically inappropriate content of national historiographies. The 
example of Iusup Abdrakhmanov is particularly instructive in this respect. 
Along with the content of national historiographies, the chronology of the 
development of “national liberation movements” had undergone significant changes. To 
                                                          
20 Joseph Stalin, The Tasks of Business Executives, February 4, 1931, accessed 21 January 2016. 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/02/04.htm.  
21 Joseph Stalin, Speech delivered on August 5, Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), August 5. 1927, accessed 21 January 2016. 
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22 Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949, p. 163. For a survey of Stalin’s thinking on “revolutionary patriotism,” see 
Erik Van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin, p. 230-255 
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frame various national movements, including the uprising of 1916, in terms of class 
struggle, historians introduced the concept of class stratification into the history of pre-
revolutionary Central Asia. Put simply, if class struggle was impossible without classes 
and the uprising of 1916 was a class struggle, then the native society had exhibited all 
signs of class divisions before the uprising and, by extension, the revolution. At the same 
time, because there were class divisions in the native society, kulaks and other “agents” 
of tsarism were joined by exploiters from among the local population. “The double 
oppression and plunder by the Tsarist government and the local national 
bourgeoisie…cleared the way for the development of peasant proletariat 
(obatrachivanie), impoverishment, and ruin of (native) households” according to 
Shestakov.23 Thus, “the native toiling masses, bukara (“this rabble,” or chern’ – black – 
in Abdrakhmanov’s translation)” owe their existence to the “class struggle among the 
Kirghiz.”24 
Rather expectedly, the “national bourgeoisie” who role was evaluated in largely 
positive terms in the historiography of the first half of the 1920s could no longer be the 
leaders of the class uprising. In the wake of the “Great Turn,” it is the toiling native masses 
who become the driving force of both national and class movements. The class nature of 
the rebellion, contend Piotr Galuzo, Aleksei Shetakov, and Baialy Isakeev, was apparent 
in the social origins of the uprising’s participants, “the peasant and pastoralist masses and 
the toilers of the cities,”25 “the broad peasant masses of both the settled farmers and the 
nomads,”26 and the “the most active and progressive elements of the batrak (rural 
proletariat) poor groups of the population.”27 
Similarly, class struggle also accounts for the “friendship of nations” between the 
Kyrgyz and Russian proletariat in the later historiography of the uprising, which was 
largely absent from the NEP-time historiography of national movements. The purging of 
ethnic conflict from national historiographies was perhaps the most difficult feat of 
conceptual juggling Soviet historians had to perform. As some of the following examples 
demonstrate, many historians were at pains to reconcile class with nation. Galuzo, for 
example, suggests that, on the eve of the uprising, “the line of struggle against all Russians 
shifted to struggle against all exploiters irrelevantly of their nationality.”28 As the result 
                                                          
23 Shestakov, 15-letie vosstaniia v Srednei Azii. Moscow: Gos. sots. ekonom. izd-vo, 1931, p. 19. 
24 Abdrakhmanov, Vosstanie kirgiz v 1916 godu. Moscow: Sovetskaia Aziia, 1931, p. 10.  
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issledovatel’skii institut istorii revoliutsii pri Sredazbiuro TsK VKP(b) (SANIIR), p. 19.  
26 Shestakov, 15-letie vosstaniia v Srednei Azii. Moscow: Gos. sots. ekonom. izd-vo, 1931, p. 39. 
27 Lesnaia, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirgizstane: Dokumenty i materialy, sobrannye L. V. Lesnoi. Moscow: 
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28 Galuzo, Turkestan – koloniia: Ocherk istorii Turkestana ot zavoevaniia russkimi do revoliutsii 1917 goda, p. 144. 
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of this shift, “in the Ferghana Valley, the area most advanced in terms of class divisions 
in the native population, the native peasants attacked primarily their own (native) 
administrators and only then the Russian officials.”29 Shestakov, who in his 1926 article 
argued that nearly the entire population of the targeted Russian settlements was murdered 
by the rebels, had, by 1931, come to argue that the rebels “shot with cherry stones” rather 
than bullets and “as a rule, did not kill women or children, taking them captive instead.”30 
He also points to “not a few cases” when Russian peasants taken captive joined or helped 
the rebels.31 
The selective forgetting of mutual acts violence was instrumental to projecting 
images and messages of unity and the sub-national Soviet identity. Three articles written 
by Iusup Abdrakhmanov provide a useful vantage point from which to examine the new 
model of inter-ethnic relations in the context of growing tensions with the outside world. 
The first article published in 1926 is a short, but dense polemical piece on the nature of 
the uprising, which Abdrakhmanov believes to be “national,” with “elements of class 
struggle,” but without true class content. He also discusses the role of Russians peasants 
(muzhiki), the “practical colonizers” (prakticheskie kolonizatory), whose interests 
coincided with those of tsarism.32  
Abdrakhmanov’s article was published on the occasion of the uprising’s fifteenth 
anniversary and reiterates the key positions of the first article. Abdrakhmanov continues 
to argue, for example, that the “uprising was nationalist,” because “first, it was directed 
against tsarism and assumed the character of an uprising against all Russians as the 
exploiting nation, and, second, because any revolutionary movement in backward 
countries,” where “peasantry is the driving force of the revolution, can only be the 
revolutionary movement of national liberation.”33 
In an odd pacing, Abdrakhmanov’s third article was published in September 1931, 
only a month after the publication of the second article. The introduction to the article, 
which informs the readers that “in connection with the decision of the Bureau of the 
Obkom of the VKP(b)” and “the Bolshevist criticism” of the previous article “comrade 
Abdrakhmanov” admits that he committed “grave political mistakes of nationalist 
nature,” makes it clear that the article was written under pressure. Among the mistakes 
admitted by Adbrrakhmanov are “pitting nation against nation, blurring the shared nature 
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31 Ibid.  
32 Abdrakhmanov, O vosstanii 1916 goda. Po povodu stat’i t. Menitskogo, Izbrannye trudy. Bishkek: Shams, 2001, p. 
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(obshchnost’) of class interests of the toiling masses of Russian and Kirghiz peasantry, 
denying the possibility of their joint struggle against tsarism, imperialist bourgeoisie, 
kulaks, bais, manaps” etc.34 In lieu of the apparently outdated interpretation of the 
uprising of 1916, Abdrakhmanov offers a rather typical for the “friendship of nations” 
definition. “The national liberation nature the uprising of 1916,” according to repenting 
Abdrakhmanov, “follows…from the fact that it was a war of national liberation against 
the domination of the Russian military-feudal imperialism in Central Asia, which created 
here the system of the most barbarian and shameless exploitation and robbery, and 
delayed the economic, cultural, and political development of the peoples of Central 
Asia.”35 
Of particular interest is the neutralization of the ethnic identification of the 
colonial authorities. “Russian imperialism” loses its face and re-merges instead as an 
ethnically neutral political regime. The Russian peasant (muzhik) – the “practical 
colonizer” in Adbrakhmanov’s original definition – is replaced with the “kulak settler” 
of unclear nationality in the later works of Soviet historians. The loss of ethnic identity 
by the “exploiting nation” had helped Soviet historians to create images and models of 
cooperation and mutual aid between the Soviet peoples. In contrast to the canons of 
historiography of the uprising during the NEP period, the later historiography of 1916 
emphasizes the class, not ethnic, nature of the conflict. In a 1932 article, Baialy Isakeev, 
a friend of Abdrakhmanov and his fellow official, draws attention to the selective nature 
of the rebels’ attacks. Rather than attacking all Russian settlers, “the rebels…struck the 
wealthy kulak dwellers (“segments of the population” in the original) of Russian 
villages.”36 Russian peasants and Kyrgyz pastoralists, similarly adds Abdrakhmanov, 
“were equally oppressed by tsarism, bourgeoisie, and kulaks without regard for 
nationality” and could be not enemies to each other. 37 
Despite the ethnic neutrality of Russian settlers who were no longer presented as 
enemies, the range of potential enemies considerably widened, encompassing not only 
tsarism, bourgeoisie, and kulaks, but also – beginning with the collectivization campaign 
– bais and manaps, the wealthy exploiters of the Kyrgyz poor.38 In significant ways, the 
new historiography of the uprising cast the pre-revolutionary Kyrgyz elites in an even 
more malevolent light than kulaks and bourgeoisie. Not only did bais and manaps not 
                                                          
34 “Zaiavlenie tov. Iu. Abdrakhmanova v biuro Kirobkoma VKP(b)” in  Bishkek: Shams, 2001, p. 202-203.  
35 Ibid, p. 203. 
36 Isakeev, Kirgizskoe vosstanie 1916 goda, p. 29  
37 Zaiavlenie tov. Iu. Abdrakhmanova v biuro Kirobkoma VKP(b). Bishkek: Shams, 2001, p. 202.  
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share the class interests of the broad masses of the native population, but they also 
participated in the “advantages of colonial domination” and “played treacherous role” in 
the struggle for national liberation.39 In other words, the class enemy was simultaneously 
a national enemy.  
Enemy images had a broad application in the Soviet official culture; they helped 
cultivate images of positive proletarian heroes. In the historiography of the uprising of 
1916, enemy images in the persons of “Chinese, Kashgar, Mongol, and Uzbek khans and 
feudal lords, Russian tsarism and local manaps and bais” who for centuries exploited and 
abused the “long suffering Kirghiz people” were contrasted with the “union of Central 
Asian peasantry and Russian proletariat and peasantry.”40 Of significance in this example 
is the union of Russians and Kyrgyz united in struggle against class and national 
oppressors and exploiters.  
On the other hand, it is clear that in this union, the native population of Central 
Asia and the uprising itself are given an important, but ultimately secondary, subordinate 
role. To cite Galuzo and late Abdrakhmanov, “the country of colonial slaves of Russian 
imperialism entered upon the revolutionary path,”41 but “the heroic struggle of the 
colonially dependent peoples of Central Asia, devoid of the united proletarian leadership, 
had the character of localized protests, and was, as the result, suppressed.”42  
The Soviet historiography of the uprising of the 1930s makes it clear that 
exclusively national struggle was doomed to failure without the class revolution. The 
ability of the native peoples of Central Asia and their republics to “independently handle 
the tasks of socialist construction” is nothing but an “illusion,” according to Mikhail 
Tsvibak.43 For “only in the closest bond with the all-Russian proletariat and its party, can 
the toiling masses of the former colony, organized by us into the national republics, follow 
the path of socialist construction.”44 
The uprising of 1916 succeeded because “it led, in its development, to the 
unification of the revolutionary forces of Russia and Central Asia.”45 Merging “into a 
single stream with the revolution in Russia and under the leadership of the latter,” the 
national movement “developed into the socialist revolution.”46 Furthermore, “the mass 
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protests of the toiling peasants (of the East) weakened the positions of imperialism, 
facilitated the resolution of the revolutionary tasks, and helped the Russian proletariat to 
successfully undertake the revolution.”47 Therefore, “the uprising of 1916 – the most 
grandiose uprising in the history of the peoples of Turkestan and Kazakhstan – was of 
great importance to the revolutionary movement in Russia in general.”48 
On the other hand, the Soviet historiography of the uprising of 1916 of the second 
decade of Soviet power strongly suggests that the Bolsheviks were the true saviours of 
the Kyrgyz for “only the October revolution, the overthrow of the dictatorship of 
bourgeoisie, and the installation of the dictatorship of proletariat saved the lives of the 
toiling Kirghiz.” Only the October revolution “solved those tasks that the uprising of 1916 
had set of itself” and provided the proletarian guidance and leadership: “continuing their 
struggle…in the union with the Russian proletariat and under the guidance of the 
Bolshevik party, the workers and peasants of Central Asia overthrew the yoke of the 
Tsarist autocracy and Russian imperialism, and the local exploiting classes.”49  
The shift in the national historiography of the uprising of 1916 in the 1930s 
naturally entailed the loss of much of communal remembrance of the uprising of 1916. 
Elevated to the status of the central foundational myth of Soviet Kirghizia, the official 
commemoration of the native rebellion, or “the movement of national liberation” to use 
the Soviet definition, was revised more than once in accordance with the state-sanctioned 
dogmas of the friendship of nations. Yet, threads of communal remembrance of the 
uprising remained in unofficial, personal memories of those lived to witness and 
participated in the events.50 By highlighting inconsistencies and ruptures in the personal 
recollections of participants and witnesses of the uprising – collected, ironically, as a part 
of the continuing state-sponsored historiography of the uprising – I would like to both 
suggest that alternative interpretations and worldviews continued to exist alongside the 
official paradigm and to open avenues for the as yet poorly studied field of memory 
studies in Central Asia.  
Although oral histories of the uprising were first collected already during the first 
decade of the Soviet rule, it was not until 1953 that a comprehensive effort was made to 
probe into the communal memories of the participants and witnesses of the uprising. This 
effort was a part of the series of conferences held in the five Central Asian capitals 
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devoted to the study of the “character of national movements” between 1951 and 1954. 
The three-day conference in Frunze in 1953 was attended by approximately 250 leading 
Central Asian historians.51 The general tone was set by a noted historian from the centre, 
Anatoly Piaskovskii of the Institute of History in Moscow, who emphasized the 
progressiveness of Central Asia’s annexation and the mutual struggle of the toiling 
masses against Tsarism.52 This view was supported by Anna Zimma, a professor at the 
Kyrgyz State University, who added that the otherwise progressive revolt “was usurped 
in some places by feudal-clerical elements” and that “representatives of the exploiting 
aristocracy set the more backward elements of the native population against the Russian 
people, striving to kindle hatred between people,” but this could not diminish the growing 
friendship of the Kyrgyz and Russian peoples.53  
The conference proceedings were published later that year, but no mention was 
ever made of the extensive oral history research conducted for the conference. This 
sensitive data consists of 136 interviews conducted with elderly people who were 
survivors of the uprising, the majority of them Kyrgyz, in the six oblasts of Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan. The research project was clearly designed to address several contentious 
questions: the reasons for the uprising, its leadership, the economic situation of the ethnic 
Kyrgyz, the relationships between the Kyrgyz and the Russians, and the possible role in 
the uprising of the celebrated folk poet Toktogul. Of course, the seemingly arbitrary ban 
on the use and publication of these invaluable insights into the memory of the uprising is 
directly related to the controversies surrounding oral history research within the Soviet 
Union.  
Certainly, some of the common threads that appear on a closer examination of the 
transcripts fall in line with the official historiography of the uprising. Among these, class 
rhetoric is probably the broadest denominator used by the interviewees in their 
evaluations of the uprising. Interestingly, while some of the interviewees are identified as 
working as hired labourers prior to the October Revolution, no information is given for 
any other interviewees concerning their class origins. A handful of interviewees had been 
long-term members of the Party and this is reflected in their recollections of the uprising, 
the rhetoric of which is well versed in the official Soviet language of class struggle. 
Jurabek Abdrasulov (b.1899), a party member since 1920, affirms that during the uprising 
“the people have divided into two groups – the rich and the poor.” Denis Zadorozhyi 
                                                          
51 Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill: University 





(b.1900), a party member since 1940, also intimates that “when the mobilization decree 
of the tsar Nicholas II was issued, there was widespread discontent with the politics of 
Tsarism and the local bais.” However, irrespective of their origins or party affiliation 
most interviewees mention the oppression of the Kyrgyz masses by bai-manaps. Others 
point to the unfairness of the conscription process, which aggravated a long-held 
discontent with the colonial administration’s policies and in part triggered the uprising. 
All interviewees discuss the violence of the colonial administration. Yet despite the wide 
use of the proletarian idiom, many interviewees approach the subject of interethnic 
relationships with caution and sometimes outright confusion.  
This confusion is particularly salient in the accounts of the ethnic Russian 
interviewees. Fiodor Tkachenko (b.1890) echoes the conclusions of the Frunze 
conference; for him “the goal of the rioters was to get rid of the Russians as the colonizers, 
but bais and manaps worked together with the Russian officials.” However, his 
uneasiness with the official take on the uprising is obvious in his disagreement over the 
nature of the leadership; he states that “at the time, the poor could not be at the head of 
the uprising, (as) the tension was fuelled by the mullahs.” Reflecting on the economic 
divide between the native population and the settlers Anton Firern (b.1879) reminisces 
that “the Kyrgyz population bore all the hardships, while the Russians did not pay any 
taxes.” Yet despite the apparent unfairness of the arrangement and the fact that the 
Russian settlers who paid no tax were less likely to be poor than the Kyrgyz, he also states 
that “the Kyrgyz and Russian poor lived peacefully.” A fellow settler, Artiom Glushko 
(b.1876) recalls that “there were no poor among us; when we arrived here in 1897 we 
were all given 12 hectares of land… (we) were given this land for free.”  
An even more contradictory account is given by Ostap Glushko (b.1885) who 
implicitly rejects the suggestion that the uprising was directed against the native 
aristocracy. He states that he does “not remember Kyrgyz killing their bais in 1916” and 
that “Russians were killed there (in Semirechye), but the Russian soldiers suppressed it, 
and our (Russian) people have been sleeping in a church for a while.” 
In spite of the ethnic violence he stresses that the Russians and Kyrgyz “lived 
peacefully together and were not feuding with each other.” Similarly, Ivan Novikov 
contends that he did not “remember the national hostility, but the poor Kyrgyz did not 
like the poor Russians and even threatened them.” On the other hand, there is little 
confusion in the account of Dorofei Pechenenko (b.1884) who states bluntly that “the 
Kyrgyz massacred indiscriminately all Russians and burned down Russian villages: 
Chervakh, Beshnadal, Karakol, Blagodatnyi.” 
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Similar discomfort at trying to reconcile the Soviet vision of the progressive role 
of the Russian Empire in Central Asia emerges in the memories of the Kyrgyz 
respondents. A group of elderly collective farm workers in the Frunze oblast recalls that 
“until 1916 the Tsarist government was not unfair to the Kyrgyz.” Still, that the 
administration was anything but just towards the Kyrgyz becomes clear in the course of 
their interview, as they remark that “along the Aksu river, on its banks, in the west, on 
both sides of the Aksu mountains, at the foot of the mountains, where our cattle were 
grazing, the Russian kulaks built their castles. And other Russian kulaks also took away 
our lands, which they turned into the reserve fund, and if our animals grazed there, they 
took ransom for sheep and cows. During the 1914 war of Russians with Germans, only 
the poor (Kyrgyz) bore all the hardships.” 
The antagonism inherent within Soviet historiography between the rich and the 
poor is equally problematized in many of the interviews. Momut Kabirov (b.1897) alleges 
that “bais, too, participated in the uprising, but the majority (of the rebels) were poor…the 
Kyrgyz and the Russians were feuding with each other.” Junush Borsukbaev (no date of 
birth provided) confirms that “the head of the rebellious Tynymseit tribe was Baizak, who 
was one of the biggest feudal lords of Tynymseit” and who “was regarded as a “national 
hero” by both the feudal lords and the poor.” 
Given the way in which the conflicting versions of the past play out in the personal 
recollections of the interviewees, it is not surprising that it is in the stories of interethnic 
violence (or rather their suggestive absence) that the tension between the official history 
and communal memory becomes most apparent. Whilst in the majority of the interviews 
little is said of the violence, which is hinted at but rarely stated, those accounts that do tell 
of violence are particularly unforgiving of the Soviet interpretation of the uprising. 
Sharshebai Galiev (b.1894) recalls that “when night fell and Russian soldiers came, they 
robbed us, took whatever they liked,” and “violated Kyrgyz girls and young women.” 
Gendered violence also figures prominently in the account of A. Dobridneva (b.1903) 
who states that “on the day of uprising, the Kyrgyz killed all Russians they caught in 
field” and “took young Russian women away with them. Sazanovka was burned 
completely.” The story of another group of the elderly Kyrgyz from a collective farm in 
Frunze oblast highlights the powerlessness and dehumanization of the native population 
in the hands of the colonial authorities and the Russian settlers: “the Russian kulaks of 
Sarypul, Kara-Balta, Poltavka, Petrovka, Belovodsk, and especially Sosnovka 






As this chapter demonstrated, the task of the Soviet historiography of national movements 
was to legitimize the October revolution, which it had clothed in “national garb” and 
positioned as at once both the continuation and the resolution of national struggle. The 
logical chain of “national struggle leading to class struggle leading to the national uprising 
leading to the proletarian revolution” implied a hierarchy of historical events, in which 
the October revolution occupied the central role. The growing concerns of the Bolshevik 
leadership with the hostile encirclement of the Soviet Union in the second half of 1920s 
and early 1930s led to a major ideological shift in national historiographies. Some of the 
more contentious moments of the uprising 1916, such as ethnic violence and the role of 
native elites in the rebellion, became subject to selective forgetting. At the same time, the 
continued existence of the communal memories of the uprising and the attendant ethnic 
and highly gendered violence suggests that the official historiography of the uprising was 

























The central question that this thesis sought to answer, put most simply, is: how and why 
was the south-eastern corner of Central Asia, the area known in Kyrgyz and Kazakh as 
Jetysu and Russian as Semirechye, that is, “the region of seven rivers,” first conquered 
by the Russian empire and later reincorporated into the reconstituted Bolshevik Russia? 
By examining the relationship between the center and the periphery, this thesis sought to 
contribute to the current debates on colonialism and state formation. Organized around 
the cross-cutting themes of empire, state, nation, violence, and modernization, this thesis 
stressed the key proposition – that sovereign power, whether empire or nation, is 
predicated on the control of territory and population. In identifying control of territory 
and population as the foundation of state sovereignty, this thesis argued that Russia, 
Tsarist and Soviet alike, was a state actor whose actions were grounded in the pursuit of 
security. Similarly, this thesis built on the argument made by Peter Sahlins that state 
sovereignty is at once upheld and tested at the borders.54 Taking Semirechye as a case 
study this thesis highlighted the dynamic of state-building in the borderlands and revealed 
the critical continuities between the Tsarist and Soviet practices and ideas in governing 
the region.  
Divided into three parts, each part addressing a different period in the modern 
history of Semirechye, this thesis examined the consolidation of Russia’s control over the 
region. The first part of this thesis investigated the emergence of Semirechye as the 
empire’s new frontier. It argued, in particular, that for the Tsarist policy makers, 
Semirechye’s importance derived from its frontier position and that its conquest should 
ultimately be seen as a part of the broader campaign of the imperial state to secure the 
empire’s borderlands from penetration by competing powers. The transition from 
conquest to governance saw the simultaneous integration of Semirechye into the empire’s 
political and military space and its exclusion from the empire’s civil order. I contended 
that the resulting ethnic segregation and inequality in status between the native population 
and European settlers was closely linked to the emergence of ethnicity as the normative 
basis of statehood. The privileging of the ethnically Slavic Russian-speaking population 
as the “core” nationality of the empire and the perceived need to further secure the 
ethnically different – and potentially hostile – periphery prompted the central authorities 
to resettle the region with the peasants of the “ruling nationality.”  
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Inevitably, the agricultural colonization of the region led to conflicts between 
settlers and the native pastoralists whose land was seized for resettlement. World War I 
had put further strain on the native population of the region. The attempt of the metropole 
to draw on the human resources of the colony by mobilizing the native male population 
into labour battalions proved nearly fatal for the colonial rule in Semirechye, where the 
nomadic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs launched a series of surprise attacks on European 
settlements. The second part of the thesis thus focused on the uprising of 1916 and its 
aftermath. Questioning the established view that the rebels sought to settle scores with 
colonists for the injustices of colonial rule, this thesis discussed both the broader social 
and material conditions of the uprising and the local and contingent factors that 
precipitated the conflict. Substantively, this thesis traced the continuous dynamic 
interaction between the rebels and the settlers as well as the punitive expeditions mounted 
by the colonial administration and has shown that each side to the conflict came to 
perceive the other as an existential threat in the course of violent clashes. Mutual fear then 
prompted the rebels and the settlers alike to seek destruction and dispossession of the rival 
group.   
Like the settlers, the colonial authorities, too, were motivated by what they saw 
as a threat to the “Russian enterprise,” to quote the military governor of Semirechye, 
Mikhail Fol’baum. The plans of the government to resettle the remaining nomads in the 
geographically isolated and resource poor uezd of Naryn reflected these fears. The native 
rebellion in the distant colony engendered the long-standing concerns among the Russian 
statesmen and colonial administrators about the ability of the metropole to maintain 
power in the borderlands. The solution, developed by the Governor General of Turkestan, 
Alexander Kuropatkin, envisioned the creation of ethnically distinct territorial units and 
complete segregation of the settler and native population. Intended in part as a 
punishment, these measures were also employed by the authorities as a part of the colonial 
state-making. The reallocation of prime land to militarized Cossack settlements and the 
removal and concentration of the suspect nomadic population in the area amenable to 
containment and control were the means with which the government sought to maintain 
and enforce state security.  
The third chapter of the thesis examined the aftermath of the uprising, which bled 
into the civil war in the wake of the two revolutions in the metropole. It found that the 
experiences of the local communities on both sides of the ethnic divide determined the 
distinctive contours of the conflict in the colony and that the patterns of ethnic antagonism 
established during the uprising continued and increased as competition for resources 
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intensified. Similarly, this chapter concluded that despite the disintegration of the central 
state, power remained in the hands of the colonial administration and the settlers, who 
sought to preserve the status quo and bolster the presence of the colonial state by 
mobilizing the human and natural resources of the colony. The mobilization of the settlers 
armed by the colonial administration during the uprising proved instrumental to the re-
conquest of Semirechye by the Bolsheviks, who were able to exploit the land hunger in 
the settler society and direct the majority of the settlers against a small group of primarily 
Cossack landowners and the native population.  
At the same time, the mobilization of the native population in the face of the 
growing pressure from the settler society led to the consolidation of collective identity. 
The primary distinction between the native pastoralists and European farmers crystallized 
into a stronger identification of the former with a distinct territorial, social, and ethnic 
entity. It is this corporate sense of solidarity – explicit in the demands made by both the 
civil-war and Soviet native elites for territorial autonomy and greater political 
representation – that was critical to the emergence of the ethnic Kirghiz autonomy 
examined in the third and final part of the thesis. Focusing on the state-building efforts of 
the Soviet regime in Semirechye the concluding chapters of the thesis analyzed the 
policies targeted at incorporating the region more firmly into the Soviet state, increasing 
agricultural output, and creating loyal citizens.  
The fourth chapter of the thesis looked at the campaigns of land and water reforms 
and national delimitation to argue that the redistribution of land and political development 
along ethno-territorial lines helped the regime attract considerable support among the 
native population and consolidate the political boundaries of the state. While the fourth 
chapter examined some of the productive aspects of the Soviet state-building project, the 
fifth chapter explored its more repressive policies, including the campaign of 
regionalization, which concentrated the prime agricultural land in the hands of the grain-
growing European minority, and the collectivization campaign, which led to the 
destruction of the native pastoralist economy. Both of these, this chapter argued, were 
implemented to secure and increase the production of grain and reorient the native 
population to grain cultivation for the purposes of national defence.  
Finally, the sixth chapter examined the Soviet historiography of the uprising of 
1916 in the first half of the 1920s and the shifts in its representation throughout the 1930s 
to explore the larger issues of the relationship between politics, the uses of history, and 
the construction of identity. This thesis argued that the Soviet historiography of the 
uprising of 1916 was an integrative mechanism that combined class loyalties to the self-
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proclaimed workers’ and peasants’ state with the loyalties to an ethnic group and a 
political territory. 
Beyond the discussion of the vagaries of state-building in Central Asia, this thesis 
sought to contribute to the broader debate about the nature of state power in the colonial 
context. Following Marco Buttino’s proposal to treat famine as a political tool, this thesis 
revealed a nexus of state building with control of resources.55 In the colonial context, this 
nexus assumed a particularly malicious nature as the central government stripped the 
native population of resources necessary for the extension of state authority over the 
colony and the conduct of war. In Semirechye, the state authorities first of Imperial and 
later Soviet Russia sought to accumulate resources by dispossessing, expropriating, and 
displacing the native nomads. The seizure of agricultural land from the indigenous 
nomads by officials of the colonial Resettlement Administration made possible the large-
scale colonization of the region and paved the way for conversion of the former 
pasturelands into grain-producing areas. Similarly, the collectivization and forced 
settlement of nomads allowed the authorities to extract resources from the native 
population, convert the remaining arable land into grain production, and forcibly transfer 
the native labour freed in the process from stock breeding to grain cultivation. At the same 
time, the land reforms of 1921-1922, widely heralded as the comprehensive 
decolonization of the land and water relations in Semirechye, had in fact preserved the 
existing asymmetry in land ownership.  
This thesis has also sought to provide a corrective to the theories of Soviet 
nationalities policies developed by scholars such as Terry Martin, Francine Hirsch, Adeeb 
Khalid and others.56 While agreeing with the general proposition that Soviet nation-
building was employed by the Bolshevik regime to recruit and mobilize the native 
population for the purposes of the building of socialism, I attributed the “affirmative 
action” principles of Soviet nationalities policy to the instrumental imperatives of the 
young Soviet state rather than the ideological maxims of Marxism-Leninism. In so doing, 
I drew on the recent studies of transnational history of frontiers by Alfred Rieber, Michael 
Reynolds, Dominic Lieven and many others, to argue that the Bolshevik leadership 
sought to foster national identities within the framework – and the political boundaries – 
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of the Soviet state as a means of constructing a protective “rim” of Soviet nations around 
the country’s industrial, political, and ethnic “core” of European Russia.57  
This suggestion carries in turn broad implications for further discussion of Soviet 
nation-building in the region. By arguing that the primary motivation of the state-led 
national construction was the survival of the Soviet state I likewise contended that the 
Bolshevik nationalities policy ought to be regarded as a strategy of extending control over 
the territory and the population of Semirechye. Consolidation of state power, rather than 
ethnic or class equality, ostensibly espoused by the Bolshevik leadership, guided the 
implementation of the policies of nativization (korenizatsiia), and border delimitation.  
In referring to the Soviet nationalities policy as a tool of asserting control, I, once 
again, departed from a commonly held view, first proposed by Adeeb Khalid, that the 
developmentalist and ethnically inclusive ethos of the Soviet project was radically 
different from the colonial organization of power, which enforced the political, cultural, 
and material cleavages, or “distance” as Adeeb Khalid puts, it, separating the rulers and 
the ruled.58 Instead, this thesis argued that the Soviet policy of ethno-territorial 
resettlement, known as regionalization, was compatible with the logic and principles of 
the colonial resettlement under the Tsarist administration. The resulting ethno-territorial 
division of the republic reproduced, in every practical sense, the colonial policies of racial 
segregation; it justified and institutionalized the existing socio-spatial inequalities and 
concentrated the economic, political, and cultural capital in the hands of the settler 
population to the exclusion and marginalization of the native population. In effect, the 
creation of self-administered minority ethno-territorial units served to insulate and protect 
the privileges of the European minority, while simultaneously putting a check on the 
political and economic demands and ambitions of the native majority.  
At the same time, this thesis found common ground with historians of the Soviet 
nationalities policies, including Adeeb Khalid and Terry Martin, in arguing that the 
Bolshevik project of comprehensive transformation brought the welfare of the non-
Russian peoples of the former Tsarist empire to the forefront. In this respect, the Soviet 
approach to governing and managing the ethnically diverse populations of the 
borderlands was radically different from that of the Tsarist Russia. Seeking to expand the 
social support basis in the ethnically “alien” regions and consolidate the Soviet state in 
the national peripheries, the Soviet leaders promoted the more inclusive notions of state 
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loyalty, fostered civic identification with the union state, and encouraged economic 
growth in the border regions. Furthermore, in contrast to the colonial administration, the 
Soviet leadership did not strive to simply replace the native peoples of the borderlands – 
whose loyalties were suspect – with the presumably loyal Russian population, but sought 
instead to cultivate these loyalties among the native peoples. By the same token, the 
recruitment and socialization of the indigenous elites within the framework of the 
korenizatsiia campaign eliminated the need for local notables, who acted as 
intermediaries between the state and the native peoples, and allowed the fledgling regime 
to legitimize its state-building project in the borderlands. In significant ways, as this thesis 
aimed to show, the Bolshevik programme of socio-economic development and 
modernization of the region owed as much to the emancipatory ethos of the Soviet project 
of transformation as to the more pragmatic agenda of providing external security of the 
state through the maintenance of domestic stability.  
Building on the suggestion that the Bolshevik leadership sought the creation of an 
assertive state, capable of mobilizing the population and resources necessary to impose 
and maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Soviet state, this thesis also 
argued that the state carefully measured and sponsored the participation of the native 
peoples in the state-building project to the extent that it permitted the cultivation of 
productive population and allowed the central state to extract labour and natural resources 
of the national republics without encountering heightened resistance. This was 
accomplished through the cultivation of new collective political identities with the 
purpose of inculcating loyalty to the state. To canvass the production of these identities I 
examined the Soviet historiography of the uprising of 1916. I argued that the uprising of 
1916 was critical to the formulation of the distinctly ethnic Kyrgyz identity and served, 
at the same time, to bolster the legitimacy of the Soviet government in the region. Thus, 
the historiography of the uprising performed three valuable functions: first, by grounding 
ethnic identities in the imagined, to use Benedict Anderson’s term, experience of 
participation in the October revolution through the actual participation in the uprising of 
1916, Soviet historians embedded the particularistic ethnic Kyrgyz identity within the 
universalist collective Soviet identity; second, commemoration of the uprising of 1916 as 
a part of the wider revolutionary movement that culminated in the October revolution of 
1917 had rendered the Soviet re-conquest of Semirechye in more legitimate 
accommodationist terms; and finally, like political and geographic borders, territorially 
circumscribed ethnic loyalties ensured the survival of the young Soviet state in potentially 
hostile surroundings.  
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By focusing on the production of political loyalties this thesis also revealed the 
importance of population to state-building. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet leadership 
viewed creation of a productive and loyal population as critical to securing and “building” 
the state in the country’s borderlands. It is with this purpose that the colonial government 
funnelled millions of Russian peasants to the colony. Similarly, despite their anti-colonial 
rhetoric, the Bolshevik policy makers engaged in the deliberate population transfers; in 
the course of the Soviet reconstruction of the region, Soviet Kirghizia attracted more 
military, refugees, colonists, and civil specialists than before the revolution. The growing 
European population of the region physically connected the Central Asian borderland 
with Moscow and served as a conduit of the centre’s ideas and policies.  
To conclude, the purpose of this thesis has been, to quote Theodore Weeks, to 
examine “what the incorporation of the non-Russian periphery shows us about the nature 
of the Soviet state.”59 As a study of the relationship between imperial power and the 
nomadic herders of Semirechye, this thesis contributed to the burgeoning scholarship in 
the wake of “imperial turn,” that is, the study of social and political histories of non-
Russian peoples and the complex interactions between the centre and the periphery.”60 In 
analysing the “configurations of territory, populations, and power” in the colonial context, 
this thesis illuminated the centrality of borderlands to the formulations of sovereignty.61 
Similarly, this thesis has also revealed the intersection of imperial and spatial histories of 
the Central Asian borderlands. At the same time, by examining the continuities between 
the colonial and Soviet mechanisms of controlling population and spaces, this thesis has 
demonstrated that empire and nation-state are neither mutually exclusive nor radically 
different. Indeed, both are essentially forms of statehood that shared structures and 
practices of managing cultural and ethnic diversity. The Soviet Union was simultaneously 
an empire in that it was a highly centralized state exercising power over ethnically diverse 
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